Abstract
At EN VII.6 1149a24-b3, Aristotle offers an argument for the conclusion that akrasia due to thumos is less shameful than akrasia due to epithumia. The reasoning in this argument is obscure, for Aristotle makes two claims in particular that are difficult to understand; first, that in some way thumos “hears” reason when it leads to akrasia, and second, that thumos responds to what it hears “as if having syllogized” to a conclusion about how to act. This paper argues that previous attempts to understand these two points have failed. It offers an account of the first difficult claim, but concludes there is not enough material in the text to determine what Aristotle means when he says thumos responds “as if having syllogized”. Nevertheless, the paper ends by offering an account of this remark that is Aristotelian in inspiration, even though it admittedly goes beyond anything that can be gleaned from the text.
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