Abstract
In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the β-core is equal to the α-core, and both are non-empty if every individual profit function is continuous and concave (Zhao, Games Econ Behav 27:153–168, 1999b). Following Chander and Tulkens (Int J Game Theory 26:379–401, 1997), we assume that firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. We deal with the problem of the non-emptiness of the induced core, the γ-core, by two different approaches. The first establishes that the associated Cournot oligopoly Transferable Utility (TU)-games are balanced if the inverse demand function is differentiable and every individual profit function is continuous and concave on the set of strategy profiles, which is a step forward beyond Zhao’s core existence result for this class of games. The second approach, restricted to the class of Cournot oligopoly TU-games with linear cost functions, provides a single-valued allocation rule in the γ-core called Nash Pro rata (NP)-value. This result generalizes Funaki and Yamato’s (Int J Game Theory 28:157–171, 1999) core existence result from no capacity constraint to asymmetric capacity constraints. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic characterization of this solution by means of four properties: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity, and non-cooperative fairness.
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Lardon, A. The γ-core in Cournot oligopoly TU-games with capacity constraints. Theory Decis 72, 387–411 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9256-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-011-9256-5