Abstract
In this article, I argue that we can have a plausible account of the experience of practical necessity, namely, the experience that some action is necessitated for someone, by referring to the philosophy of Wang Yangming (1472–1529), a Neo-Confucian philosopher in Ming Dynasty China. The experience of practical necessity, according to Wang, can be of two kinds: general (to be a human) and particular (to be a particular person), both having their bases on human nature and related to the fulfillment of the self. I argue that this account fares better than the non-reductionist account and other reductionist accounts, including Christine Korsgaard’s, which explains the experience in terms of the constitution of the self.
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Notes
I take the reductionists and the reductionist accounts as suggesting that the experience of practical necessity is reducible to something else.
That is, ‘if you believe the premises, then you must draw the conclusion. If you will the end, then you must will the means’ (Korsgaard 2009, p. 1; emphasis original).
It can be explained by Bernard William’s words that ‘Practical necessity, and the experience of reaching a conclusion with that force, is one element that has gone into the idea of moral obligation (this may help to explain the sense, which so many people have, that moral obligation is at once quite special and very familiar)’ (Williams 1985/2006, p. 188). As Robert J. Gay understands it, ‘it is not that an idea of necessity is supplied by a system of morality (or by an idea about the will of God, or whatever) and then there is an experience of necessity, but that the experience of practical necessity comes first, and the systems of morality take their idea of necessity from it’ (Gay 1989, p. 552, n. 1; emphasis added). Therefore, this issue is not the same as ‘why should I be moral?,’ as it is a more fundamental inquiry into the forces per se.
That is, while sometimes ‘a conclusion that one must ϕ is the result of a process of thought which has taken a particular goal for granted’ ([e.g.,] ‘I must leave now—that is, if I am to get to the movie’) (Gay 1989, p. 552), here, the goal is itself of a necessity.
Robert J. Gay also highlights that practical necessity is not just a description of the experience of a strong emotion. He suggests the distinction between ‘merely strong emotions’ and ‘states which we would properly express by “I must”.’ That is, a distinction can be made between the power that a strong emotion possesses and the appearance of authority that leads one to say ‘I must’ (see Gay 1989, pp. 553–554).
I will show my disagreement with most of Gay’s criticisms or doubts in light of Wang later.
Although it is always a question for what qualifies as a sufficient, if not the ultimate, explanation of the ground of the things.
It can be said that the necessities show or even constitute one’s character, as Williams says that there can be a model ‘that what one can do sets the limits to deliberation, and that character is revealed by what one chooses within those limits, among the things that one can do. But character (of a person in the first instance; but related points apply to a group, or to a tradition) is equally revealed in the location of those limits, and in the very fact that one can determine, sometimes through deliberation itself, that one cannot do certain things, and must do others. Incapacities can not only set limits to character and provide conditions of it, but can also partly constitute its substance’ (Williams 1981, p. 130; emphases added); and that, ‘To arrive at the conclusion that one must do a certain thing is, typically, to make a discovery—a discovery which is, always minimally and sometimes substantially, a discovery about oneself’ (Williams 1981, p. 130). En passant, I wonder that it may be equally right to say, in contrary, that it is the character itself that poses the necessities, which is the line we find in Wang.
Besides a Confucian and a moral teacher, Wang was an official and a general, who fought against some rebels in central and south China. For biography, see the chronicles in Wang (2014), volumes 33–35.
For simplicity, I do not emphasize the distinction between ‘good,’ ‘moral,’ and ‘right’.
The citations of Wang in this paper are taken from Wang (2014), i.e., Complete works of Wang Yangming 王陽明全集, which consists of 41 volumes (juan 卷 in the ancient Chinese sense), presented in 4 books (or “volumes” of nowadays) in that 2014 set, and Wang (2016), the supplement of it.
For quotations in Wang (2014), I parenthesize the volume number and the page number (e.g., ‘2.91’ means ‘volume 2, page 91’), and plus the page number and item number of Chan’s English translation (1963), if available. The translations are adapted from Chan (1963) or by myself. For keywords and terms difficult to translate, I provide the Chinese phonetic transcriptions and characters.
For example, ‘When Kuai Kui had returned, Zhe would forthwith entrust the state to him and beg to be punished by death. Since Kuai Kui would then have been influenced by his son, and furthermore, since Grand Master Confucius, with his perfect sincerity, would have mediated, the father would surely (jue 決) decline to accept but order Zhe to continue to rule’ (Wang 2014, 1.19; Chan 1963, p. 37 [no. 43]).
Here, I am aware of the ‘lexical fallacy,’ which reminds us that the lack of certain terms in some philosophical tradition does not imply the lack of the relevant ideas. The contrary also calls for attention. For instance, I find some of the usages of bi 必, which is usually rendered as ‘must,’ in Wang’s texts do not match our present focus.
Li 理in Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism is sometimes rendered as “principle” (e.g., Chan 1963; Liu 2018), “pattern” (e.g., Shun 2013; Angle and Tiwald 2017), or “coherence” (e.g., Angle 2009). For the Neo Confucians, li is the ontological substance and the norm that governs the myriad things. Given its complexity, I leave it untranslated.
There are similar phrases, budeyi 不得已 and bunengyi 不能已, which approximately mean ‘have no alternatives but do so reluctantly’ and ‘cannot stop’ respectively. For example, in Wang’s reply to his friend: ‘[Your] words on “being strong and resolute” are correctly said! However, the saying that “[the goal of fulfilling the Confucian way] can neither be given up nor reduced; can neither be stopped nor not to reach” implies the sense of having no alternatives but doing so reluctantly (budeyi 不得已). The sense of having no alternatives but doing so reluctantly is still on the different level with having something which is naturally not being able to stop (bunengyi 不能已). Master Cheng [Yi] said, “knowing [the way] and reach it, then you will have joy if you follow the li, and misery if you do not.” Having something which is naturally not being able to stop means the joy of following the li’ (Wang 2014, 4.167). While the phrases budeyi and bunengyi can reveal the concept of practical necessity, in this example, the former is with the sense of reluctance and the latter the sense of willingness. To avoid complexities, I do not include them in the main text.
Liangzhi literally stands for ‘good’ ‘knowledge.’ However, as it is something about the moral, we may directly take liang as ‘moral.’ Moreover, I follow Yong Huang (2018) in italicizing the word ‘moral’ to show that it is not merely about the moral but it is itself moral and good because it involves the inclination to the moral. And as it is a faculty for moral perception (see Ivanhoe 2002, p. 180, n. 60), I prefer the gerund instead of the noun form of ‘know.’
For instance, see Wang (2014, 3.105, 3.120; Chan 1963, p. 193 [no. 206], p. 218 [no. 265]). In the sense that moral knowing is what that judges and reveals the rightness or goodness of things, and that the rightness or goodness of things does not reside in themselves but is revealed in our moral knowing’s response Wang says that ‘the heart-mind is the li (xin ji li 心即理)’ (e.g., Wang 2014, 1.2; Chan 1963, p. 7 [no. 3]), ‘there is no li outside the heart-mind’ (xin wai wu li 心外無理) (Wang 2014, 1.17; Chan 1963, p. 33 [no. 32]), ‘when the heart-mind is engaged in a thing, there is li (ci xin zai wu ze wei li 此心在物則為理)’ (Wang 2014, 3.137; Chan 1963, p. 251 [no. 322]); and that ‘moral knowing of my heart-mind is the so-called heavenly li (tianli 天理)’ (Wang 2014, 2.51; Chan 1963, p. 99 [no. 135]; see also Wang 2016, p. 280).
‘Fan Chi asked about benevolence. The Master [i.e., Confucius] replied, “Love your fellow men” (airen 愛人)’ (the Analects 12.22, in Lau 2000, p. 116). Such love or concern is a universal one that takes all human beings, animals, and even plants and inanimate things in concern. Mencius raises the idea that ‘ten thousand things are there in me’ (Mencius 7A4, in Lau 2003, p. 286), and Cheng Hao 程顥 develops it into the idea of ‘ten thousand things in one body’ (see e.g., Cheng and Cheng 2008, pp. 16–17), which Wang also accepts (see e.g., Wang 2014, 1.29; Chan 1963, p. 56 [no. 89], Wang 2014, 26.1066, Wang 2016, p. 160). See my discussion below.
In fact, in the above illustration of the Great Learning, what Wang wants to bring out is that ‘knowing and action are originally one’ (zhixing benyi 知行本一, although he does not use this phrase), as it demonstrates the ‘original state of knowing and action’ (zhixing de benti 知行的本體 or zhixing tiduan 知行體段) (Wang 2014, 1.4; Chan 1963, p. 10 [no. 5], and Wang 2014, 6.232 respectively). This is highlighted in his earlier phase of teaching, whereas the ‘unification’ or ‘identification’ (heyi 合一) of knowing and action, namely, ‘the unity of knowing and action’ (zhixing heyi 知行合一), is emphasized in the later phase. This latter is about the restoration (fu 復) of the original state of the knowing and action and the element of cultivation (gongfu 工夫) and effort is involved (e.g., Wang 2014, 1.4, 3.119; Chan 1963, p. 10 [no. 5], p. 216 [no. 261]). See Zheng (2018, p. 6).
The original heart-mind or its other manifestations as the world, i.e., heaven (tian 天), way (dao 道), or heavenly way (tiandao 天道), do not allow such failures. We can have the following quotation (g) catching up with the previous ones: (g) ‘One has doubts and does not have sufficient self-confidence. He therefore seeks answers from heaven by use of The Book of Changes. The idea is that the human heart-mind involves some [selfish desires]. Heaven alone does not allow (burong 不容) falsehood’ (Wang 2014, 3.116; Chan 1963, p. 211 [no. 247]). So, a more pertinent reading of quotation (f) is that the normally functioning master itself cannot help but manifest the heavenly li.
For example, according to Martin L. Hoffman, the psychological findings suggest that empathy ‘is reliably aroused in humans in response to misfortune in others, it predisposes the individual toward helping action …and it appears to have neural base that may have been present early in human evolution’ (Hoffman 1981, p. 121).
Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 is right in saying that morality is something that we ‘cannot help doing because of the due of the human nature (xingfen burongyi 性分不容已) (see e.g., Mou 1968, p. 505).
Of course, one also fails to fulfill one’s self if one does not even feel this practical necessity. See my discussion in the later part of the section.
Wang also says, “Those who are devoid of the heart-mind of affirming and denying are not human beings’ (Wang 2014, 7.266). The locus classicus is Mencius 2A6 (in Lau 2003, p. 72). Besides, Wang would say that the evil people are just destroying (zei 賊) their moral knowing (e.g., see Wang 2014, 2.67; Chan 1963, p. 129 [no. 147]).
Given the heart-mind is nothing but the heavenly li, the very preservation means the functioning of our moral heart-mind.
The use of ‘beasts’ to describe people who are ‘devoid of’ the heart-mind appeared early in Mencius. For example, see Mencius 3B9, 6A8 (in Lau 2003, p. 140 and p. 250).
Vital force is mostly put in singular form, and is especially so when we emphasize that there is only one vital force circulating in the world, as Wang says that since everything is in one body and shares the same vital force, the grains and animals can nourish human beings and medicines and minerals can heal diseases (see Wang 3.122; Chan 1963, pp. 221–222 [no. 274]). The Neo-Confucians also has the phrase ‘the single vital force circulates’ (yiqi liutong 一氣流通) (see Chen 2014, pp. 35–36). Perhaps it can be put in plural form in the sense of its different manifestations.
Wang says that although the emotions, which are the movements of the vital force, can block the moral knowing, we cannot thereby extinguish them, for they are ‘the functions of the moral knowing and cannot be distinguished as good or evil’ (Wang 2014, 3.126; Chan 1963, p. 229 [no. 290]). What we can and have to do is to make them to be in accordance with the li. That is, while vital force is indispensable for morality, it is itself morally neutral.
Some scholars render cai 才 as ‘ability.’ See e.g., Chan (1963).
The Analects 13.21: ‘The unrestrained are enterprising, while the restrained will draw the line at certain kinds of actions’ (in Lau 2000, p. 128).
See also Mencius 5B1 (in Lau 2003, p. 218).
In contemporary moral philosophy, some issues or actions are demarcated into the so-called non-moral realm that is not subject to moral evaluations or regulations, such as deciding whether one should eat the orange, or part one’s hair on the left or right side of the head. Some may suggest that Confucianism may not admit such a realm, for every action (and even thought), however subtle, is a manifestation of one’s being a good human or not. I can agree with this view; but here, for convenience, I tend to take the Confucian morality as one that, as I argue the previous subsection, focuses on having benevolence to the myriad things. Thus, actions that will not directly affect others can be put into the non-moral realm.
See e.g., Wang 2014, 1.13, 1.15, 1.16, 1.22, 1.37, 3.114; Chan 1963, p. 25 [no. 16], p. 29 [no. 24], pp. 31–32 [no. 30], p. 43 [no. 53], pp. 72–73 [no. 115], p. 208 [no. 241], Wang 2014, 4.190, 5.222, 7.290, 26.1083, 27.1103, 28.1128, Wang 2016, p. 125. Huang (2018) takes the volitional aspect of moral knowing to show that Wang recognizes free will.
Or ‘Wang’s account of practical necessity’ in shorthand, although it may be more pertinent to put it as ‘practical necessity in Wang’s philosophy,’ for our analyses are induced or integrated from his ideas, while he does not directly address the issue that way.
But we will see that their substantial contents are different from those in Wang’s philosophy.
Korsgaard says, ‘If, when we act, we are trying to constitute ourselves as the authors of our own movements, and at the same time, we are making ourselves into the particular people who we are, then we may say that the function of action is self-constitution’ (Korsgaard 2009, p. xii; emphasis original); and human beings as living beings are ‘engaged in an endless activity of self-constitution’ (Korsgaard 2009, p. 41).
In this regard, we are different from animals that acts in accordance with instincts (see Korsgaard 2009, p. 107).
As Bambauer explains, Korsgaard ‘construes the concept of “humanity” in the line of Kant’s idea of a “kingdom of ends,” (Bambauer 2017, p. 68) and ‘Since the kingdom of ends includes all autonomous agents, all of its citizens are obliged to only endorse these laws, which are compatible with the laws that can be willed by any other rational agent. …she seems to have something in mind similar to Kant’s thesis that those maxims are morally wrong that imply a contradiction in the will’ (Bambauer 2017, p. 82, n. 19).
She says, ‘a good action is one that constitutes its agent as the autonomous and efficacious cause of her own movements,’ and conformity to the Kant’s categorical imperative renders us autonomous, and conformity to the hypothetical imperative renders us efficacious (Korsgaard 2009, p. xii).
Bambauer gives a reasonable remark that ‘[T]aking into account the complexity of everyday life and the variety and diversity of our particular practical identities, it is not possible to strictly avoid any kind of conflict between some of these identities. Contradictory relations between personal identities only become problematic in a serious way if they render the agent incapable of acting’ (Bambauer 2017, p. 83, n. 26).
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Leung, Yh. Wang Yangming’s Reductionist Account of Practical Necessity: General and Particular. SOPHIA 59, 413–436 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-0711-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-0711-z