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A logic for propositions with indefinite truth values

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Abstract

In the first part of this paper a logic is defined for propositions whose probability of being true may not be known. A speaker's beliefs about which propositions are true are still interesting in this case. The meaning of propositions is determined by the consequences of asserting them: in this logic there are debates which incur certain costs for the protagonists.

The second part of the paper describes the mathematics of the resulting logic which displays several novel features.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Mathematics Department, University of Otago, Box 56, Dunedin

    G. F. Liddell

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  1. G. F. Liddell
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Liddell, G.F. A logic for propositions with indefinite truth values. Stud Logica 41, 197–226 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00370345

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00370345

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