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Chances, Problems, and Limits of Experimental Ethics

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Experimental Ethics

Abstract

Throughout its age-old tradition, philosophy has continuously been presented with new challenges. The latest one in this series comes from the experimental disciplines and their methodology: experimental philosophy has, during the last 10 to 15 years, increasingly gained reputation, and it has certainly been a controversial issue. Within this movement, the field of ethics deserves more attention. This article aims to give not a complete overview of, but at least an introduction to, the newly rising field of ‘Experimental Ethics’, the chances it offers, the problems for discussion, and the criticism to be expected.

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© 2014 Christoph Luetge

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Luetge, C. (2014). Chances, Problems, and Limits of Experimental Ethics. In: Luetge, C., Rusch, H., Uhl, M. (eds) Experimental Ethics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137409805_3

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