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Hedonism and the good life

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Notes

  1. Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) pp. 128-9, 205.

  2. I admit that the example is far fetched. In my defense I will simply note that examples of “frozen” mental states are stock objections in epistemology to coherence theories of justification.

  3. I discuss this problem in more detail in “Indeterminate Value, Basic Value, and Summation,” The Right, the Good, Life, and Death: Essays in Honor of Fred Feldman edited by Richard Feldman, Kris McDaniels, Jason R. Raibley, and Michael J. Zimmerman (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, forthcoming).

  4. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1174b33-5, (Bk 10, ch. 5; translation by Darwall). See Stephen Darwall, “Valuing Activity”, Social Philosophy and Policy, Volume 16, Issue 1 (Winter 1999), p. 176. The line is quoted in Feldman on p. 162.

  5. Darwall, p. 188.

  6. It seems to me that this is basically the form of argument that Feldman uses to show that Anna’s compassionate suffering is not good. If what I say below is right, perhaps that argument needs to be reconsidered.

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Correspondence to Noah Lemos.

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Lemos, N. Hedonism and the good life. Philos Stud 136, 417–423 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9041-4

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