Classical World

Cawkwell's aim is to write an analytical history of two centuries of Persia's interactions with the Greek world, from Cyrus' conquest of Asia Minor to the defeat of the Achaemenid dynasty at the hands of Alexander. His job is made more difficult by the nature of the evidence: Persian sources are virtually nonexistent, while the Greek sources are problematical when it comes to their knowledge and understanding of matters Persian and their presentation of the events. This forces Cawkwell to use conjecture based on probability, logical reasoning based on external criteria, and mere guesswork to determine what might have really happened in those instances where he disagrees with the Greek sources. Despite the difficulties of his task, Cawkwell does a credible job in setting out the events of this period and the actions of these two important cultures in a systematic fashion and at the same time highlighting the weaknesses of much of our evidence for this period.

Cawkwell approaches the topic from the Persian viewpoint, seeking to explain Persian attitudes towards empire, their intentions towards the Greek world, and why they ultimately failed (hence the title "Greek Wars" rather than "Persian Wars" in an attempt to shift attention away from the Hellenocentric point of view). In the absence of Persian sources, Cawkwell is forced to rely on Greek prose sources, although Aeschylus is largely ignored. Cawkwell's approach to this source material is understandably skeptical. The biases in the Greek accounts of both Greek heroism and Persian inferiority have long been apparent. What Cawkwell does not do, however, is to explain the underpinnings of the biases of the Greek sources (the Greek authors were more concerned with matters of Greek identity and moral superiority and saw them realized in the Greek victory over the Persian "barbarians"). This omission is understandable given the nature of Cawkwell's study, but so comprehensive an examination of Persian matters and so clear a rejection of the Greek sources might have benefited from making the bias of the latter explicit. Cawkwell concludes that the failure of Persia was not the result of Greek moral superiority, but rather a combination of Persian politics, geography, and military factors.

The body of the book is composed of a straightforward chronological history, with matters that are either controversial (e.g., the authenticity of the Themistocles decree and the existence of a "peace of Callias") or tangential (e.g., the size, composition, and training of the Persian navy and army) confined to appendices (there are nine in total, taking up the final quarter of the book). These appendices provide detailed discussions that argue the issues at length and often conclusively.

Cawkwell provides a useful analysis of Persian interactions with the Greek world and demonstrates the skewed nature of the source material. Unfortunately, the value of his study is marred by not infrequent pretentious diction, convoluted syntax, and unidiomatic English that impede understanding. As he states up front, he is writing to the experts. This results in an approach that cuts no slack for the uninitiated, leaving students and those not already conversant with the intricacies of Achaemenid history floundering. Although Greek terms and quotations are limited, they are inconsistently translated: Greek in the body of the text is usually translated, Greek in the footnotes and appendices very often is not. This reduces the accessibility of the very elaborate and detailed footnotes and appendices for those who cannot read Greek. Ultimately, it is possible for an academic to write what Cawkwell dismissively calls "a good read" and still provide a learned [End Page 173] analysis of the subject in question that is accessible to a wider audience. While Cawkwell has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of the "Greek" Wars, the utility of the work is restricted to a limited few among those interested in the subject.