Abstract
Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture.
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