Abstract
Evan Fales has recently argued that, although I provide the most promising approach for those concerned to defend belief in divine intervention, I nevertheless fail to show that such belief can be rational. I argue that Fales’ objections are unsuccessful.
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Notes
Fales (2010, p. 15, 36).
Larmer (1986)
Stoeger (1995, p. 244). This concern has led scientist-theologians such as Nancey Murphy, Arthur Peacocke, and John Polkinghorne to suggest that divine interventions into the natural order should be understood as imparting information, rather than energy, into the universe. This is to ignore, however, that the creation or transfer of information always has energetic implications. See, for example, Larmer (2009).
Fales, Divine Intervention, p. 17. Fales takes for granted that Hume, in Part I of the Essay, provides a clear and strong argument against the rationality of belief in miracles. It is far from evident that this is the case. Commentators substantially disagree on how the argument is to be interpreted and its strength. Earman (2000), in his Hume’s Abject Failure takes Hume to task both on the basis of his lack of understanding of probability theory and the ambiguity of the text. On the basis of a close reading, Earman argues that
commentators who wish to credit Hume with some deep insight must point to some thesis which is both philosophically interesting and which Hume has made plausible. I don’t think that they will succeed. Hume has generated the illusion of deep insight by sliding back and forth between various theses, no one of which avoid both the Scylla of banality and the Charybdis of implausibility or outright falsehood. p. 48
In the context of this paper, nothing hangs on how one interprets Hume. Fales’ arguments, inasmuch as they appeal to balancing probabilities, have a Humean flavour, but what is important is to evaluate them on the basis of their own merits.
Ibid., pp. 15–16.
An essential claim of theism is that God causes the universe to exist. If the universe is conceived to be composed of forms of mass/energy that can neither be created nor destroyed, then this claim is false.
As Alvin Plantinga notes, conservation principles
apply to isolated or closed systems...there is nothing in them to prevent God from changing the velocity or direction of a particle. If he did so, obviously, energy would not be conserved in the system in question; but equally obviously, that system would not be closed, in which case the principle of the conservation of energy would not apply to it. Indeed, there is nothing here to prevent God from miraculously parting the Red Sea, or changing water into wine, or bringing someone back to life, or, for that matter, creating ex nihilo a full-grown horse in the middle of Times Square. It is entirely possible for God to create a full-grown horse in the middle of Times Square without violating the principle of the conservation of energy. That is because the systems including the horse would not be closed or isolated. For that very reason, there would be no violation of the principle of conservation of energy, which says only that energy is conserved in closed or causally isolated systems-ones not subject to any outside influence. It says nothing at all about conservation of energy in systems that are not closed; and, of course, if God created a horse ex nihilo in Times Square, no system containing that horse, including the whole of the material universe, would be closed. (2011, pp. 78–79).
Craig and Sinclair (2009).
An anonymous referee suggests that to interpret Big Bang cosmology as implying an absolute beginning to the mass/energy that composes the universe is to commit to an untenable absolutist conception of time, and probably space. This appears mistaken. Leading writers on the topic such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig, explicitly argue that time and space began as a result of the big Bang, yet hold to an absolute beginning of the mass/energy making up the universe. Smith writes that “the empirically established cosmological theories that predict a beginning of the universe do so by predicting a beginning of time”. (1995, p. 118), and Craig notes that
the standard big bang model, as the Friedman-Lemaître model came to be called, thus describes a universe that is not eternal in the past, but which came into being a finite time ago. Moreover—and this deserves underscoring—the origin it posits is an absolute origin ex nihilo. For not only all matter and energy, but space and time themselves, come into being at the initial cosmological singularity. (2004, p. 223)
Also see Spitzer’s very detailed discussion in his New Proofs for the Existence of God. (2010, pp. 13–74) and Gordon’s “Postscript to Part One: Inflationary Cosmology and the String Multiverse” (2010, pp. 75–103) in Spitzer’s New Proofs for the Existence of God.
Ducasse, writing in 1951, fails to distinguish between the two forms of the Principle...He sees clearly, however, the implications of the claim that energy can neither be created nor destroyed, when he notes that “conservation of energy is something one has to have, if (as the materialistic ontology of...naturalism demands) one is to be able to conceive the physical world as wholly self-contained, independent, isolated.” (1951, p. 241).
Fales, Divine Intervention, p. 16.
Ibid.
If there exists no complete explanation in terms of natural causes it will be impossible, to use Fales’ phrase, to ‘balance the books’ on energy conservation.
Colwell (1982, p. 331).
Fales, Divine Intervention, p. 16.
Ibid., p. 17.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Lest it be objected that this is to make the Principle vacuous, finding no application in the physical universe, it should be noted scientists routinely make reference to ideal gas laws, even though they are cognizant of the fact that no gases actually behave in such a manner. Just as an ideal gas law conveys genuine information, inasmuch as it tells us that to the degree that an actual gas resemble an ideal gas the actual gas will behave in a certain way, the scientific form of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy conveys genuine information, inasmuch as it tells us that to the degree that a physical system is causally isolated its energy will be conserved. As Ellis notes that
ideal laws often remain the fundamental ones, even when much more realistic laws are known. The perfect gas laws...are still the fundamental laws of the theory of gases, even though real gases are not perfect. (2002, p. 94)
Fales, Divine Intervention, p. 17.
Keener (2011, p. 238). Keener goes on to note that,
of course many of these claims would not withstand critical scrutiny, and presumably an even higher percentage would fail to persuade others predisposed not to believe. But those who would simply reject all healing claims today...should keep in mind that they are dismissing, almost without argument, the claimed experiences of at least a few hundred million people. (p. 239) In his two volume work, Keener presents case after case of dramatic instances of healing that are well attested by reliable witnesses and have no even remotely plausible natural explanation. Such cases are not confined to any one geographical area of the world or any particular social class. In many instances there exists not only testimonial evidence, but physical traces, e.g. before and after medical records. Those doubting the massive amount of evidence that exists for such cases would do well to consult Keener’s Miracles (2011), especially pp. 309–765.
Fales, Divine Intervention, pp. 35–36.
Cover (1999, p. 362).
Young (1972, p. 33). This line of argument has a long pedigree, going back at least as far as Mill, who writes
in order that any alleged fact should be contradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the cause existed without being followed by the effect, for that would be no uncommon occurrence; but that this happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now in the case of an alleged miracle, the assertion is the exact opposite of this. It is, that the effect was defeated, not in the absence, but in consequence of a counteracting cause, namely, a direct interposition of an act of the will of some bing who has power over nature;...A miracle...is no contradiction to the law of cause and effect; it is a new effect, supposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause (A System of Logic, Bk. 3, Chap. 25, Sect. 2).
Alston (1971, pp. 17–24).
Lewis (1947, p. 71).
Ibid., p. 72.
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Larmer, R. Divine intervention and the conservation of energy: a reply to Evan Fales. Int J Philos Relig 75, 27–38 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-013-9411-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-013-9411-8