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Three Dogmas of Response-Dependence

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Correspondence to Mark Lebar.

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Lebar, M. Three Dogmas of Response-Dependence. Philos Stud 123, 175–211 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-0781-8

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