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References
Geduldig v.Aiello, 417 US 484 (1974);General Electric Co. v.Gilbert, 429 US 125 (1976). For the feminist critique regarding the Supreme Court's approach see e.g. J.O. Brown, W.E. Parmet and P.T. Baumann, “The Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in Constitutional Dissonance”,Buffalo Law Review 36 (1987), 574–644; A.E. Freedman, “Sex Equality, Sex Differences and the Supreme Court”,Yale Law Journal 92 (1982–83), 913–968; L. Krieger and P. Cooney, “The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality”,Golden Gate Law Review 13 (1983), 513–572; S.A. Law, “Rethinking Sex and the Constitution”,University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132 (1984), 955–1040.
Geduldig,supra n.1, at 496 footnote 20.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Section 701(k).
California Federal Savings and Loan Association v.Guerra, 479 US 272 (1987).
CalFed, 285.
CalFed, 289.
The following overview is derived from W.C. Monster and M.P. Timmersde Vin, Positierecht, Samsom, Alphen a/d Rijn 1989.
Cited in P. Westen, “The Empty Idea of Equality”,Harvard Law Review 95 (1982), 537–596, 543.
Westen,supra n. 8, at 540 n.9. Westen's article gave rise to an extensive debate on equality, see e.g. K. Greenawalt, “How Empty is the Idea of Equality?”,Columbia Law Review 83 (1983), 1167–1185; P. Westen, “To Lure the Tarantula from its Hole: A Response”,Columbia Law Review 83 (1983), 1186–1208; S.J. Burton, “Comment on “Empty Ideas”: Logical Positivist Analysis of Equality and Rules”,Yale Law Journal 91 (1981/82), 1136–1152; P. Westen, “On “Confusing Ideas”: Reply”,Yale Law Journal 91 (1981/82), 1153–1165; E. Chemerinsky, “In Defence of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen”,Michigan Law Review 81 (1983), 575–599; P. Westen, “The Meaning of Equality in Law, Science, Math, Aad Morals: A Reply”,Michigan Law Review 81 (1983), 604–663.
The following overview of the different elements of equality is explored more fully in my dissertation. See T. Loenen,Verschilin Gelÿkheid (Zwollle: Tjeenk Willink, 1992).
The main articles with which I am familiar, apart from those mentioned in note 1supra, include inter alia M.E. Becker, “Prince Charming: Abstract Equality”,Supreme Court Review 27 (1987), 201–247; N.E. Dowd, “Work And Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace”,Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 24 (1989), 81–172; M. Fineman, “Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change”,Wisconsin Law Review 63 (1983), 789–886; L.M. Finley, “Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate”,Columbia Law Review 86 (1986), 1118–1182; C.A. MacKinnon,Feminism Unmodified (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); A. Scales, “The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence”,Yale Law Journal 95 (1986), 1373–1403; W. Williams, “The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism”,Women's Rights Law Reporter 7/3 (1982), 175–200;
W. Williams, “The Equality Crisis”, seesupra n.11, and “Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate”,New York University Review of Law and Social Change 13 (1984–85), 325; C. MacKinnon,Feminism Unmodified, supra n. 11.
MacKinnon,supra n. 11, at 32–45.
Geduldig,supra n.1, at 496 footnote 20.
Griggs v.Duke Power Co., 301 US 424 (1971). Griggs was cited before the European Court of Justice by both the complainant and the Advocate General in case 96/80,Jenkins v.Kingsgate Ltd. (1981).
I will not go into the problematic issue of the division of the burden of proof. In the US the SC seems to have reshifted the burden of proof towards the complainant in the caseWards Cove Packing Company v.Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989). In the European case law the burden of proof shifts to the person/institution making the distinction with the disparate effect, once this effect is shown by the complainant.
Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v.Karin Weber Von Hartz, case 170/84 (1986).
Bilka, consideration 31.
Bilka, consideration 36.
Rinner-Kühn v.FWW Spezial Gebäudereinigung GmbH, case 171/81 (1989).
See case 30/85,Teuling-Worms v.Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Chemische Industrie (1988).
See in this respect also M. Minow, “The Supreme Court 1986 Term. Forword: Justice engendered”,Harvard Law Review 101 (1987), 10, 10–95.
Gilbert,supra n.1, at 139–140.
Taking human rights as a point of reference is not unproblematic, as the rights which are enshrined in the major human rights documents seem to be gendered as well. How could theynot be in a gendered world? Elsewhere I have argued that we will have to redefine human rights and maybe “create” new ones from a feminist perspective, e.g. a right to economic independence or a right to care and be cared for. See T. Loenen, “Gelijkheid: een gepasseerd station?”,Nederlands Juristenblad 65 (1990), 3, 92–99.
See C. Smart,Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989). Smart is rather sceptical about the instrumental value of law for women.
See e.g. the Amicus Brief of the National Organisation of Women in CalFed.
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Loenen, T. Comparative legal feminist scholarship and the importance of a contextual approach to concepts and strategies: The case of the equality debate. Feminist Legal Stud 3, 71–87 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01103681
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01103681