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References
Dworkin, R. (1994). Prudence or rescue?Fabian Review 106(2), 10–14.
For a classic statement of this position, see Ayer, A. J. (1936).Language, Truth and Logic, Victor Gollancz, Oxford.
Stevenson, C.L. (1994).Ethics and Language, Yale University Press, London. (Stevenson, of course, would deeply resent being associated with the claims that ‘there is no distinction between moral argument and sheer propaganda’, and that there can be no distinction between good and bad arguments. However, with respect to Stevenson there is a difference between what Stevenson says about his own theory and its logical implications. He would undoubtedly disapprove of many of the more unpleasant uses of propaganda which we have seen this century, particularly of forms of propaganda which sway people by means of straightforward deceit. But his objections to such forms of argument would surely be moral, rather than logical, and on his own emotivist analysishis moral views should surely be analysed as expressions of his personal emotive reactions, no more right, objectively, than anyone else's. Since what I say about his analysis concentrates entirely on his statements about ‘non-rational’ persuasive techniques, it is fair to point out that Stevenson does allow that there is a limited role for rationality in moral arguments, in that very much of moral argument concerns pointing out inconsistencies and exposing the fact that the reasons given for certain attitudes involve appeals to false beliefs. However, given that there seem to be nological limits on what sorts of beliefs can provide reasons for specific attitudes, it is not clear howI can be criticised if, when you point out the claims I have made in order to justify my attitudes are false, I accept your statement but do not change my attitudes: your argument has simply failed to convince me. You might criticise memorally for my failure to alter my attitudes, but you could do that anyway, simply for holding attitudes different from yours, and similarly I could criticise you. The point is that neither of us, on this view, could be said really to be right.)
Loughlin, M. (1993). Critique: The Illusion of Quality.Health Care Analysis 1(1), 69–73.
MacIntyre, A.C. (1981).After Virtue, Duckworth, London.
Hume, D. (1978).A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
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Loughlin, M. Critique. Health Care Anal 2, 310–316 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02251077
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02251077