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Hegel and Husserl on Phenomenology, Logic, and the System of Sciences: A Reappraisal

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Abstract

Husserl envisages transcendental phenomenology as a radically founding science that lays bare the higher-order experiences whereby logic and a theory of science become constituted. On the other hand, according to a usual presentation of Hegel’s philosophy, phenomenology is “logic’s precondition,” and science presents itself as its “result.” This alleged precedence of Hegel’s phenomenology (with its experiential and historical horizons) regarding logic may be a motif behind the current affinities recently traced between Hegelian and Husserlian notions of phenomenology that highlight their views on experience, history, and the lifeworld. This paper offers instead a reconsideration of aspects of their philosophies mostly challenged or dismissed since the rise of positivism: a reappraisal of their views on the relationship between phenomenology, logic, and philosophy as an “absolute” system of sciences. The argument is made that the irreconcilable difference between their projects ultimately stands on the radical contrast between Hegel’s speculative-conceptual method and system of sciences and Husserl’s foundational science and method as experiential-phenomenological all the way through. Despite this methodological abyss, this paper vindicates their affinities in their refusal to segregate science from life, and their attempts to overcome modernity’s inherited fragmentation of culture by providing an all-unifying approach to philosophy.

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Notes

  1. A non-phenomenologist like Stephen Houlgate himself acknowledges Hegelian-Heideggerian motifs since Being and Time’s “ontological turn” (p. 7) in Gadamer, the late Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Levinas, Ricoeur, etc., and even in Derrida’s deconstructionist program and his notion of différance (2005, pp.1–3, 7, 16, 18, 49, 129, pp.130, 131, pp. 253, 254, p. 419; 2006, pp. 1, 440). Others, such as Koyré, Hyppolite, and Kojève, rediscovered Hegel through Jean Wahl’s works (Moran & Magrì, 2017, p. 3).

  2. Tanya Staehler’s 2017 book is based on her earlier 2003 German publication but is only a partial translation of the same. Thus although they are occasionally quoted together, the “Works Cited” lists them apart.

  3. An amusing anecdote reflects the predominance of positivism in German academic quarters and the discredit of Hegel’s philosophy during the nineteenth century: “The mathematician Weierstraß, who was Husserl’s teacher, married one of Hegel’s daughters. Thus, concerned to shield himself from friends and visitors, he hung in plain view on his office wall a small poster that read: “‘Hier soll man Hegel nicht beschimpfen,’” “Here one must not revile Hegel” (De Waelhens, 1958, p. 9).

  4. G. Hindrichs (Zur kritischen Theorie), R. Jaeggi (Ein Gespräch über kritische Theorie [mit N. Fraser]), and G. Zöller (Hegels Philosophie, eine Einführung), whose books appeared in 2020, were the authors interviewed in this survey.

  5. This view is shared by the British philosopher Stephen Houlgate, who opines that “Marx, Heidegger and Gadamer” appreciated Hegel’s contribution to modern thought in demonstrating that “human life is historical” (2005, p. 2).

  6. See, for instance, Popper (in his 1945 The Open Society and its Enemies and his 1957 The Poverty of Historicism) and Russell (in his 1946 History of Western Philosophy).

  7. Even some of Hegel’s former “notorious critics,” such as Russell, did “acknowledge a debt to their German Idealist forebear” (Houlgate, 2005, p. 2).

  8. In the phenomenologists’ view, the analytic authors’ concern with epistemological and metaphysical problems drastically reduces the wide scope of both Hegel’s and Husserl’s conceptual frameworks and theoretical assumptions, leading these authors to be preoccupied with such issues as whether to interpret Husserl’s and Hegel’s philosophies as foundationalism or holism, internalism or externalism, realism or idealism (Staehler, 2017, p. 17), or whether Hegel’s categories are “objects of thought” or “being[s] as such” (Houlgate, 2006, pp. 137–143), and the like.

  9. In 1802, the first part started with a reflective (subjective) logic followed by a rational (objective) logic or metaphysics, an order that he flipped in 1804—and never changed thereafter—whereby he placed first the “Logic of Being” and its categories, followed by a “Reflective Logic,” which later comprised the categories of the “Logic of Essence” and the “Logic of the Concept,” namely, the reflexive turn to itself of absolute reason.

  10. “Consciousness” and “Self-consciousness” tally with the “Logic of Being” and the “Logic of Essence,” respectively, while the third and last part of the same work, which deals with “Reason,” corresponds to the “Logic of Concept” according to his 1812–1816 Science of Logic (1975b, pp. 209–506/2010a, pp. 507–753) and to his 1817 Encyclopædia (1975c/2010b, pp. 160–244).

  11. This advent takes place at the third section on reason (the fifth chapter), namely, at its final sections on religion and absolute knowledge.

  12. This apparent incongruity is also reflected in its internal ordering in eight chapters, announced previously as three large sections.

  13. Hegel adds that “the absolute” “would surely ridicule” the ruse of using “outside instruments” or “passive mediums” to “bring it closer to us” (1973, p. 69/2018, p. 50).

  14. See Heinrichs, Die Logik der “Phänomenologie des Geistes” (1974), which—if it had been heeded—would have “reorient[ed] the ensemble of Hegelian studies” (Léonard, 1976, p. 572) and clarified much of the current alleged “impenetrability” of Hegel’s logic for more than a “happy few”.

  15. The Encyclopædia gives a final, carefully worded form to Hegel’s system of philosophical sciences, yet in a condensed, abstract, and more precise presentation as a delineatio.

  16. The idea is nothing other than “thinking that is utterly identical with itself,” and also “the activity of opposing itself to itself [alienating itself in its otherness] in order to be for itself [ergo, to return to itself] and solely by itself in this other” [as the “idea in and for itself” having returned after its estrangement in its otherness] (1975c/2010b, p. 18).

  17. It is to be noted that each of the following particular sciences (of nature and spirit) reflects logic’s abstract series of mediations—which, again, is the third and founding reading of Hegel’s entire system of sciences.

  18. The State is “The self-conscious ethical substance, the unification of the family principle with that of civil society” (1975c/2012, p. 535).

  19. See also Léonard, 1971, pp. 499–502.

  20. With “das sich-Urteilen” (p. 577), Hegel is playing with the words “urteilen” (“to judge”), ur (“primal”), and teilen (“to divide”), hence “primal self-partition”.

  21. As already mentioned, Heidegger set the course of the non-transcendental “phenomenological” traditions of the twentieth century: hermeneutics, existentialism, etc., many of which adopted Hegelian notions (such as experience, history, etc.) that they linked to their own phenomenological interests (Kirkland, 1997, pp. 293–298).

  22. He initially put it in simple terms: “how can knowledge reach out beyond itself, how can it make contact with a being that is not to be found within the confines of consciousness?” (1950b, p. 5/1999, p. 62).

  23. When Husserl stated in a 1935 appendix to his Crisis that “Philosophy as science, as serious, rigorous, indeed apodictically rigorous, science—the dream is over” (1954, p. 508/1970, p. 389), he was not referring to the end of his own faith in the open possibility of realizing this dream, but to the crisis that had been affecting sciences, philosophy, and humanity since modern times.

  24. These investigations concern the “transcendental constitution of a world,” thus the “radical clarification of the sense and origin […] of the concepts: world, Nature, space, time, psychophysical being, man, psyche, animate organism, social community, culture, and so forth” that “function as fundamental concepts in all positive sciences” (1950a, p. 180/1960, p. 154).

  25. See also (1954, p. 321/1970, p. 276; 1956, p. 199/2019, pp. 204, 205; and 1959, p. 3/2019, p. 207).

  26. “The problem of explicating this monadic ego phenomenologically […] must include all constitutional problems without exception” (1950a, pp. 103, 104/1960, pp. 68, 69).

  27. Husserl’s versions of generalization (ideation) and formalization had been developing since his early studies on mathematics, logic, descriptive psychology, and traditional theories of abstraction (1984a/2001, p. I, pp. 17–23 and p. II, pp. 1–4; 1976/1982, p. 13).

  28. The transcendental experiences include intentional, meaning-giving, and intuitively-validating functions (Leistungen) (1952b, p. 139/1989, p. 406).

  29. The difficulties of “the reflective reference […] to itself” also appertain to psychological introspection in the natural attitude (1976/1982, p. 65). They increase when it bears on the “universal a priori of correlation,” thus also on the objects as intended (1984a/2001, p. 3).

  30. Their flowing temporal nature complicates the intentional analyses, which must be “self-evidently reidentified” (without distortions) in intentional descriptions and fixed in communicable expressions (1984a, pp. 13–17/2001, p. I, pp. 170–172; 1976/1982, pp. 64, 65, pp. 77–79; 1950a/1960, pp. 20, 34).

  31. The “general thesis of the natural attitude” (1976/1982, p. 30) is the primal belief (Urglaube, Urdoxa) that underlies every conceivable (theoretical, practical, or evaluative) “position-taking” (Stellungnahme): namely, the belief that “the world is always there,” and we are entities within it (1976/1982, p. 104).

  32. Kant had previously stated something similar (1974/1999, p. B 155; 1954/1970, p. 53; Husserl 1976/1982, pp. 53, 54). Husserl avowed (1952b, p. 154/1989, p. 421) that this aspect of the method (the meaning of the transcendental) was the hardest to make his readers understand. He was right.

  33. Intentional analyses bring forth “on the noetic side, the openly endless life of pure consciousness and, as its correlate on the noematic side, the meant world, purely as meant […] solely as the intentional correlates of modes of consciousness of them” (1950a, p. 75/1960, p. 37).

  34. “Mutual real externality (reelles Aussereinander [of nature]) is naturally compatible with intentional mutual internality (intentionalen Ineinander [of spirit])” (1973b, p. 377; 1954, pp. 260, 346/1970, pp. 257, 298).

  35. “The horizons are predelineated potentialities. […] The predelineation itself, to be sure, is at all times imperfect; yet, with its indeterminateness, it has a determinate structure” (1950a, pp. 82, 83/1960, p. 45).

  36. “The tracing back of all being to transcendental subjectivity and its constitutive intentional functions leaves open […] no other way of contemplating the world than the teleological” (1962, p. 301/1997, p. 179).

  37. These passive and active interactions with the “outer” surrounding world, along with the “inner,” self-organizing (passive-active) dynamics of transcendental life, echo the “open circularity” that also characterizes the “feedback loop causality” of every living organism.

  38. Since early on, Husserl planned to build a “concrete ontology” in the sense of a “universal and concrete theory of science,” which in turn would find its “absolute foundation” in transcendental phenomenology (1950a, p. 181/1960, p. 155).

  39. These would include, among others, the factum of the historical-teleological world, death, destiny, etc. (1962, pp. 298–301/1997, pp. 176–179; 1950a, pp. 39, 106, 181, 182/1960, pp. 71, 72, 155, 156), and the “factum transcendental ego” without which “the eidos transcendental ego is unthinkable” (1973b, p. 385ff.), etc.

  40. Texts on these topics from his Freiburg years are collected in Husserl 2013, third and fourth parts.

  41. These are not merely attempts to unite “philosophy and experience” or “philosophy and life” as in Marx, Kierkegaard, or Nietzsche (De Waelhens 1958, p. 78), but rather attempts at all-embracing rational accounts.

  42. This is a paradox that mutatis mutandis also challenges the “logical isomorphism” of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus (Wittgenstein 1979, entry for Oct. 17, p. 1914).

  43. “The corresponding idea of perfection would be that of ‘adequate evidence’—[but] the question whether adequate evidence does not necessarily lie at infinity may be left open” (1950a, p. 55/1960, p. 15).

  44. This is the case, however, if and only if one does not interpret the Logic’s absolute Idea in-itself and for-itself unilaterally as merely the “abstract, immediate beginning” of the system of philosophical sciences—nor as merely phenomenology’s “result”—but rather (after having undergone the concrete unfolding of the totality of its determinacies) as the middle term of the “syllogism of philosophy” that connects the other two syllogisms through their middle terms by splitting itself (sich-Urteilen) into the Idea-of-Nature and the Idea-of-Spirit.

  45. Husserl accordingly proposed “to preserve the habit of inner freedom even with respect to our own descriptions” (Husserl 1976, p. 224/1982, p. 235).

  46. To refer to the results of each stage of the dialectical process (which sublates the analytic and synthetic moments) Hegel used “negative unity” or “common negation,” whereby the identity attained is that of an “identity and difference.” “Synthesis” is, however, a Kantian term that Hegel rejects in general, for it tallies with a logic of non-contradiction.

  47. These contradictions were for Marx those between the social (subjective) productive relations and the material (objective) productive forces. On Marx’s retrieval of Hegel, see Taminiaux 1982, pp. 48–73.

  48. Such a reading forgets that for Hegel, “the absolute wishes to be in-itself and for-itself with us since the beginning”.

  49. The same author reiterates a misinterpretation of Beilage XXVIII to The Crisis (Appendix 9 in Carr’s version) (Husserl 1954, p. 508/1970, p. 389) (Lau, in Ferrarin et al., 2019, p. 61)—one that has long been corrected (Husserl 1993a, p. xviii; 1954, p. 509/1970, p. 390, and n. 23 supra). Husserl’s alleged “change in the Crisis” as influenced by Hegel’s “critique of immediate knowledge” is also a misreading.

  50. This includes what it produces as instruments to enhance its finite reach, such as mathematics, logic, etc.

  51. In fact, they have not only been discredited, but have been sarcastically disparaged as “grand narratives” (Lyotard, 1979).

  52. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and core metaphysical insights may have foreshadowed the emergence of a new scientific paradigm—“the systems view of life” and its “unified vision”—that may be currently displacing the Western dualistic and mechanistic scientific and philosophical paradigm since Descartes and Newton (Capra & Luisi, 2014). It may also be better suited to offer it its philosophical foundations. This does not mean the “naturalization” of phenomenology, but quite the contrary.

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    Rosemary R. P. Lerner

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Lerner, R.R.P. Hegel and Husserl on Phenomenology, Logic, and the System of Sciences: A Reappraisal. Husserl Stud 39, 301–330 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-023-09335-7

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