Skip to main content
Log in

Molyneux’s question and the individuation of perceptual concepts

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Molyneux's Question, that is, “Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube and a sphere... and the blind man made to see: Quaere, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the globe, which the cube”, was discussed by many theorists in the 17th and 18th centuries, and has recently been addressed by contemporary philosophers interested in the nature, and identity conditions, of perceptual concepts. My main concern in this paper is to argue – against Evans, Campbell, and a number of other contemporary philosophers – that a test of the sort Molyneux envisioned, at least if carefully designed and administered, can indeed be a crucial experiment for the claim that we deploy the same perceptual concepts when identifying shapes by sight and by touch. I will explore some implications of this argument for a theory of recognitional concepts. And I’ll try to trace out some unhappy consequences of various alternative views.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Berkeley, G. (1709/1965): Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision, in Armstrong, Berkeley’s Philosophical Writings. Macmillan, 1965

  • Campbell, J. (1996): “Molineux’s Question”, in E. Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing

  • Campbell J. (2005). Information-Processing, Phenomenal Consciousness and Molyneux’s Question. In: Bermudez, José (eds) Thought, Reference and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans, pp. Oxford University Press, forthcoming, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Dretske F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans G. (1985). Molyneux’s Question, in Evans, Collected Papers. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Leibniz G.W. (1765/1982). New Essays on Human Understanding. Cambridge U. Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Livingston, K.R., Andrews J.K. and Harnad, S. (1998): ‘Categorical Perception Effects Induced by Category Learning’, Journal of Experimental Psychology 24(3), 732–753

    Google Scholar 

  • Loar B. (1996). Comments on John Campbell, “Molineux’s Question. In: Villanueva, E. (eds) Perception, pp. Ridgeview Publishing, Atascadero, CA

    Google Scholar 

  • Ludwig K. (1996). Shape Properties and Perception. In: Villanueva, E. (eds) Perception, pp. Ridgeview Publishing, Atascadero, CA

    Google Scholar 

  • Lycan W. (1996). Layered Perceptual Representation. In: Villanueva, E. (eds) Philosophical Issues 7, pp. Ridgeview Press, Atascadero

    Google Scholar 

  • Macdonald, C. (2004): ‘Mary Meets Molyneux: The Explanatory Gap and the Individuation of Phenomenal Concepts’. NOUS 38:2

    Google Scholar 

  • Martin, M. (1992): ‘Sight and Touch’, in T. Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience, Cambridge University Press

  • Meltzoff, A. (1993): ‘Molyneux’s Babies’, in N. Eilan, R. McCarthy and B. Brewer (eds.), Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology (pp. 219–235)

  • Pitcher, G. (1977): Berkeley, Boston: RKP

  • Printz J. (2002). Furnishing the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Rozemond and Yaffe (2004): ‘Peachtrees, Gravity and God: Mechanism in Locke’, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12(3), 387–342

    Google Scholar 

  • Thomson, J.J. (1974): ‘Molyneux’s Question’, Journal of Philosophy 71

  • Tye M. (2000). Consciousness, Color and Content. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Janet Levin.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Levin, J. Molyneux’s question and the individuation of perceptual concepts. Philos Stud 139, 1–28 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9072-5

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9072-5

Keywords

Navigation