Abstract
This paper explores a late-Ming Chinese philosopher Wang Yangming’s (1472–1529) philosophical assertions showcasing the pivotal role that human mind plays in shaping our worldview. Wang Yangming’s view—especially his declaration that the Mind is the Principle—emphasizes that the human mind is the sole foundation of moral principles and that worldly affairs are identified with human ethical practices. This position has been contentious both in his times and among contemporary scholars. While some critics, notably Chen Lai, find Wang’s synthesis of the ethical and the metaphysical realm problematic, others like Wing-tsit Chan view Wang Yangming’s philosophy as verging on subjective idealism. Both Chen and Chan argue that Wang Yangming commits the fallacy of the conflation of fact and value. In this paper, I defend Wang Yangming’s ethics-oriented metaphysics against such criticisms. I will engage a comparative study between Wang Yangming’s perspective and pragmatist metaphysics—a modern philosophical stance which sees metaphysics as intertwining with human ethics and practices. Building upon this comparative study, this paper aims to highlight the intrinsic bond between metaphysics and ethics and to advocate for the centrality of ethics in shaping the very foundation of metaphysical thinking. The conclusion of this paper is that Wang Yangming’s metaphysics aligns with commonsense realism, rather than with subjective idealism. His metaphysics is not a confused worldview that conflates fact with value, nor is it subjective idealism. Instead, it is a metaphysics with the ethical grounding of human engagements and humanistic concerns.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For this comparative angle, Frisina credits David Hall and Roger Ames for having introduced a comparative study between Confucianism and pragmatism. According to Frisina, Hall and Ames argue that pragmatism’s assumptions “are much closer [than traditional sinology] to original Chinese sensibilities and therefore provide a more natural starting point for entry into Chinese thought” (Frisina 2016: 564).
Interestingly, Frisina’s comparative approach starts from the opposite end to my approach: He sees the merit of pragmatist metaphysics through Wang Yangming. He writes, “My encounter with Chinese thinkers, especially the sixteenth century Neo-Confucian Wang Yangming, has shaped my approach to Whitehead and Dewey. It was Wang’s slogan “chih hsing ho-i” (the unity of knowledge and action)—a slogan that I believe he meant us to take literally—that led me to see two things about pragmatism and process thought that I simply would not have realized on my own” (Frisina 2000: 122).
This issue is too complicated to be elaborated here. For more background understanding, see Liu, J. 2017.
These four moral sentiments are what Mencius identifies as “the four sprouts of the goodness of human nature” (siduan).
In Wu Zhen’s 吳震 interpretation, Wang Yangming affirms the interconnection between life and qi: “While affirming that qi is the fundamental basis for the existence of the world, he also gives a positive and proactive affirmation to the issue of ‘life (sheng 生)’” (Wu Z. 2020: 115). Wu calls it a return to Gaozi’s view that “what is inborn is called nature (sheng zhi wei xing 生之謂性)” in the Mengzi, which Mencius vehemently rejected. He thinks that the revival of Gaozi’s view began with Wang Yangming, but Wang turned it into a different treatise from that of Gaozi’s naturalistic (as well as amoral) view of human nature (See Wu Z. 2020).
Before Wang Yangming, Neo-Confucians took qi to be mixed in qualities as well as values. Zhu Xi in particular took qi to belong to the material world underneath the realm of principle. A late-Ming Neo-Confucian Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 continued to develop the view that qi is all good. Chen Lai calls it “doctrine of the goodness of qi (qi shan lun 氣善論)” (Chen 2004).
For example, the debate between realism and anti-realism on value, morality, truth, etc. deals with the independence dimension of these abstract things, while the debate between realism and anti-realism on mathematically or scientifically postulated entities such as numbers, strings, electrons, quarts, etc. is a contention in the existence dimension of these things. Commonsense realism concerns the existence dimension, and the anti-realism that denies the true existence of commonsense objects is represented by such schools as the Consciousness-only school in Chinese Buddhism.
The metaphysical assertion of the existence of Dao in the Daodejing is an example of this kind of metaphysical realism.
Putnam’s later work in 1990s seems to have slightly modified his position on realism, rejecting the designation “internal realism” and opting for “commonsense realism.” His arguments against the ready-made world are still valuable, nevertheless.
This comment appears in Putnam’s “Literature, Science, and Reflection.” New Literary History 7.3: 483–91. Reprinted in Putnam 1978: 83–94. Massimo (2017) was the first to draw my attention to this remark by Putnam.
Since both Chen’s and Chan’s criticisms of Wang Yangming point to his “conflating fact and value,” it is essential that we spend more time explicating Putnam’s dismissal of the dichotomy between fact and value.
For more details of the Cheng-Zhu school’s moral metaphysics, see Liu, J. 2017, Chapter 3.
Frisina thinks that Wang Yangming proposes the thesis of the unity of knowledge and action represents a direct return to traditional Confucianism. According to Frisina, traditional Confucianism does not commit a “fundamental epistemological mistake” in the bifurcation of two epistemic orders: “a knowing order, where one garnered a cognitive awareness of the world’s essential characteristics, and a physical order where that knowledge was put to use” (Frisina 2000: 123).
Here, I use “object” to render the Chinese term wu; however, in Wang Yangming’s usage, wu is nothing but “affairs.” An object means nothing to us until we are engaged with it, and when we engage with the object, it becomes an affair to us—our handling of the object. His conflation of usage of wu is often the source of misunderstanding.
Putnam states, “I would have pointed out that the concern of exact science is not just to discover statements which are true, or even statements which are true and universal in form (‘laws’), but to find statements that are true and relevant. And the notion of relevance brings with it a wide set of interests and values. But this would have only been to argue that our knowledge of the world presupposes values, and to make the more radical claim that what counts as the real world depends upon our values” (Putnam 1981: 137, emphasis original).
References
Chan, W.-T. (1963). A source book in Chinese philosophy. Princeton University Press.
Chen, L. (1991). The realm between being and nonbeing (youwu zhijiing). Renmin Publishing.
Chen, L. (2011). Neo-Confucianism in the Song-Ming Dynasties (songming lixue). SDX Joint Publishing Company.
Chen, Lai (2004). Interpretation and reconstruction: The philosophical spirit of Wang Chuanshan (quanshi yu chongjian—wangchuanshan de zhexue jinshen) Beijing, China: Beijing daxue chubanshe
Chen, Zhirui (2021). Investigation of Wang Yangming’s Theory of Qi (wangyangming qilun tanxi). Master’s Thesis Guizhou University. China
Devitt, M. (1996). Realism and truth (2nd ed.). Princeton University Press.
Frisna, W. (1986). Metaphysics and moral metaphysics. Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 13, 311–328.
Frisna, W. (2000). Value and the self: A pragmatic-process-Confucian response to Charles Taylor’s Sources of the Self. Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 27, 117–125.
Ge, Yaohui (2020). A study of Wang Yangming’s thought of Qi (wangyangming qisixiang Yanjiu). Master’s Thesis. Shanghai Normal University. China
Gong, Liyu (2016). A study of Wang Yangming’s theory of Qi (wangyangming qilun Yanjiu). Master’s Thesis. Shanxi University. China
Ivanhoe, P. J. (2009). Readings from the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism. Hackett Publishing Company.
Liu, JeeLoo (2017). Neo-Confucianism: Metaphysics, mind, and morality. Wiley-Blackwell
Liu, Yanqin (2022). A study of Wang Yangming’s theory of Qi (wangyangming qilun Yanjiu). Master’s Thesis. Lanzhou University. China
Locke, John (1689). An essay concerning human understanding. Part I
Pihlström, S. (2009). Pragmatist metaphysics: An essay on the ethical grounds of ontology. Continuum International Publishing Group.
Pihlström, S. (2021). Pragmatist truth in the post-truth age. Cambridge University Press.
Pihlström, Sami (2005). Pragmatic moral realism: A transcendental defense. Value Inquiry Book Series, Vol. 171. Amsterdam; New York: Rodopi
Pihlström, Sami (2007). “Metaphysics with a human face: William James and the prospects of pragmatist metaphysics.” William James Studies Vol. 2. (https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26203703)
Pihlström, Sami (2023a). “Toward a pragmatically naturalist metaphysics of the fact-value entanglement: Emergence or continuity?” In (Pihlström 2023b): 115–146
Pihlström, Sami (2023b). Realism, value, and transcendental arguments between neopragmatism and analytic philosophy. Vienna Circle Institute Library, Vol.7. Springer eBook
Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, truth and history. Cambridge University Press.
Putnam, H. (1982). Why there isn’t a ready-made world. Synthese, 51(2), 141–167.
Putnam, H. (2002). The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy and other essays. Harvard University Press.
Putnam, Hilary (1978). Meaning and the moral sciences. Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. Reprinted as Routledge Revivals in 2010
Putnam, Hilary (1990). Realism with a human face. (Ed.) James Conant. Harvard, MA: Harvard University Press. Reprinted in paperback in 1992
Seigfried, Charlene Haddock (2001). “Pragmatist metaphysics? Why terminology matters.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Winter 2001, Vol. 37, No. 1: 13–21
Wang, Yangming (2008). The Essential Master Yangming (yangming xiansheng jiyao). Beijing, China: Zhonghua Shuju
Wang, Yangming (2014). The complete works of Wang Yangming (wangyangming quanji). Shanghai, China: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe
Wu, Yisheng (2017). A study of Wang Yangming’s theory of Qi (wangyangming qilun yanjiu). Master’s Thesis. Northwestern University. China
Wu, Zhen (2020). “The new trends of the heart/mind school and the vital-force [Qi] School (xinxue yu qixue de xixiang yidong).” Fudan Journal (Social Sciences): No. 1. 2020: 113–125
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
About this article
Cite this article
Liu, J. The metaphysical as the ethical: a pragmatist reading of Wang Yangming’s “The Mind Is the Principle”. AJPH 3, 15 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00149-8
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00149-8