Abstract
The paper brings Dummett’s formulation of “realism” into dialogue with Heidegger’s understanding of truth as “unconcealment.” Livingston argues, with references to Frege and Wittgenstein, that the phenomenon of truth can be understood theoretically and analytically as requiring the pre-theoretical appearing and constitution of objects, in experiential, practical, or explicitly linguistic modalities. This approach provides a basis for new logically- and phenomenologically- based accounts of the structure of objectivity within linguistic truth in relation to the appearance and being of objects. Within the context of a development of Heidegger’s idea of ontological difference, this further implies that truth and objectivity must have a logically paradoxical structure. Even if Heidegger does not often say so explicitly, this paradoxical structure of objectivity and truth is centrally involved, as Livingston argues, in his understanding of the “clearing” and the interpretation it allows of beings “as such and as a whole.”
