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Goldman On Knowledge As True Belief

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Abstract

Alvin Goldman contends that, in addition to the familiar sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge is at least true justified belief, there is a weaker yet strict sense or use of the term “knowledge” according to which knowledge amounts to nothing more than information-possession or mere true belief. In this paper, I argue that Goldman has failed to show that there is such a weaker sense, and that, even if he had shown this, he has not shown that this putative weaker sense is a strict one by his own criterion for strictness.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Philosophy and Religion, The College of New Jersey, P.O. Box 7718, Ewing, NJ, 08628, U.S.A

    Pierre Le Morvan

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  1. Pierre Le Morvan
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Correspondence to Pierre Le Morvan.

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Morvan, P.L. Goldman On Knowledge As True Belief. Erkenntnis 62, 145–155 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-1213-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-004-1213-z

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