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I. Introduction
The New Testament affirms that Jesus Christ had both human1 and divine natures.2 Nevertheless, many skeptics throughout the centuries have accused the New Testament characterization of the incarnation as being incoherent. For example, in his earlier works John Hick remarks that this doctrine is logically contradictory as a square circle.3 However, Hick has backed off from this claim recently.4 Commenting on this, Oliver Crisp argues that Hick's later gesture is sensible, because "we cannot know a priori that the two-natures doctrine is incoherent without first establishing a) exactly what the constituents of divinity and humanity consist in. . . and b) that these constituents are mutually exclusive of one another. It is notoriously difficult to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions of being human. . . even if the necessary and sufficient conditions of being divine are clearer because of revelation."5
In response to Crisp's comments, the accuser of the incarnation might agree that it is difficult to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions of being human and being divine based on philosophical speculations alone. However, he might point out that the New Testament does reveal what Jesus' human properties were, and he might argue that these properties cannot co-exist with the properties of being divine in the same person at the same time without entailing logical contradictions. He might remind us that his objection is not that human and divine natures are necessarily incompatible; rather, his objection is that it is the New Testament's account of human and divine natures simultaneously existing in Jesus that is incoherent. In other words, the accuser can frame his argument as such:
1. The divine nature essentially has the properties of being a. omniscient, b. omnipotent, c. omnipresent, d. non-physical, e. un-tempt-able6 and f. immortal.
2. Jesus exemplified human properties such as a', ignorance,7 b'. fatigue,8 c'. spatial limitation,9 d'. physicality;10 He was e'. tempted11 and P. He died.12
3. For any person P,
3.1 P cannot be "knowing all truths" (omniscience) and "not knowing all truths" (ignorance) at the same time.
3.2 P cannot be "incapable of experiencing fatigue" (as implied by omnipotence) and be "capable of experiencing fatigue" at the same time.
3.3 P cannot be "present at all points in space" (omnipresent)...