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Disagreement in science

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Summary

The argument of this paper is (1) that, contrary to what is often thought, there are cases of disagreement among scientists concerning the relative acceptability of theories which do not turn on nonrational or extra-scientific considerations, (2) that agreement cannot be secured without adversely affecting the scientific enterprise as we know it, and (3) that disagreement can be accommodated within a theory of scientific rationality and progress based on the idea that the relative acceptability of scientific theories is a function of their relative problem-solving effectiveness.

The diversity of our opinions does not proceed from some men being more rational than others but solely from the fact that our thoughts pass through diverse channels and the same objects are not considered by all.’ Descartes, Discourse on Method.

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Literatur

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  5. The quote is from B. Barber, ‘Resistance by Scientists to Scientific Discovery’ in B. Barber and W. Hirsch (eds.)The Sociology of Science, Free Press, New York 1962, p. 555. In this paper, Barber discusses a large variety of nonrational and extra-scientific factors which, he claims, have frequently influenced the acceptance of scientific theories. Barber's own view would appear to be a version of the classical view at present under discussion.

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  27. In my ‘Overdetermined Problems in Science’,Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, forthcoming, section 6, I argue that paleontological considerations play a crucial role in Agassiz's argument for the Ice-Age hypothesis.

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  37. Ibid., pp. 112–113. Mill's arguments for freedom of opinion have been endorsed recently by P. Feyerabend. See,e.g., his paper ‘Against Method’ in M. Radner and S. Winokur (eds.)Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis, Vol. IV (1970), pp. 28–29. Feyerabend's point, however, is different from the one being urged here: Feyerabend calls on Mill in support of his view about the need for a proliferation of theories, a view quite compatible with total agreement in science.

  38. Cf. L. Laudan,op. cit. (note 4), pp. 5–6 and pp. 11–12.

  39. Ibid., p. 68.

  40. Ibid., p. 15, p. 17, and p. 49. For the last point seeibid., pp. 50–54.

  41. Ibid., p. 131.

  42. Cf.ibid., chapter 3.

  43. T. S. Kuhn,The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (note 7), p. 155. This is not to say that Kuhn thinks problem solving unimportant. In his ‘Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research’ in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.)Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (note 4), p. 20, he tells us that his ‘own impression ... is that a scientific community will seldom or never embrace a new theory unless it solves all or almost all the quantitative numerical puzzles that have been treated by its predecessor’. See alsoThe Structure of Scientific Revolutions (note 7), p. 155.

  44. Laudan considers this to be a case of Kuhn-loss inop. cit. (note 4), p. 149.

  45. This is Laudan's approach to the problem. Cf.ibid., p. 150.

  46. T. S. Kuhn,The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (note 7), pp. 157–158.

  47. L. Laudan,op. cit. (note 4), p. 109.

  48. D. J. de S. Price, ‘Networks of Scientific Papers’,Science, Vol. 149 (1966), p. 512. For a useful discussion of the size of contemporary science see D. J. de S. Price,Little Science, Big Science, Columbia University Press, New York, 1963.

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  49. Laudan mentions these factors as being relevant to rational theory choice inop. cit. (note 4), p. 131.

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  51. This case is more complicated than suggested in the text. As noted earlier Lyell thought that Agassiz's approach was confronted by an empirical problem. But he also recognized that his own theory was confronted by an important problem of this sort, namely ‘our never having yet discovered marine shells or Recent or Pliocene species in the great valley of Switzerland’. Lyell,op. cit. (note 28), p. 252. Lyell's response to this difficulty was to point out that ‘daily experience teaches us to attach less and less importance to this kind of negative evidence’.Ibid., p. 253.

  52. This is also in conflict with Laudan's proposal that ‘rationality consists in making the most progressive theory choices’ inop. cit. (note 4), p. 7.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Ottawa, K1N 6N5, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

    Andrew Lugg

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Lugg, A. Disagreement in science. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 9, 276–292 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01801223

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