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Liberalism and the moral basis for human rights

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Acknowledgments

I wish to thank John Exdell and Amy Lara for very helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of the paper. I also thank two reviewers for this Journal for a number of very good suggestions. Thanks also to participants at the 2005 NEH Summer Seminar on “Political Obligation, Democratic Legitimacy and Human Rights” at Georgia State University. This paper is greatly imporved as a result of constructive suggestions from participants in the Seminar. Finally, I thank the audience at the Universidad Di Tella in Buenos Aires for a number of comments on a presentation given in September 2006.

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Mahoney, J. Liberalism and the moral basis for human rights. Law and Philos 27, 151–191 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10982-007-9013-7

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