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Roles for Values in Scientific Activities

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Abstract

My aim in this paper is to rebut objections that have been made of the account of the various roles for values in scientific activities that I have developed, initially in my book Is Science Value Free?, in response to criticizing the proposal that science is value free. Specifically I respond to objections that my account does not recognize the significance of basic science, and that my defense of the ideal of impartiality cannot be sustained.

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Notes

  1. When "value(s)" is unqualified it substitutes for "ethical, social and other non-cognitive value(s)."

  2. For more detailed and nuanced statements of I and N, see Lacey (2005a), pp. 23–28; and for discussion of A, Lacey (2016) and Lacey and Mariconda (2012).

  3. "Theory" is used in a broad sense to include, in addition to (those) theories with the logico-mathematical structures much discussed by philosophers of science, also systematically organized bodies of empirically based claims.

  4. The statement can readily be extended to apply to all claims of scientific knowledge (Lacey 2015a) and reformulated to accommodate competing analyses of the criteria (Lacey 1999).

  5. Sometimes neutrality is taken to be the view—"cognitive neutrality" [CN] (Lacey and Mariconda 2012)—that claims, held in accordance with I, have no value judgments among their entailments. CN represents a logical thesis, not an epistemological or ethical ideal. Accepting CN does not imply upholding N.

  6. The notion of “strategy” was introduced in Lacey (1999).

  7. E.g., systematic effects of social change; interactions and processes of the components of sustainable agroecosystems (Lacey 2015c); consequences (harmful effects and risks) of introducing applications into social practices that are occasioned by socioeconomic mechanisms; and conditions for effective measures to protect public health in impoverished areas. Moreover, explaining human action, including engaging in scientific research using DSs, requires the use of intentional categories.

  8. For various mechanisms, and associated values, see Lacey (2005b, 2015a, 2016).

  9. Hypotheses investigated under DSs have no value judgments among their entailments; adopting DSs ensures that CN (see Note 5) is satisfied. Insofar as SVF identifies neutrality with CN, it implicitly takes for granted that scientific research must proceed under DSs. But CN does not imply N.

  10. "DS [CS]-research" stands for "research conducted under DSs[CSs]," "DS[CS]-knowledge" for "knowledge obtained in research conducted under DSs[CSs]," "DS-theories" for "theories deployed under DSs," etc.

  11. For clarification of "scientific risk investigations," and discussion of their strengths and limitations in the case of GMOs, see Lacey (2017b).

  12. Here I draw extensively on Douglas (2009)—although she does not use the term "endorse," and rejects the way in which I distinguish between endorsement and holding in accordance with I.

  13. For a brief discussion of what constitutes well made endorsements and the strategies (DSs and CSs) that need to be adopted so that they are properly informed by the results of scientific investigations, see Lacey (2015a).

  14. Fruitfulness and comprehensiveness may be interpreted in the light of social values—certainly comprehensiveness is often interpreted in the light of commitment to using DSs. This may introduce ambiguities in the notion of basic research.

  15. Upholding materialist metaphysics has often motivated attempts to seek explanations in DS-theories of phenomena (e.g., human action) that normally are explained using intentional, value and other categories that have no place under DSs. RVS allows a legitimate place for such research in the context of multi-strategic research. Without CS-research also being conducted on these phenomena, it would not be possible to test whether or not DS-theories can match or exceed the relevant CS-theories (of these phenomena) in empirical adequacy, explanatory power, and capacity to anticipate future possibilities.

  16. I have been said to uphold this ideal, e.g., by Douglas (2009, p 16) and Elliott (2017, p. 17).

  17. SVF represents my attempt to explicate an outlook that has been influential throughout the modern scientific tradition, whereas, according to Douglas (2009), svf is intended to represent an ideal that has been defended in discussions that originated with Rudner’s well known article, "The scientist, qua scientist, makes value judgments" (Rudner 1953).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA, USA

    Hugh Lacey

  2. University of São Paulo, São Paulo, Brazil

    Hugh Lacey

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  1. Hugh Lacey
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Correspondence to Hugh Lacey.

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Lacey, H. Roles for Values in Scientific Activities. Axiomathes 28, 603–618 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-018-9386-2

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