Abstract
This paper aims to clarify what it means for a normative theory to be fact-sensitive, and what might be wrong with such sensitivity, by examining the ways in which ‘justice as fairness’ depends upon facts. While much of the fact-sensitivity of Rawls’s principles consists of innocent limitations of generality, Rawls’s appeal to stability raises a legitimate worry about defining justice down in order to make ‘justice’ stable. If it should turn out that the correct principles of justice are inconsistent with human nature, it might be important for us to recognize that as a feature of human psychology we regret, rather than revising our principles for the sake of stability in a way that obscures the fact that there is anything to regret. Whether or not Rawlsian principles are in fact watered down depends on how one interprets the role of reciprocity in the theory. Reciprocity can be seen as a fact about human psychology that limits the extent to which justice can be realized where assurance of compliance on the part of others is lacking. Or it can be seen as a fact about justice, to wit, that its point is to create a relationship of mutual recognition and respect, making strictly unilateral compliance pointless.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Valentini argues (contra Farrelly) that the distinction between fact-sensitive and fact-insensitive principles is not a matter of degree but a dichotomy, because fact-insensitive approaches ask what is justice as such, independent of empirical facts, whereas fact-sensitive approaches ask what principles should govern the exercise of political power here and now, assuming various facts about society and human nature that make the exercise of political power necessary (Valentini 2009, p. 335). Within Valentini’s category of fact-sensitive approaches, however, we can distinguish degrees of fact-sensitivity. I am arguing that recognition of partial or relative fact-insensitivity can matter, ethically speaking. I will also later argue that we should distinguish facts that limit the realizability of justice from facts that make the concept of justice applicable.
If close-knitness and chain connection hold, then when the difference principle is satisfied, any inequality between any two positions raises the lower position (Rawls 1999, pp. 69–70). Without close-knitness the worst off do not benefit from all inequalities, because where the contribution curve is flat over some range, additional inequality does not raise the lowest position. Without chain connection, the worse-off party does not benefit from every inequality, because some people who are worse off than some others will lose from an inequality that is necessary to benefit those who are even worse off than themselves.
Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this objection.
Wiens also argues that the difference principle cannot rank worlds in which capital mobility is high and worlds in which it is low (Wiens 2015, p. 444). He imagines a given society under both factual scenarios. In both, the position of the worst off is maximized, and at the same level, but in the high-mobility scenario the contribution curve is much flatter, with the result that it takes a lot more inequality to get the worst off up to their maximum level, i.e. the better off are much better off, in a high-mobility scenario. Wiens says that the difference principle does not rank one world above another. That is true if all the difference principle says is ‘maximize the position of the worst off’. If we think of the principle as ranking gains for the worst off against equality, however, we should prefer the low-mobility world (the one with the steeper contribution curve), on the grounds that it requires less inequality to bring the worst off up to the same level.
Weithman contrasts ‘inherent’ with ‘imposed’ stability in order to remind us that enforcement and punishment are not taken to be part of the core system, and thus do not count as internal. The status of enforcement is more complicated than Weithman’s initial presentation suggests, however, because Rawls thought that even in a well-ordered society enforcement would still be needed, in order to provide assurance of compliance on the part of others (Rawls 1999, p. 237).
This analysis goes in the same direction as David Estlund’s argument that facts about human nature do not limit the content of justice. Justice only applies where there is limited altruism, but the content of justice is what it is regardless of how altruistic people are (Estlund 2011, pp. 225–229).
I do not want to exaggerate the differences between Rawls and Cohen on the ethical as opposed to institutional demands of justice. On the one hand, Cohen recognizes an individual prerogative to pursue personal goals at the expense of the goal of benefitting the worst off (Cohen 2008, pp. 10–11). On the other hand, Rawls recognized individual ethical duties that would not be enforced by law, including the duty of mutual respect (Rawls 1999, pp. 156, 297, 477). Still, the demands that Rawls’s principles place on us are limited where assurance of compliance on the part of others is lacking.
Moreover, when institutions are needed but not yet in place, I have a natural duty to help create them, a duty that is not conditional on others reciprocating, but which is limited it the extent of costs it can impose on me. It is for this reason that I say that our duties of distributive justice are only ‘attenuated’ and not eliminated when assurance of compliance on the part of others is lacking. I discuss the relationship between reciprocity and justice at more length in Lister (2013).
References
Arneson, Richard. 2008. Justice is not equality. Ratio 21: 371–391.
Cohen, G. A. 1992. Incentives, inequality, and community. Vol.13, Tanner lectures on human values. Salt Lake City, UT: University of Utah Press.
Cohen, G. A. 2003. Facts and principles. Philosophy & Public Affairs 31: 211–245.
Cohen, G. A. 2008. Rescuing justice and equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Corak, Miles. 2013. Income inequality, equality of opportunity, and intergenerational mobility. Journal of Economic Perspectives 27(3): 79–102.
Estlund, David. 2011. Human nature and the limits (if any) of political philosophy. Philosophy & Public Affairs 39(3): 207–237.
Estlund, David M. 1998. Liberalism, equality, and fraternity in Cohen’s critique of rawls. Journal of Political Philosophy 6(1): 99–112.
Farrelly, Colin. 2007. Justice in ideal theory: A refutation. Political Studies 55: 844–864.
Fehr, Ernst, Urs Fischbacher, and Simon Gacther. 2002. Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms. Human Nature 13: 1–25.
Garthoff, Jon. 2016. Rawlsian stability. Res Publica forthcoming.
Hume, David. 1826a. A treatise of human nature. The philosophical works of David Hume, vol. 2. London: Adam Black and William Tait and Charles Tait.
Hume, David. 1826b. An inquiry concerning the principles of morals. The philosophical works of David Hume, vol. 4. London: Adam Black and William Tait and Charles Tait.
Lister, Andrew. 2013. Reciprocity, relationships, and distributive justice. Social Theory and Practice 39(1): 70–94.
Mills, Charles W. 2005. ‘Ideal theory’ as ideology. Hypatia 20: 165–184.
Mills, Charles W. 2009. Rawls on race/race in Rawls. Southern Journal of Philosophy 47: 161–184.
Pogge, Thomas. 2008. Cohen to the rescue! Ratio 21: 454–475.
Quong, Jonathan. 2010. Justice beyond equality. Social Theory and Practice 36(2): 315–340.
Rawls, John. 1996. Political liberalism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Rawls, John. 1999. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original edn., 1971).
Sandel, Michael. 1998. Liberalism and the limits of justice, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Smart, J. J. C., and Bernard Williams. 1973. Utilitarianism: For and against. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stemplowska, Zofia, and Adam Swift. 2012. Ideal and nonideal theory. In The Oxford handbook of political philosophy, ed. David Estlund, 373–392. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tomlin, Patrick. 2010. Survey article: Internal doubts about Cohen’s rescue of justice. The Journal of Political Philosophy 18(2): 228–247.
Valentini, Laura. 2009. On the apparent paradox of ideal theory. Journal of Political Philosophy 17(3): 332–355.
Valentini, Laura. 2012. Ideal vs. non-ideal theory: A conceptual map. Philosophy Compass 7(9): 654–664.
Weithman, Paul. 2010. Why political liberalism? On John Rawls’s political turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
White, Stuart. 2003. The civic minimum: On the rights and obligations of economic citizenship. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wiens, David. 2015. Against ideal guidance. Journal of Politics 77: 433–446.
Williams, Andrew. 1998. Incentives, inequality, and publicity. Philosophy & Public Affairs 27: 225–247.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Lister, A. Fact-Sensitivity and the ‘Defining-Down’ Objection. Res Publica 23, 117–135 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-016-9332-3
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-016-9332-3