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Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and Pragmatics

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Abstract

In this paper, I offer a novel defense of moderate pessimism about moral deference, i.e., the view that we have pro tanto reason to avoid moral deference. I argue that moral deference fails to give us the epistemic credentials to satisfy plausible norms of moral assertion. I then argue that moral assertions made solely on the basis of deferential moral beliefs violate a plausible epistemic and moral norm against withholding information that one knows, has evidence, or ought to believe will importantly affect another person’s deliberation. Finally, I argue that not only does moral deference fail to put the audience in a good epistemic position it also puts the audience in a bad epistemic and moral position. First, there is a tight connection between outright believing something and being disposed to assert it and so deferential moral beliefs often motivate people to assert something that they don’t have the epistemic credentials to properly assertion. Second, there will often be moral reasons to make assertions—even based on deferential moral beliefs. These assertions, while all-things-considered permissible, will be epistemic impermissible and involve violating a moral norm.

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Notes

  1. Moderate pessimists include: Nickel (2001), McGrath (2011), and Crisp (2014). I think Hills (2009) and Hopkins (2007) can be read as moderate pessimists as well. However, some read them as strong pessimists, who think that we have a general obligation (of some kind) to not defer.

  2. Moderate optimists include: Howell (2014), Enoch (2014), Fletcher (2016), and Lord (2018). Strong optimists think that there we do not have pro tanto reasons to not defer and it’s no less sub-optimal than deference about many non-moral matters. Sliwa (2012) is the clearest case of a strong optimist.

  3. This has been independently noted by Hazlett (2017)

  4. For a stricter set of criteria, see: McGrath (2011).

  5. Davia and Palmira (2015) argue that moral deference is off-putting because it involves deferring to an epistemic peer. For criticism of this argument, see: Lewis (2020).

  6. For example, see: Friedman (2017).

  7. These two ways of hedging assertions correspond (as far as I can tell) to Benton and van Elswyk (2019)’s distinction between attitudinal and evidential hedging.

  8. For more on the norm of garden-variety assertion, see: Williamson (2000), DeRose (2002), Weiner (2005), Douven (2006), Lackey (2008), and Goldberg (2015).

  9. This is also a reason to think that there is a special norm of assertion in high-stakes situations.

  10. It’s true that some non-moral assertions have practical import (e.g., directions or weather reports), but these assertions, when trusted, often do not affect whether we behave in a morally good or bad way.

  11. In talking about moral assertions, I’m only talking about utterances which are supposed to be about how the world is. Thus, on many expressivist views of moral discourse such utterances won’t constitute assertions.

  12. This last is implausible as many in the moral deference literature and elsewhere think you can get moral knowledge that p through a single instance of testimony and/or that a single instance of testimony cannot transmit or generate moral understanding of why p. For example, see: Jones (1999) and McGrath (2011).

  13. For a criticism of this view, see: Lewis (2019).

  14. However, I’m inclined to think that this norm is either the knowledge norm or the justified belief norm.

  15. More accurately, I think these extra conditions are unique to normative assertions in general, moral or otherwise.

  16. See: Hills (2009).

  17. One exception seems to be Goldberg (2015). He argues that what epistemic credentials one needs to warrantedly assert change based on what certain beliefs that the speaker and the audience share, e.g., about the interests and informational needs of the interlocutors (257).

  18. Lackey (2011) also argues that certain kinds of assertions require the speaker to have epistemic credentials that cannot be acquired through deference. In particular, she argues that certain kinds of assertions (e.g. in high stakes situations) require an epistemic state different than knowledge for epistemically proper assertion. What distinguishes my project from Lackey’s is that is she is concerned with showing that knowing that p is not sufficient for being able to epistemically permissibly assert that p for. Second, she doesn’t make any specific recommendations about what the relevant epistemic state might be. Third, her cases concern experts making assertions with content that is related to their area of expertise (often in high stakes situations) on the basis of deferential beliefs. I think making moral assertions solely on the basis of deferential moral beliefs is intuitively improper even if the asserter is not a moral expert and the situation is not high stakes.

    Carter & Gordon (2011) defend an understanding-why norm of assertion for a “restricted class of assertions (632).” They do not define the members of this class of assertions, but they focus on the same cases as Lackey (2011), i.e., cases in which an expert makes an assertion (in high stakes situation) with content that is related to their domain of expertise. And, like Lackey (2011), they do not consider moral assertions.

  19. I thank Mona Simion for this example.

  20. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this objection.

  21. Lackey (2008), 111.

  22. The reason that people mistakenly think that Stella is asserting is that is uttering an unqualified declarative sentence and assertion is the default speech act we perform by making such utterances. However, if one accepts speech act contextualism, one can explain why her utterances are not assertions. According to speech act contextualism, which speech act one performs depends on the context one is in. For example, when one is testifying in a courtroom, one’s utterances in the declarative constitute swearing or testifying instead of asserting. Or, when one speaks to a priest in a confession booth, one’s utterances count as confessions, not assertions. In the classroom, the teacher’s utterances in the declarative mood constitute something like reporting. The teacher’s job is not to share her own views or opinions with the students, but report what the best available evidence says or what the most up-to-date theories say. For more one speech act contextualism, see: Turri (2010).

  23. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this objection.

  24. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this case.

  25. Fletcher (2014) tells a similar story about the relationship between moral utterances and expressing certain desire-like attitudes.

  26. Grice (1989), 26.

  27. Grice (1989), 26.

  28. Coady (1992), 71.

  29. This also explains one reason that requiring understanding why p is important for being able to provide an explanation of why p to one’s audience. If one’s explanation is not an expression of one’s understanding, then it will be insincere, because one will assert “p because q” without one’s belief that p being based on q. If one properly bases one’s belief that p on q and is q is why p, then I just think that one will understand (to some degree) why p. As an analogy, consider a case in which John asks Sarah how he can (honestly) morally justify his voting for a particular candidate. John and Sarah have all the same political views and leanings. Sarah tells him that he could appeal to the candidate’s financial policies to morally justify his vote. However, Sarah also knows that she would never use that as a justification for her voting for that candidate. There would be something insincere about Sarah suggesting that John appeal to that reason to justify his action.

  30. Moreover, notice that even if the speakers were to hedge their utterances, e.g., I think deadnaming is wrong, these utterances would still provide misleading evidence. This is because even hedged assertions give one’s audience reason to believe that one formed the belief that one is expressing using the aforementioned moral-epistemic capacities. Thus, this is a problem for all pure moral assertives and not just flat out assertions.

  31. Proponents of the stronger link include: Sosa (2010), 172; Smithies (2012), 279; and Poston (2014), 18.

  32. For more on moral grandstanding, see: Tosi and Warmke (2016).

  33. I thank Glen Pettigrove for discussion on this point.

  34. I thank Pekka Väyrynen for this objection.

  35. For example, see: Pettit (2006), Hopkins (2007), 630, Hills (2009), e.g., 122–123, Fletcher (2016), Mogensen (2017).

  36. For example, see: Pettit (2006), Howell (2014), Mogensen (2017), and Callahan (2018).

  37. For example, see: Scanlon (1998), 147–160. Hills (2009) also notes that having moral understanding is important for being able to do this (106–107).

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Robert Cowan, Errol Lord, Lisa Miracchi, Mona Simion, Daniel J. Singer, audiences at Social Epistemology Network Event 2 at Yonsei University and the 2019 British Society for Ethical Theory annual conference, and two anonymous referees. A special thanks to Michael Lynch for written comments on an earlier version of this paper.

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    Max Lewis

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Lewis, M. Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and Pragmatics. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 23, 5–22 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10065-4

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