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How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A Reply to Derose’s "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context"

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Abstract

Keith DeRose has recently argued that the contextual variability of appropriate assertion, together with the knowledge account of assertion, yields a direct argument that ’knows’ is semantically contextsensitive. The argument fails because of an equivocation on the notion of warranted assertability. Once the equivocation is removed, it can be seen that the invariantist can retain the knowledge account of assertion and explain the contextual variability of appropriate assertion by appealing to Williamson’s suggestion that practical and conversational considerations can influence the extent to which adherence to the constitutive norm of assertion matters.

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References

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  1. Department of philosophy, Indiana University, Sycamore Hall 026, 1033 E. Third St., Bloomington, IN, 47405, USA

    Adam Leite

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  1. Adam Leite
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Correspondence to Adam Leite.

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Leite, A. How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A Reply to Derose’s "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context". Philos Stud 134, 111–129 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9081-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9081-4

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