Abstract
Is Moore’s principle of organic unities true? Does it matter whether it is? I argue that it is true and important. I defend the principle of organic unites and the view that intrinsic value can be defeated by presenting examples of the defeat of intrinsic value. I next respond to two objections. The first claims the examples fail since the allegedly defeated parts lack actual intrinsic value—they are “evaluatively inadequate”. The second is that the principle of organic unities lacks “theoretical significance” since there is no precise way to measure intrinsic value. Finally, I illustrate the importance of the principle by considering the Indispensability Argument which claims that if some type of good is an indispensable good, then it is the only good, that pluralism must be false. I argue that appealing to the concept of defeat allows the pluralist to consistently hold both (i) that pluralism is true and (ii) that some goods are indispensable for a life or a world to be very good. Since the debate between pluralists and monists in axiology is important and since the concept of defeat provides the pluralist with a reasonable way to reply to the Indispensability Argument, the principle of organic unities is important.
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Notes
A state of affairs is intrinsically indifferent just in case it has the same intrinsic value as its negation. For example, there being an odd number of stones has the same intrinsic value as there not being an odd number of stones. A state of affairs is neutral just in case it has the same intrinsic value as one that is indifferent. A state of affairs can be neutral without being indifferent. For example, I assume there are no happy unicorns is a neutral state of affairs, but it is not indifferent since it does not have the same intrinsic value as its negation, there are happy unicorns.
Moore assumes that some things have intrinsic value, i.e. that they have a certain kind of value solely in virtue of their intrinsic nature. Some philosophers hold that things can have that sort of value, but it need not depend solely on the intrinsic nature of what has it; things can have that sort of value in virtue of their non-intrinsic or relational properties. Since they deny this value depends solely on a thing’s intrinsic nature, they prefer to use the term, “final value”.
In Brentano and Intrinsic Value, Chisholm offered several important definitions concerning the notion of defeat. Chisholm offer a general characterization of what is for the intrinsic goodness of a state of affairs to be defeated by wider whole of which it is a part. He writes:
D2 Some of the goodness of G is defeated by W = Df. G is a good part of W and better than W; and if W has a bad part that is worse than W, then that bad part is a part of G. (82).
In addition, to this general characterization, he offers us definitions of partial and total defeat:
D3 The goodness of G is partially defeated by W = Df. Some of the goodness of G is defeated by W, and W is good.
D4 The goodness of G is totally defeated by W = Df. Some of the goodness of G is defeated by W, and W is not good.
Chisholm offered similar definitions concerning the defeat of intrinsic badness. He also offered some examples to support the view that the intrinsic goodness or badness of a state of affairs can be defeated by a wider whole. Chisholm’s definitions of defeat do not make use of the notion of something’s contributing its intrinsic value to a wider whole.
In Brentano and Intrinsic Value, Chisholm discusses goods that are contrary to desert and inappropriate attitudes, but he does not discuss instances of knowledge and true belief.
Oliveira (2016) makes a similar point about the failure of basic goods to contribute to wider wholes such as worlds. He focusses on various “suppressing features” to explain the failure of contribution. Perhaps following Oliveira we might say that the absence of an indispensable good is a kind of suppressing feature.
Lin considers a version of this reply but does not endorse it (Lin 2016: 337). He suggests that the monist would regard it as baroque and ad hoc. It does seem baroque and ad hoc.
References
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Lemos, N. Defeat, pluralism, and indispensable goods. Philos Stud 179, 3039–3053 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01818-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-022-01818-1