Abstract
Some contemporary philosophers maintain we lack the kind of free will that makes us morally responsible for our actions. Some of these philosophers, such as Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and Bruce Waller, also argue that such a view supports the case for significant reform of the penal system. Pereboom and Caruso explicitly endorse a quarantine model for dealing with dangerous criminals, arguing that while not responsible for their crimes such criminals should be detained in non-harsh conditions and offered the opportunity for rehabilitation. Waller does not explicitly endorse the quarantine model, but his view is similar in significant respects. I argue that such views can too easily lead to the endorsement of legal policies which would result in more frequent punishment of innocent persons for crimes they have not committed. Thus, we should have deep moral reservations about such views.
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Lemos, J. Moral Concerns About Responsibility Denial and the Quarantine of Violent Criminals. Law and Philos 35, 461–483 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-016-9266-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-016-9266-0