Abstract
Virtue ethics is increasingly regarded as a viable alternative to consequentialist or deontological systems of normative ethics. This paper argues that there can be no such triumvirate of contending comprehensive ethical systems. That is not because virtue is unimportant but rather because genuine virtue is excellent and therefore rare. For most people in most morally salient situations there is no possibility of virtuous response because possession of the relevant virtues simply does not obtain nor can be usefully simulated. Instead, the much more universal and important moral requirement is suitable moderation of one’s vices. Nor should it be supposed that the absence of virtue(s) necessarily diminishes the quality of an individual’s life and that person’s value to others. Rather, moral deficiencies are compatible with other excellences and may indeed contribute to them. I conclude that virtue ethics is less worthy of pursuit than vice ethics.
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Notes
It is no part of the ambition of this paper to adjudicate what lies inside and what is outside the perimeter of virtue ethics. To put (some of) my cards on the table, I take Hursthouse (1999) to be a paradigm instance of the genus. Also central are Driver (2001) and Christine Swanton (2003). Preceding these and influential across a wide range of professed virtue ethicists is Foot (1978). Arguably the work that birthed the entire line of thought in which virtue ethics finds a home is Anscombe (1958). The argument of this essay abstracts from what is distinctive in these and other contributions to the virtue ethics literature in order to construct a general critique, so I apologize in advance for riding roughshod over nuances.
Smith (1982), p. 25 concurs: “[I]n the common degree of the moral, there is no virtue. Virtue is excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises far above what is vulgar and ordinary. . . There is, in this respect, a considerable difference between virtue and mere propriety; between those qualities and actions which deserve to be admired and celebrated, and those which simply deserve to be approved of.”
Serena Williams’s swinging forehand volley is a marvelous stroke but not for the masses (including the author of this essay).
Perhaps even this outlier can, with suitable plastic surgery, be rendered recognizable to contemporary sensibilities. See Chappell (2014), Ch. 7 “Glory as an ethical idea”.
The Platonic dialogue Euthyphro is wonderfully teachable except for the opening hurdle of clarifying the unfamiliar sense of ‘piety’ being employed by Socrates and Euthyphro. It is not a virtue concept easily accessible to contemporary sensibilities.
Aristotle himself is a metic, a resident alien in Athens and thus excluded from playing the public role to which his own students aspire. Many readers of NE have been puzzled by the abrupt transition in the final book from political to philosophical activity as an ideal. One may suspect that Aristotle’s reflections on his own status as opposed to that of the young men he instructs provides a big part of the explanation.
See for example Badhwar (1996). As the title of this essay indicates, she is one among many contemporary virtue ethicists who are willing to jettison in whole or part the traditional Aristotelian unity of the virtues.
“Men and women need to be industrious and tenacious of purpose not only so as to be able to house, clothe, and feed themselves, but also to pursue human ends having to do with love and friendship. They need the ability to form family ties, friendships, and special relations with neighbours. They also need codes of conduct. And how could they have all these things without virtues?” Foot (2001), pp. 44–45 (emphasis added).
Additional character traits specific to one’s occupation, affections, ethnic identity, religious or ideological convictions and other commitments will also figure as inputs into the equations.
See Isaacson (2011); Boyle (2015). I admit that my knowledge of Jobs’s life is superficial. If it turns out that I have gotten its moral tenor wrong I am prepared to withdraw this example and substitute another. Although Jobs’s genius is exceptional, the claim advanced in this section is that the phenomenon of nonmoral qualities countermanding and outweighing moral defects is reasonably common.
The suggestion that one moral virtue can only properly be traded off for some other moral virtue is reminiscent of Rawls’s (1971) prescription that “a basic liberty. .. can be limited only for the sake of liberty itself”, p. 204.
It will not be easy to secure any consensus concerning the makeup of the select coterie of those whose extra-moral excellences outweigh a lack of moral virtue. In the philosophical literature Gauguin is perhaps the most common example put forth of someone whose “moral luck” insulates him from the recriminations that would otherwise attach to someone derelict in bourgeois duties to friends and family. See the influential essays by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in Statman (1993). I don’t know enough about Gaugin’s inner life to estimate whether his deviations from the norm are better understood as rooted in character or geography. Perhaps if breadfruit trees had been more common in his immediate neighborhood he would have been able to accommodate both his artistic calling and his domestic duties. Individuals I judge to be more appropriate company to Jobs include Vincent van Gogh, George Patton, St. Jerome, Jimi Hendrix, Frieda Kahlo, Malcom X, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Joan of Arc, and the artist formerly known as Prince. It is plausible that for each of them a certain deformation of character constitutes a crucial basis for greatness. Despite temptations to the contrary, I refrain from adding Nietzsche to this conversation.
An unprecedented two year decline in U.S. longevity among middle-aged whites is largely a consequence of opioid intemperance. See Case and Deaton (2015).
Some moralists demand that geographically far-off distress be actively sought and then tended to, even at considerable cost to the agent. See, for example Singer (2015). Whether or not such a policy is uniquely admirable can be debated, but it is beyond doubt that its fruits are enjoyed by others rather than the agent herself.
Again Adam Smith is to the point: “[T]here may frequently be a considerable degree of virtue in those actions which fall short of the most perfect propriety; because they may still approach nearer to perfection than could well be expected upon occasions in which it was so extremely difficult to attain it,” p. 25.
Readers of Nicomachean Ethics are often surprised by the disproportionate attention – two books – extended to friendship. Even if friends are needed for living a good life, it isn’t altogether clear why their function is specifically ethical. One hypothesis that makes sense is that friends of a suitably moral standing are all-but-necessary for maintenance of excellent character.
The founding document is Lipsey and Lancaster (1956).
As those who have attended to previous footnotes will surmise, I believe that Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments is one classical source that merits more attention. Overshadowed in the philosophical canon by Hume’s Treatise, Smith is especially good at emphasizing strategies non-pinnacle individuals can adopt to make themselves more lovely in the eyes of others and also to themselves insofar as they adopt the stance of the Impartial Spectator.
Review fn 3, above, in which Adam Smith is cited as distinguishing virtue in its strict sense from mere propriety.
Talbot Brewer graciously allowed me to audit his graduate seminar on virtue ethics in which my skeptical hunches were both challenged and sharpened. Among the other participants I am particularly indebted to conversation with William Hasselberger. Neera Badhwar and James Cargile commented on previous drafts of this paper and Jeffrey Carroll helped guide me through some shoals of ideal theory. Two anonymous referees for this journal put the arguments through their paces thereby nudging me to tighten them up. Decades previously my teacher Joel Kupperman planted ideas that germinated slowly. Remaining errors are attributable to my deficiencies with regard to managing the vice of stubbornness.
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Lomasky, L.E. The Impossibility of a Virtue Ethic. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 22, 685–700 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10017-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-019-10017-7