Abstract
This article analyzes how the development of the European Union (EU) fundamental rights policy feeds Euroscepticism—and notably political Euroscepticism—within segments of national political elites in EU Member States. More specifically, it argues that this relatively new policy also gives rise to a new form of political Euroscepticism, which has been defined as “value-based Euroscepticism,” e.g., the perception that the EU via its fundamental rights policy, unduly interferes in matters where value systems and core domestic preferences on ethical issues are at stake. This happens in a context where the EU is resented, by some segments of political elites, for allegedly empowering diverse groups (such as ethnic minorities, immigrants' associations, judges, and so on) at the expense of popular sovereignty. This resentment is exacerbated by the fact that national governments are increasingly submitted to the critical assessment of EU-level actors (e.g., the European Parliament or the European Commission) in terms of democratic credentials.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Hereafter referred to as EUFRP for practical purposes.
The EU is the largest donor in the fight against the death penalty; it offers financial assistance to abolitionist NGOs worldwide. Moreover, it has supported Resolutions of the UN General Assembly calling for a moratorium on the death penalty, while issuing dozens of statements condemning individual executions. The European Parliament (EP) plays a crucial role on this issue, by issuing a number of resolutions calling for a universal abolition of the death penalty, which it defines as “one of the main objectives of the EU human rights policy” (European Parliament 2010).
For instance, the 2006 Cooperation and Assistance Agreement signed between the two organizations provides for the exchange of information. Moreover, the EU offers worldwide financial support to NGOs fighting for the ratification of the Rome Statute.
In that case, the accused government can be deprived of its voting right in EU bodies.
I borrow this expression from Taggart and Szczerbiak (2003).
Quoted in Kopecky and Ucen (2003, 175).
This notion is defined below, as well as that of “value-based Euroscepticism.”
I borrow the notion of “value-based” Euroscepticism from Madeley and Sitter (2005).
To draw upon the seminal definition of “value” given by Clyde Kluckhohn; according to this definition, a value is “a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual, or characteristic of a group of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of action” (Kluckhohn 1951, 395).
The subsidiarity principle, which is used as a criterion in order to distribute competences between the EU and its Member States, provides that action at EU level is only justified when it is more effective than action taken at the national level (except in those areas where the EU has exclusive competences). In today's EU, it is mostly referred to in order to limit the scope of EU powers.
As far as stem cell research is concerned, the debate is whether EU funds can be used in order to finance research on stem cells coming from human embryos. Legislation regulating stem cell research remains national.
In a 1991 ruling, the Court of Justice of the European Union was asked whether restrictions on the counseling activities of Irish organizations providing information for Irish women willing to have an abortion abroad were compatible with EU law. Those organizations argued that these restrictions were violating, inter alia EU provisions on the free circulation of services within the internal market. The Court displayed a very prudent approach in its ruling by deciding that EU provisions on services did not apply to the case and by avoiding expressing its own views on abortion. However, the concern of antiabortion organizations, including segments of the Catholic Church, is that the EU might be used as external leverage by proabortion activists.
Indeed, the EU does not have any legal competences on these issues in line with the subsidiarity principle.
The social chapter of the charter mentions a number of rights at the benefit of workers—notably, limitations to maximum working hours (limitations that are set by the famous Working Time Directive, the pet hate of British Conservatives).
This wish was expressed, notably, in a speech on the future of the relationship between the UK and the EU delivered on 23 January 2013; full text available at: http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/560654/cameron-europe-transcript.pdf.
Idem.
Cameron, David, 2009. “Fixing broken politics”, speech delivered on 26 May; http://www.Conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/05/. Retrieved on 28 June 2009.
Speech delivered on 23 January 2013; accessible at http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/560654/cameron-europe-transcript.pdf.
Michael Howard, “Keynote speech in Southampton”, 1 June 2004.
The CSU is the sister party of the Conservative CDU in Bavaria.
“Bocklet: EuGH-Urteil zum Diesnt von Frauen in der Bundeswehr ist eklatantes Beispiel für Kompetenzüberschreitung der EU”, 11/01/00; available at http://www.bayern.de/Presse.
Ibid.
Limited to all nationals from EU Member States, EU citizenship grants them rights which they can eventually uphold before the authorities of the Member State in which they reside even if they are not nationals of this state.
In this sense, Europeanization can be defined as an “incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech 1994:69).
In comparison with other Central and Eastern European countries that also joined the EU in 2004 and where support for accession (via referenda) was quite high.
All EU Member States are also members of the Council of Europe.
At the time, EU law did not contain provisions on discrimination on grounds of religious beliefs.
Which, as previously explained, involved the European Commission as guardian of the Treaties.
Signatories of the Schengen agreement abolish border controls at their common borders. Although initially signed outside of the EU framework, the Schengen agreement was later incorporated into EU law. The EP Resolution refers to the fact that the Dutch government had previously vetoed the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Schengen area.
A good example is the UK, where the meaning of British identity was discussed, inter alia in the House of Lords on several occasions notably in 2006 and 2008 (House of Lords 2008).
Two pieces of domestic legislation, one canceling the independence of the national central bank, and one on the retirement of judges, are currently being subjected to an infringement procedure introduced by the European Commission at the time of writing. The tolerance of the Hungarian government towards xenophobic and anti-Semitic acts and discourses, however, has triggered comparatively little protest in the EP (when compared to reactions in the aforementioned Italian and Austrian cases).
At the time, the other fourteen governments had taken bilateral, diplomatic sanctions (coordinated by the Presidency of the EU) against the Austrian government.
References
Council of the European Union (25 June 2012) EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy.
European Parliament (18 January 2006) Resolution on homophobia in Europe.
European Parliament (2 February 2000) Resolution on the outcome of the legislative elections in Austria and the proposed formation of a coalition government between the ÖVP (Austrian People's Party) and the FPÖ (Austrian Freedom Party).
European Parliament (3 July 2002) Resolution on Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in Europe.
European Parliament (3 July 2013) Resolution on the situation of fundamental rights: standards and practices in Hungary
European Parliament (4 May 1994) Resolution on the Council in Corfu.
European Parliament (7 May 1981) Resolution on the violence in Northern Ireland.
European Parliament (9 September 2010) Resolution on the expulsion of Roma from France.
Goetz, K and Hix, S (2000) Introduction: European Integration and National Political Systems. West European Politics 23(4):1–26.
Guiraudon, V(1998) Weak weapons of the weak? Transnational mobilizations around migration in the EU in Imig, D and Tarrow, S (eds) Contentious Europeans. Protests and Politics in an Emerging Polity, Oxford and New York, Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 163–181.
Guiraudon, V (2004) Construire une politique européenne de lutte contre les discriminations: l'histoire de la directive ‘race’. Sociétés contemporaines 53(1):11–32.
House of Lords (19 June 2008) Library Note. 19th June 2008: Debate on British identity and citizenship.
Hughes, J, Sasse, G and Gordon, C (2002) Saying ‘Maybe’ to the ‘Return to Europe’: Elites and the political space for Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe. European Union Politics 3 (3): 327–355.
Huysmans, J (2000) Contested Community. Migration and the question of the political in the EU. in Kelstrup, M and Williams, M (eds) International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration, London, Routledge, pp. 149–170.
Kluckhohn C (1951) Values and value-orientation on the theory of action: An exploration in definition and classification. In Parsons T. and Shils E Toward a general theory of action, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, pp.388-433.
Kopecky, P and Ucen, P (2003) Return to Europe ? Patterns of Euroscepticism among the Czech and Slovak political parties in Rupnik, J and Zielonka, J (eds) The road to the European Union. Volume I. The Czech and Slovak Republics. Manchester, Manchester University Press, pp. 164–179.
Ladrech, R (1994) The Europeanization of domestic politics and institutions: the case of France. Journal of Common Market Studies 32(1):32–88.
Leconte, C (2010) Understanding Euroscepticism. London and New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
Lubbers, M and Scheepers, P (2007) Explanations of political Euroscepticism at the individual, regional and national levels. European societies 9 (4): 643–649.
Madeley, J and Sitter, N (2005) Differential Euroscepticism among the Nordic Christian Parties: Protestantism or Protest? Conference paper, annual meeting of the Norwegian Political Science Association. http://publicpolicy.ceu.hu/node/13147. Accessed on 10 June 2013.
Radaelli, C (2001) The domestic impact of European Union public policy: notes on concepts, methods and empirical research. Politique européenne 5: 107–142.
Taggart, P (1998) A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems. European Journal of Political Research 33:363–388.
Taggart, P and Szczerbiak A (2003) Theorizing party-based Euroscepticism: problems of definition, measurement and causality. Sussex European Institute Working Paper 69. https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=sei-working-paper-no-69.pdf&site=266. Accessed on 10 June 2013.
Vetik, R. et al. (2006) ‘Reactive identity versus EU integration’. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44 (5): 1079–1102.
Weiler, J (1995) European democracy and its critique, in Haywards, J (ed) The crisis of representation in Europe, London, Frank Cass, pp. 4–40.
Weiler, J (1999) The constitution of Europe: ‘Do the new clothes have an emperor?’ and other essays on European integration. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Weiler, J (2002) Fédéralisme et constitutionnalisme: le Sonderweg de l'Europe, in Dehousse R (ed) Une constitution pour l'Europe ?Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po, pp. 151–176.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Leconte, C. The EU Fundamental Rights Policy as a Source of Euroscepticism. Hum Rights Rev 15, 83–96 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-013-0299-6
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-013-0299-6