Abstract
It is by now well established that the fact that an action or aconsequence was inevitable does not excuse the agent from responsibilityfor it, so long as the counterfactual intervention which ensures thatthe act will take place is not actualized. However, in this paper I demonstrate that there is one exception to this principle: when theagent is aware of the counterfactual intervener and the role she wouldplay in some alternative scenario, she might be excused, despite the fact that in the actual scenario she acts, as we say, of her own freewill. I illustrate this contention by way of a critique of Fischer andRavizza's well-known account of responsibility for consequences.
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Levy, N. Excusing Responsibility for the Inevitable. Philosophical Studies 111, 43–52 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021269912443
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021269912443