Abstract
Physicalist Christology (PC) is the view that God the Son (GS), in the Incarnation, became identical with the body of Jesus. The goal of this paper is to defend PC from two recent objections. One is that if GS is a physical object, then he cannot have properties had by God (e.g., necessary existence). Then, by Leibniz’s law, the incarnate GS cannot be identical with the second Person of the Trinity. The other objection is that PC implies that the incarnate GS did not exist in the interim period between his death and resurrection. PC then leads to the theologically absurd consequence that one of the three Persons of the Trinity did not exist during this period. I argue that the first objection fails because the very same argumentative strategy applies to the Incarnation on any view. As for the second objection, I endorse an animalist theory of death and argue that the incarnate GS continues to exist as a dead person from his death to resurrection. This shows that there is still continuing Trinity of GS during this period.
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Notes
According to Merricks, PC is a better account of the Incarnation than dualist Christology for two reasons. First, PC implies that GS is identical with the very body of Jesus while dualist Christology does not. The other reason is that PC requires GS to become incarnate to be human while dualist Christology does not. Two stipulations are the following: (1) ‘Physicalism’ in this paper is physicalism about persons. It does not say that everything is physical. So, PC is consistent with property dualism about mental properties. So, PC says that the incarnate GS is not merely a physical object. (2) Merricks rightly classifies composite dualism—the view that a person is a composite of a soul and a body—as a form of substance dualism. Following him, I shall ignore, until the “A Possible Response to the Coherence Problem” section, the distinction between substance dualism and composite dualism. So, I shall not consider the ‘compositional account of Christology,’ the view that GS, in the Incarnation, is united with a human body and a human soul. For a defense of this account, see Cross (2003), Leftow (2002), Stump (2002), and Swinburne (1994). For an objection to it, see Senor (2007). For a general objection to composite dualism, see Olson (2001).
Merricks thinks that dualist Christology implies that a person is a soul and so embodiment is not necessary for being human. Van Horn (2010, pp. 330–337) disagrees (cf. Plantinga 1974, p. 67; Swinburne 1986, pp. 146–147). Suppose that after you die, God causes you, the soul, to be embodied in a Klingon’s body. In this case, you are not human but Klingon, while you are currently human. So, van Horn concludes dualism says that embodiment is necessary for being human. I think this argument commits a fallacy of equivocation. Van Horn’s ‘being human’ is ‘having biological properties.’ This is trivially true; even physicalists can concede that if dualism is true, you could not be human (e.g., biological) because you as a soul could be embodied in nonhuman bodies, such as Klingon. They can concede that dualism implies that you as a soul must be embodied in a particular way (e.g., in a human animal) in order to have particular properties. Merricks’ ‘being human,’ on the other hand, is ‘being persons like you and me.’ What Merricks points out (though I agree his word ‘being human’ is a bit ambiguously used) is that dualism implies that we could exist even without having any physical properties (e.g., without having animal bodies) because, given dualism, we are essentially and fundamentally immaterial objects. So, according to Merricks, dualist Christology implies that GS could become like us even without having any physical properties including becoming embodied. His complaint is that this dualist view makes the Son’s becoming a person like us one thing and his becoming embodied something else.
I believe that historic Christology, especially the Chalcedonian definition, says that the whole Jesus is identical with the second Person of the Trinity (see Cross 2009, p. 461; Senor 2007, p. 55). As mentioned in a previous note, however, some deny this tradition by endorsing the compositional account of Christology. I shall discuss this option in the “A Possible Response to the Coherence Problem” section.
I shall not consider relative identity to understand two distinct natures of Jesus. See van Inwagen (1994) for a discussion of the Incarnation in terms of relative identity. For a general critique of this approach, see Senor (1999). The aim of my paper is not to defend the coherence of the doctrine of the Incarnation but to defend PC from the particular objections discussed in the text.
One general worry about PC is that God is an immaterial being and cannot become a material object (Leftow 2011; Plantinga 1999). This worry is on the grounds of kind essentialism: ‘if something is a member of a natural kind, then it is essentially a member of that kind’ (Merricks 2007, p. 296). I assume, following Merricks, that kind essentialism undermines any accounts of the Incarnation. For example, suppose that God the Son became a human soul. A human soul would constitute a natural kind. Then, kind essentialism implies that God the Son cannot become a human soul. Or, suppose that being human constitutes a natural kind. If kind essentialism is true, God the Son cannot become human. Van Horn (2010) thinks that the present worry about PC does not presuppose kind essentialism. He rather thinks that it is impossible that a simple, necessarily existing being can be wholly composed of contingent parts or become composite. This criticism is similar to the ‘coherence problem,’ which I shall discuss in this section. Further, this criticism leads to a particular version of dualist Christology. I shall address this in the “A Possible Response to the Coherence Problem” section.
In his discussion of the Letter of Chalcedon, McCall claims that PC cannot explicate the necessary conditions of the Incarnation the letter addresses: without confusion, without change, without division, without separation (McCall 2015, pp. 209–210). For example, he says, ‘If GS = B (in the Incarnation), then does B enjoy omnipresence? So, what does it mean to say that the natures are not confused?’ (p. 209). But the same reasoning applies equally to HSV. To make sense of his analysis of the Letter of Chalcedon, he must therefore appeal to DSV. The same is true of van Horn’s argument against PC. He thinks that a necessary being cannot be wholly composed of contingent parts (van Horn 2010, pp. 337–341). Human soul is a contingent being. So, his view implies that GS cannot become a human soul. Van Horn also attempts to reject PC on the grounds that something physical cannot be omniscient even if it can think (van Horn 2010, pp. 340–341). I think van Horn would have to say similarly that something human cannot be omniscient. So, his view implies that GS cannot become a human soul. So, his attack on PC leads to DSV.
Because of its rejection of the human mind of Jesus, apollinarianism was condemned as heresy at the first Council of Constantinople in 381.
McCall also says that PC cannot make sense of what Jesus said to the thief on the cross: ‘today you shall be with me in paradise’ (Luke 23:43). Merricks attempts to explain this verse in terms of ‘jumping ahead in time’ (Merricks 2009, p. 489, n.17).
Although Merricks’ response is consistent with PC, I think proponents of PC should also explain what the corpse was during the period. For the corpse just looks like B prior to Jesus’ death. I shall assume that the corpse during the period was a just-deceased, and so generally intact body.
Van Inwagen believes that animalism is consistent with the doctrine of the Resurrection. He suggests that God replaces corpses with their perfect replicas while storing the original corpses for the Day of Resurrection. Another suggestion he makes is that God could preserve the essential part of the person, such as his brain and central nervous system, at his death and re-create the person later by using that part (van Inwagen 1979).
Some philosophers attempt to make sense of these options. Neo-Lockean constitutionalists, such as Baker (2000) and Shoemaker (2008), would accept the first option by saying that the corpse is the body that constitutes you, the person, until you cease to exist at death. On the other hand, Burke (1994) and Rea (2000) would say, by relying on the ‘dominant sortal account,’ that the corpse is a new entity distinct from the original person. I shall not discuss these theories as the aim of this paper is not to solve the corpse problem. Olson (2007) and van Inwagen (1990) would try to solve the corpse problem by eliminating it from the animalist ontology (see also Hershenov 2005). That is, atoms arranged corpsewise do not compose any object because the activities of those atoms do not constitute a life. This ‘eliminativist’ view is consistent with the biological criterion of personal identity. Olson (2016) considers this view as a response to the ‘remnant person problem,’ a dilemma similar to the corpse problem (Johnston 2007). But many would find this view—as Olson himself agrees (2016, p. 158)—‘drastic.’ For a recent discussion on the incompatibility of animalism and eliminativism, see Lim (2017).
By relying on her neo-Lockean constitutionalist view (Baker 2000), Baker (2004) argues that a person can continue to exist, even after his death, just in case he maintains his first-person perspective by being constituted by any kind of body. So, according to Baker, a body that is different from an earthly biological body could realize a first-person perspective and so constitute a person at an intermediate state. Baker would say the same thing about the death and resurrection of Jesus.
Some might say that GS as a corpse is non-functional (e.g., it cannot think). So, the divine life during his existence as a corpse is functionally binitarian. This seems to be a theologically significant cost. In response, consider a representative ‘function’ that our imagined objectors might consider: the capacity for thought. The fact that a person does not exercise the capacity for thought at a certain time does not entail that he does not have that capacity at that time (e.g., The fact that I sleep unconscious t1 through t2 does not entail that I therefore lose the mental capacity t1 through t2). The “Objections and Replies” section will discuss a similar issue in detail.
Morris draws an analogy between the two-minds view and a ‘multi-mind view’ of persons and argues that his Christology does not require two distinct persons or mental subjects. I find this analogy unpersuasive. It seems to me that thinking and speaking from multi consciousnesses make Jesus schizophrenic. But for the sake of argument, concede that Morris’ analogy is correct. Then the two-minds view is consistent with HSV: GS became a human soul and that soul has both divine and human belief systems. And if it is consistent with HSV, it could be consistent with PC (“A Possible Response to the Coherence Problem”). So, depending on the plausibility of Morris’ analogy, the two-minds view can be neutral on the mereological accounts of Christology.
Philippians 2:5–7: ‘5 Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus: 6 Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God: 7 But made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men’ (KJV).
McGrath is not a kenoticist. For a philosophical defense of kenoticism, see Forrest (2000). He supports ontological kenoticism (what he calls ‘extreme kenosis’) by abandoning the traditional ‘perfect being theology.’ So he says that ‘Jesus was truly divine but lacked normal divine powers’ (Forrest 2000, p. 130). On his kenotic account, God out of love ‘abandons absolute power while retaining sufficient power to warrant total trust’ (Forrest 2000, p. 131). Thanks to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
Thanks to an anonymous referee for the distinction between ontological kenoticism and functional kenoticism.
Erickson (1998, pp. 750–755) develops a similar account, though he does not regard it as a kenosis theory. It seems to me that his account is functional kenoticism of some sort.
Functional kenoticism can apply to Matthew 24:36 and Mark 13:32, in which Jesus says he does not know the date of the Second Coming. I would say he intentionally and voluntarily refrained from exercising his maximal knowledge with respect to the Second Coming.
The fetus might have potentials or dispositions to belief. But potentials or dispositions are not beliefs. The proponent of DSV or CA could say that GS in the fetal development was actually omniscient and having other mental properties, such as loving (cf. Forrest 2000). But I have already discussed why these options do not work (“A Possible Response to the Coherence Problem”).
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful for comments and questions received by participants at the 2018 Central Division Meeting of American Philosophical Association, the 2017 Midsouth Philosophy Conference, and the 2016 National Meeting of Evangelical Philosophical Society. I am also grateful to Joel Archer, Christopher Conn, Mark Coppenger, and various referees of this journal for helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper.
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Lim, J. In Defense of Physicalist Christology. SOPHIA 60, 193–208 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-0718-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-019-0718-5