Abstract
This introduction to the special issue on empirically informed moral theory sketches the more important contributions to the field in the past several years. Attention is paid to experimental philosophy, the work of philosophers like Harman and Doris, and that of psychologists like Haidt and Hauser.
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Levy, N. Empirically Informed Moral Theory: A Sketch of the Landscape. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 12, 3–8 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9146-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-008-9146-2