Abstract
Mona Simion has recently argued for a function-first norm of moral assertion. According to function-first accounts, the norm of any kind of assertion is determined by the function of that kind of assertion. She argues that, on the assumption that moral understanding is the goal of moral inquiry, the function of moral assertion is reliably generating moral understanding in others and that the norm of moral assertion should fall out of that function. In particular, she thinks the norm should be such that satisfying it is the most reliable way for one’s moral assertions to generate moral understanding in others—at least when all else goes well. With this in mind, she proposes The Explanation Proffering Account of Moral Assertion (EPNMA). First, I argue that satisfying EPNMA is not the only or most reliable way for one’s moral assertion to generate moral understanding in one’s audience. I propose an alternative norm on which one must accompany one’s moral assertions with a maieutic speech act, i.e., an utterance in the form of a question or assertion that aims to elicit knowledge or other epistemic states from an audience. Second, I present counterexamples to EPNMA wherein speakers make moral assertions that violate EPNMA and yet they are not intuitively epistemically criticizable for their assertion. I conclude by briefly sketching an alternative account that avoids the pitfalls of EPNMA.
Notes
When presenting the gist of her norm of moral assertion, Simion asks: given epistemically auspicious background conditions, what would be “the most reliable way to generate moral understanding” in a particular hearer? (483). Her answer is: asserting that p and providing an explanation of why p.
Simion (2018), 483.
Simion (2018), 484.
Sometimes she claims that the function of moral assertion is “reliably generating moral understanding in hearers (478).” Other times she seems to want more. For example, she rejects the stronger epistemic requirement that speakers must understand why their moral assertion is true by asking, “[I]s it plausible that understanding on the speaker’s side is going to be the most reliable way to generate understanding on the hearer’s side? (486).”
I thank Michael Vazquez for suggesting the word “maieutic.”
This example is based on one from Smartwood (2017).
The teacher could ask less rhetorical questions and get the same effect. For example, “Do you think there’s any important moral difference between texting while driving and drunk driving?”
When Simion discusses explanations, she seems concerned only with explicit explanations of the form: p because q, where q makes it the case that p. For example: “eating meat is wrong because animals are living beings just like you and they deserve to be treated with equal respect ...’ (483).”
For example, perhaps such assertions violate Grice (1989)s' maxim of manner, e.g., be clear and avoid obscurity or ambiguity (27).
In the following examples, it’s important to distinguish the goal/function/aim of moral assertions and the asserter’s aim in making a moral assertion. An asserter might not always be aiming to generate moral understanding in her audience.
Even if one is not convinced by my particular cases, I think it is independently plausible that there are epistemically permissible moral assertions that are not accompanied by any explanations.
Cf. Kauppinen (2018).
I thank a referee for this suggestion.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Errol Lord, Lisa Miracchi, Mona Simion, Michael Vazquez, two anonymous referees at this journal, and audiences at Penn Normative Philosophy Group and the MIRA group at the University of Pennsylvania for discussion and comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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Lewis, M. The Norm of Moral Assertion: A Reply to Simion. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 22, 1043–1049 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10033-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10033-7