Abstract
This essay deals with the question of the descriptive vs the normative within the philosophy of religion. Philosophy as an enterprise based on argument involves the implicit appeal to the reader's or interlocutor's ability to recognise certain ideas as meaningful or meaningless. In philosophy of religion, we also need an implicit agreement on what could intelligibly qualify as an expression of (genuine) religious faith. But in many cases, this cannot be assumed. It is argued that, if we really want to describe possible uses of religious expressions, we cannot do so independently of what we see as religious possibilities for ourselves. And to find out about this is not only a matter of description but also of making decisions for our own part, finding out what we can go along with. The first part of the essay amplifies on these general remarks. Then Peter Winch's discussion of the Resurrection is considered as a case in point. The essay ends with general conclusions about the role of ‘the philosophical “we”’ in conceptual inquiries.
© Philosophia Press 2008
