Abstract
After defending the ontologically genuine existence of at least some of the actual nomic relations, I discuss some issues concerning their metaphysical features. I firstly argue in favour of the metaphysical contingency of nomic relations and then I suggest that their relata-specificity is the most plausible metaphysical view that guarantees the unity of facts that the laws of nature are. Finally, I present a novel account according to which some of the actual nomic relations are neither external nor external but contingently possess a kind of hybrid character.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Armstrong uses a non-standard definition of supervenience that does not refer to groups of properties. For him, an entity Q supervenes upon entity P iff it is impossible that P could exist and Q not exist, where P is possible (1997, 11). I prefer the more or less standard definition according to which internal relations supervene on the natures of their relata iff there cannot be a difference in the relations without a difference in the natures of its relata.
In his earlier work (1978, vol.2, 86) Armstrong presents two reasons in favour of the thesis. First, according to his a posteriori realism it is a suspicious fact that one can discover the existence of internal relations simply by knowing the properties of their relata. Second, it seems implausible to think that internal relations exist given that we have no reason to attribute causal efficacy to them.
Mumford (2004) presents these basic asymmetrical relationships between properties. For instance, the having of the property of being coloured metaphysically makes (a) necessary the having of the property of being extended and (b) possible the having of the property being blue. Moreover, the having of the property of being square is metaphysically incompatible with the having of the property of being circular.
The fact that, in a C-world, all nomic relations are external does not preclude the possibility that other, non-nomic, relations between natural properties are internal.
The criterion of dispositionality for the fundamental properties of the actual world does not have to be related (as dispositional essentialists claim) to the essentialist’s criterion of transworld identity, which is based upon the assumption that the causal/nomic roles are essential to properties. Hence, all those philosophers that accept the existence of genuine, irreducible dispositional properties do not have to follow the essentialist route. I’ll return to this important point in Sect. 3.
Of course, this holds only under the assumption that the fundamental properties and relations are dispositional in all worlds in which they exist. Anyone (like me) who refutes this assumption must restrict the range of the validity of the claim to those worlds in which properties retain their dispositional character.
As in the case of the C-world, the fact that, in a D-world, all nomic relations are internal does not preclude the possibility that other, non-nomic, relations between natural properties are external.
S-properties are aspects of physical systems in respect of which the latter undergo change as a result of a symmetry operation.
The metrical structure of relativistic spacetime incorporates (in a sense) the set of all spatiotemporal relations.
This is a natural conclusion one arrives at when, for instance, considering models of the General Theory of Relativity that represent spatiotemporal worlds empty of matter.
Perhaps it is a brute fact that it is of the essence of some terms (as opposed to the essence of the others) to belong to the supervenience base. Acknowledging that, however, does not increase the plausibility of the suggestion under consideration. The relevant point here is that by denying that the internal relation supervenes on all of its terms, one has no cogent reasons to choose some of the terms as belonging to the supervenience base. I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for revealing this possibility.
In any case, and in spite of the previous discussion, anyone who remains sceptic on the existence of nomic relations may read the following remarks of this article as conditional upon the assumption of their reality.
Recall that according to dispositional essentialists the causal roles that any natural property confers to its bearers are essential features that exclusively constitute its identity in every possible world in which it exists.
It might also beg the question against identity theorists, such as Martin and Heil, who think that fundamental natural properties are both dispositional and non-dispositional.
One might even claim that the upshot is almost trivial, since categorical monists in their majority happily endorse the metaphysical contingency of the nomic relations of the actual world. I say “in their majority” because categorical monists can also be nomic necessitarians provided that the nomic relations are both external and metaphysically necessary. Evan Fales (1993, 140) is a well-known philosopher who defends such a view. As he acknowledges, however, this view treats the metaphysical necessity of nomic relations as primitive and sui generis. I agree; for, if nomic relations, qua external, do not supervene on the nature of their relata, what determines that there must be the connections that those relations express and not others? Hence, I think that Fales’ view, though possible, is not plausible. I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding me of this possibility.
A detailed defence of the thesis of Contingent Dispositionality against possible objections is beyond the scope of this article [for such an attempt, see (Livanios 2010b)]. Suffice it to say that, besides providing a dispositionalist a natural way to avoid the essentialist’s criterion, it can do a lot of other metaphysical work. For instance, it leads to a kind of reconciliation of Hume’s dictum (i.e. there is no kind of physical de re necessity) with the core thesis of dispositionalism, that is, the acceptance of the existence of genuine fundamental dispositional properties. This reconciliation is metaphysically important, because it partially bridges the gap between dispositionalists and categorical monists with a low cost for both. It can be shown that, following Contingent Dispositionality, categorical monists do not have to reject Hume’s dictum, which constitutes the bedrock of their Humean view. Likewise, dispositionalists can accept genuine dispositional properties and so do not have to deny one of the main motivations for their view; namely, that it can provide an adequate explanation of the ascriptions of unmanifested dispositions.
To avoid misunderstandings, this is not the kind of metaphysical underdetermination that ontic structural realists appeal to for motivating their view. According to this often-discussed underdetermination, distinct metaphysical packages are all consistent with a fundamental theory (for instance, individualist and non-individualist accounts of particles’ nature are both consistent with quantum theory). This fact implies that the theory cannot tell us what the world is like as far as the nature of its objects is concerned [for more details about the varieties of undetermination and possible reactions to them, see (French 2011)]. In our case, we do not have a mature scientific theory that posits entities whose nature is metaphysically underdetermined; rather, it is a belief that a number of metaphysical accounts share which presupposes the existence of entities characterised by a metaphysically underdetermined feature.
It might objected that the essential coexistence does not provide a genuine unity of R with a and b. For some philosophers, the fact that all R-worlds are also a&b related by R-worlds does not secure that the latter are also worlds in which a, R and b form a genuine unity. Yet I do not think that a stronger form of metaphysical unity is needed either in this case or in my (properly modified) application of Weiland and Betti’s proposal in the case of nomic relations.
Armstrong (1989, 118) credits the idea of non-transferability to C.B. Martin; he thinks that the assumption of non-transferability of tropes leads to a parsimonious ontology because, given that states of affairs supervene on the existence of their constituents, they become an ontological free lunch. But as we have seen, this assumption (under a different interpretation) can also ground the unity of genuinely existing facts. For relevant objections to the relata-specificity, see (Armstrong 1989, 117-8) and (Vallicella 2004, 173-4).
At least under the interpretation where we consider the relata of each particular instance of the relation. Perhaps, a ‘global’ relata-specificity can be defined even in this case provided that we take into account (in an appropriate manner) the set of all ordered pairs that constitute the relata of each instance of the relation. Yet, as far as I know, there is no plausible account of how this global feature can be adequately defined. So, in absence of a proper definition of such a ‘global’ relata-specificity (which, incidentally, would have to ground the totality of all facts involving a specific relation as constituent), I think that repeatable relations cannot plausibly be construed as relata-specific.
Two points that need to be stressed; first, talking about the same nomic fact in different worlds does not commit one to the truth of the thesis of transworld identity either of nomic relations or of their relata. In a counterpart-theoretic framework, my claim would be that in all worlds in which a counterpart of the actual nomic relation exists, it involves counterparts of mass and spatial distance. Second, the point of the paragraph is not to establish the view about the relata-specificity of nomic relations, but rather to raise its plausibility by showing that it accords to a part of our modal intuitions concerning laws of nature.
The objection that this claim is supported by a limited conception of the nomological role of spatiotemporal relations has been met in Sect. 2. Similar remarks apply to the present case.
The doctrine according to which there are no relational differences without differences in monadic properties.
It might be objected that one may implicitly attribute a specific sweetness to a wine by identifying the independent-from-sentient-beings basis in the wine for its sweetness with its sugar content. Yet, I think, even in that case, the crucial point of Campbell’s example still holds. Recall that what Campbell wants to show is that the nature of at least some of the relata of external founded relations is dependent on external factors. As long as it is sweetness (and not its basis in the wine) that is part of the nature of the relatum of Campbell’s relation, it certainly needs an external factor (the taste of a sentient being) in order to exist. I want to thank an anonymous referee for pressing this point to me.
Here I assume, for the sake of the illustration, that electric charge is a fundamental dispositional property in the actual world.
According to my view, the metaphysical contingency of hybridity is not a modal brute fact. Rather, it can be construed as ‘flowing’ from the contingent dispositionality of the fundamental properties and relations that are the relata of nomic relations. For instance, there are worlds in which all dispositional relata of an actual hybrid nomic relation are non-dispositional and consequently, the relation is no longer hybrid but external.
References
Armstrong, D. M. (1978). Universals and scientific realism, vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D. M. (1983). What is a law of nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Armstrong, D. M. (1989). Universals. An opinionated introduction. Boulder: Westview.
Armstrong, D. M. (1997). A world of states of affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bigelow, J., Ellis, B., & Lierse, C. (1992). The world as one of a kind. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43, 371–388.
Bird, A. (2007). Nature’s metaphysics: Laws and properties. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Campbell, K. (1990). Abstract particulars. Oxford: Blackwell.
Ellis, B. (2001). Scientific Essentialism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ellis, B. (2009). The metaphysics of scientific realism. Durham: Acumen.
Fales, E. (1993). Are causal laws contingent? In J. Bacon, K. Campbell, & L. Reinhardt (Eds.), Ontology, causality and mind (pp. 121–144). Cambridge: Cambridge U.P.
French, S. (2011). Metaphysical underdetermination: Why worry? Synthese, 180(2), 205–221.
Lewis, D. K. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
Livanios, V. (2008). Bird and the dispositional essentialist account of spatiotemporal relations. Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 39(2), 383–394.
Livanios, V. (2010a). Symmetries, dispositions and essences. Philosophical Studies, 148(2), 295–305.
Livanios, V. (2010b). On the possibility of contingently dispositional properties. Abstracta, 6(1), 3–17.
Molnar, G. (2003). Powers: A study in metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Mumford, S. (2004). Laws in nature. London: Routledge.
Psillos, S. (2006). What do powers do when they are not manifested? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXXII, 1, 137–56.
Vallicella, W. (2004). Bradley’s regress and relation-instances. Modern Schoolman, 81, 159–183.
Weiland, J. W., & Betti, A. (2008). Relata-specific relations: A response to Vallicella. Dialectica, 62(4), 509–524.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Livanios, V. Exploring the Metaphysics of Nomic Relations. Acta Anal 27, 247–264 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0159-z
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-012-0159-z