References
S. Blackburn (1984) Spreading the Word Oxford University Press Oxford
S. Blackburn (1985) ‘Errors and the Phenomenology of Value,’ Honderich (Eds) Morality and Objectivity Routledge and Kegan Paul London 1–22
S. Blackburn (1993) ArticleTitle‘Circles, Finks, Smells, and Biconditionals’ Philosophical Perspectives 7 259–279
S. Blackburn (2000) ‘Relativism,’ Lafollette (Eds) Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory Blackwell Oxford 38–52
B. Brower (1993) ArticleTitle‘Dispositional Ethical Realism’ Ethics 103 221–249 Occurrence Handle10.1086/293494
Casson, R. (1997). ‘Color Shift: Evolution of English Color Terms from Brightness to Hue’, in . Hardin and . Maffi (eds.), Color Categories in Thought and Language, Cambridge University Press, pp. 224–239
T. Cuneo (2001) ArticleTitle‘Are Moral Qualities Response-Dependent?’ Nous 35 569–591 Occurrence Handle10.1111/0029-4624.00352
Darwall S., Gibbard A., Railton P. (1997). ‘Toward Fin de siècle Ethics: Some Trends’, in their Moral Discourse and Practice. Oxford University Press, pp. 3–47
J. Fodor (1998) Concepts Clarendon Press Oxford
A. Gibbard (1990) Wise Choices, Apt Feelings Harvard University Press Cambridge
S. Holland (2001) ArticleTitle‘Dispositional Theories of Value Meet Moral Twin Earth’ American Philosophical Quarterly 38 177–795
J. Haukioja (2001) ArticleTitle‘The Modal Status of Basic Equations’ Philosophical Studies 104 115–122 Occurrence Handle10.1023/A:1010311311103
T. Horgan M. Timmons (1991) ArticleTitle‘New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth’ Journal of Philosophical Research 16 447–465
T. Horgan M. Timmons (1996) ArticleTitle‘From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step’ Critica 28 3–37
Johnston M. (1989). ‘Dispositional Theories of Value’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. Supplemental Volume 63, 139–174
Johnston, M. (1991). ‘Explanation, Response-Dependence and Judgment-Dependence’, in . Menzies (ed.), Response-Dependent Concepts, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, pp. 123–183
Johnston, M. (1993). ‘Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism without Verificationism’, in . Haldane and . Wright (eds.), Reality, Representation and Projection, Oxford University Press, pp. 85–130
M. Johnston (1998) ArticleTitle‘Are Manifest Qualities Response-Dependent?’ Monist 81 3–43
S. Kripke (1972) Naming and Necessity Harvard University Press Cambridge, MA
J. Mackie (1977) Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Penguin New York
J. McDowell (1981) ‘Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following’ Holtzman Leich (Eds) Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule Routledge & Kegan Paul London 141–161
J. McDowell (1985) ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’ Honderich (Eds) Morality and Objectivity Routledge & Kegan Paul London 110–129
D. Merli (2002) ArticleTitle‘Return to Moral Twin Earth’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy. 32 207–240
N. Miscevic (1998) ArticleTitle‘The Aposteriority of Response-Dependence’ Monist 81 69–84
Pettit, P. (1991). ‘Realism and Response-Dependence’, in . Menzies (ed.), Response-Dependent Concepts, Canberra: Research School of Social Sciences, pp. 4–45. Reprinted in Mind 100, 587–626
P. Pettit (1998) ArticleTitle‘Terms, Things, and Response-Dependence’ European Review of Philosophy 3 55–66
M. Powell (1998) ArticleTitle‘Realism or Response Dependence?’ European Review of Philsophy 3 1–13
Putnam H. (1975). ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in His Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge University Press
P. Railton (1998) ArticleTitle‘Red, Bitter, Good’ European Review of Philosophy 3 73–90
R.M. Sainsbury (1998) ArticleTitle‘Projections and Relations’ Monist 81 133–160
Sayre-McCord G. (1997). ‘Good” on Twin Earth’. Philosophical Issues 8 (‘Truth’, ed. Villanueva). 267–292
Smith M. (1979). ‘Dispositional Theories of Value’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemental Vol. 63, 89–111
M. Smith (1998) ArticleTitle‘Response-Dependence without Reduction’ European Review of Philosophy 3 85–108
P. Vallentyne (1996) ArticleTitle‘Response-Dependence, Rigidification and Objectivity’ Erkenntnis 44 101–112 Occurrence Handle10.1007/BF00172855
R. Wedgwood (1998) ArticleTitle‘The Essence of Response-Dependence’ European Review of Philosophy 3 31–54
Wiggins D. (1987). Needs, Values, Truth, Oxford University Press
Wright, C. (1988). ‘Moral Values, Projection, and Secondary Qualities’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplemental vol. 62, 1–26
Wright, C. (1992). Truth and Objectivity, Harvard University Press
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lebar, M. Three Dogmas of Response-Dependence. Philos Stud 123, 175–211 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-0781-8
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-0781-8