Abstract
A recognition of the acutely terministic and agonistic character of philosophizing has led to the perception of a dilemma in philosophical debates: differing positions are capable of being maintained only at the expense of ‘mutual unintelligibility,’ and a real ‘contact of minds’ could never be achieved without one side of the controversy abandoning its position and the enabling argumentative tension ceasing to exist. This perception is sustainable, however, only if we continue to accept the assumption that a direct, unmediated confrontation between disputants personifying two sets of rigidly defined terms is the mode of philosophical argumentation. A triadic rather than diadic conception of a typical debate between opposing schools of thought, which differentiates between the opponent and the audience, would address the theoretical misgivings caused by the perceived predicament.
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Liu, Y. Unintelligibility or Defeat: The Issue of Engagement in Philosophical Debates. Argumentation 11, 479–491 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007724314222
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007724314222