Abstract
This paper suggests that some climate denialism is bullshit. Those who spread it do not display a proper concern for the truth. This paper also shows that this bullshit is harmful in some significant ways. It undermines the epistemic demands imposed on us by what we care about, by the social roles we occupy, and by morality. It is also harmful because it corrodes epistemic trust.
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Notes
It is worth noting that no claim is being made about what a climate denier believes. Climate deniers, as I am using the expression, may or may not believe the key conclusions (or their negations) of “mainstream” climate science. Rather, what is most important about them for the purposes of this paper is that they are outwardly seen to attack key conclusions of “mainstream” climate science.
See Petersen et al. (2019) for more on the extent climate deniers are dominating public conversations about anthropogenic climate change using new media sources. For more on the effects their claims have had on public belief see, Leiserowitz et al. (2012), van der Linden, Leiserowitz, Feinberg, and Maibach (2015), Shi, Visschers, and Siegrist (2015), Aklin and Urpelainen (2014), and Leiserowitz, Maibach, Roser-Renouf, Smith, and Dawson (2013), for example.
Catriona McKinnon (2016) argues that, for this reason, it should not be tolerated.
Biddle and Leuschner (2015: p. 269) note, for example, that climate deniers impeded scientific progress “by forcing scientists to respond to a seemingly endless wave of unnecessary and unhelpful objections and demands, and that they create an environment in which scientists fear to address certain topics and to defend hypotheses as forcefully as they believe is appropriate.”.
For a detailed and interesting discussion of some of many tactics used by influential climate deniers see Oreskes and Conway (2011).
This view is often attributed to Harry Frankfurt (2009). See, for example, his popular book On Bullshit.
While this is not the only analysis of bullshit on the market (see, for example, Cohen (2012) and Ludlow (2022)), it is, probably, the simplest and most straightforward one to apply. Since other accounts roughly amount to the same thing, and because none of the differences between them matter for the purposes of motivating the idea that some climate denialism is bullshit, or, as we will see in the next section, that this bullshit is harmful, we will make use of this account.
This is a version of what James Edwin Mahon (2016) calls the traditional definition of lying and is the most widely accepted definition of it.
Bullshit also seems to be closely related to another concept that is common to talk about in discussions of climate denialism: manufactured doubt. This concept originates from, and is usually associated with, the work of Oreskes and Conway (2011). Bullshitting is one way to manufacture doubt about anthropogenic climate change. It is not the only way to achieve it though. As Oreskes and Conway (2011) document, climate deniers use a range of different tactics (such as lies and threats) to raise doubts for both policy makers and the general public about issues unfavorable to certain business and political interests. While Oreskes and Conway (2011) do not discuss bullshit, I think they would be happy to say that slinging bullshit is one tactic that can and that has been used to manufacture doubt. Something else to note about the relationship between bullshit and manufactured doubt is that bullshit is not always aimed at manufacturing doubt. Rather, sometimes it is used to induce particular actions, e.g. purchasing a used car. Other times it is used to produce confident beliefs about something, e.g. confident beliefs that our global climate is not changing in any significant way. So, in a nutshell, bullshitting is one way to manufacture doubt, and sometimes bullshitting is done for reasons other than to manufacture doubt. The two, however, sometimes coincide.
See, for example, Borenstein (2016).
It is worth noting that the Heartland Institute is a conservative and libertarian public policy think tank known to have received large amounts of funding from organizations that include ExxonMobil, an oil and gas organization, Koch Industries, a petro-chemical company, and Murray Energy, a coal mining company. For more on the funding sources of the Heartland Institute see Shulman et al. (2007), Fang (2019), Friedman (2019), and Goldenberg (2012).
See, for example, the collection of reconstructed temperature records in Dessler (2015: Ch.2).
See, for example, Solomon et al. (2007) for details about the role and extent natural forcings play in shaping the global climate.
Evidence supporting this claim can be found, for example, in Myhre et al., (2013).
For the details of these pieces, see the “Craig Idso” entry at DeSmog.com.
For the details of his co-authored books and documentaries see Idso’s staff page on the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change’s website. A link to his radio appearance on the The Richie Allen Show can be found on “Craig Idso” entry at DeSmog.com.
See, for example, Darling and Sisterson (2014: p.73).
This issue, along with several others, is noted by Darling and Sisterson (2014: p.73).
For more on the climate strategy adopted by the Heartland Institute, see Shulman et al. (2007), Gillis and Kaufman (2012), and Littlemore (2012a). Other reports also reveal Craig Idso's financial ties to the oil industry and conservative think tanks. These include those produced by Goldenberg (2012) and Harkinson (2009).
See Surgey (2016) for more on this filing and on Idso’s relationship with Peabody Energy.
These remarks can be found in O’Keefe (2004).
This fact about the carbon cycle can be found in many climate science textbooks. See, for example, Dessler (2015: Ch.5).
While carbon dioxide is the most abundant greenhouse gas, it is not the most powerful. Methane, for example, another greenhouse gas, is about twenty times more powerful than carbon dioxide. Interestingly, methane is much more quickly naturally removed from the atmosphere. On average, it takes about ten years for a methane molecule to be removed from the atmosphere. Since a number of human (agricultural, petrochemical, and waste) activities produce methane that ends up in the atmosphere, most mitigation strategies include polices to reduce methane emissions. One might think then that one could, contra O’Keefe, make changes to our practices through immediate and drastic reductions in methane emissions that would result in changes to the atmospheric concentration profile over the next few decades. Whether or not we think such changes count as significant depends on what we mean by a significant change. Charitably, given the dominance of carbon dioxide over methane, we might think, in line with O’Keefe’s remark, that immediate and drastic reductions in methane emissions would not change the atmospheric concentration profile over the next few decades in a meaningful way.
See the most recent IPPC (2019) report for the details and graphics of various Representative Concentration Pathways.
See, for example, Dodd, Papineau, Grenne, Slack, Rittner, Pirajno, O’Neil, and Little (2017).
See, for example, the collection of large scale reconstructed temperature records in Dessler (2015: Ch.2).
Again, see, for example, the collection of large scale reconstructed temperature records in Dessler (2015: Ch.2).
See, for example, Darling and Sisterson (2014: Ch.3) for a discussion of the impacts, but especially the impacts on humans, of anthropogenic climate change.
See NA (1998).
This information can be found on Robert Balling’s publicly available Curriculum Vitae.
The collection of epistemic demands discussed here is drawn from a larger collection of epistemic demands, suggested by Linda Zagzebski (2009), that apply to epistemic agents. See her work for a good, detailed, and general discussion of the epistemic demands of epistemic agents and the problem of bullshit. See also Zagzebski (2004).
One might naturally wonder about what this means for our practical duties and the harms we potentially face when we possess conscientiously acquired but false information given to us by well-intended authorities. If climate denialism bullshit is harmful because it undermines the epistemic demands that are imposed on us in virtue of the things we care about, then in what sense is this harm different from what we would experience if we conscientiously acquired or held well-intended but false beliefs? Bullshit involves intentional, reckless, or negligent harms, while the well-intended cases are instances of accidental harms. So, only in the former case are harms done to us. In the latter case, harms occur, but they are not the fault of anyone. Of course, descriptions are one thing, how well off we are is something else. What may be more important than how we describe these cases is how well off we are in either scenario. In both cases we are, all other things being equal, probably equally likely to be less able to fulfill our practical duties than what we would be than if we held true beliefs. Also, epistemic trust is broken only in the bullshit case. Provided, that is, that we detect it. So, we might say that, in a sense, the bullshit case leaves us less well off than in the well-intended but false belief case because epistemic trust has been broken. Things are tricky though, because if we detect bullshit, then we may be better able to locate the truth. Our detection of it may prompt us to search for the truth again, and this time we may have better luck. This could mean that we would be, in a sense, better off than we would be if we were simply handed well-intended false information. The idea is that determining that it is false in the later situation may be more challenging (if we even think to check) than locating the truth after we discover that past information was bullshit. I take it that in such a scenario, we would likely be better able to fulfil our practical duties, despite the harms we incurred. Whether we are, all things considered, better or worse off in such a scenario is unclear to me, and it will likely depend on more the details of the case. What I think is safe to say though is that, on average, we are more likely to latch onto the truth and fulfil our practical duties if our sources of information speak with a proper concern from the truth than if they don’t. And so, on average, we would be better off if people were well-intended.
For more on the responsibilities we have to our children and to future generations with respect to anthropogenic climate change see, for example, Caney (2021) (especially Sect. 3) and the references contained therein.
For a good discussion of some of the harms that arise for scientists, qua scientists, from dissent, see Biddle and Leuschner (2015).
This is true regardless of the account of epistemic trust we prescribe to.
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Luczak, J. Climate denialism bullshit is harmful. AJPH 2, 7 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00062-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-023-00062-6