Abstract
This paper extends the theory of situated inference from Mares (Relevant logic: a philosophical interpretation. Cambridge University Press, Cambrdge, 2004) to treat two weak relevant logics, B and DJ. These logics are interesting because they can be used as bases for consistent naïve theories, such as naïve set theory. The concepts of a situation and of information that are employed by the theory of situated inference are used to justify various aspects of these logics and to give an interpretation of the notion of set that is represented in the naïve set theories that are based on them.
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Notes
Brady’s logic MC (meaning containment) has the same theorems as DJ, but includes certain disjunctive metarules. From the semantic point of view, the metarules are useful in proving that DJ is complete over a class of models each of which have a single normal situation. This semantic difference adds complications to the philosophical story that I tell here and so I avoid it and stick with DJ.
One might object that I am trying to capture a very intensional theory in an extensional framework—one based on classical logic. There are various ways of understanding this. First, I could adopt the view that the extensional metatheory is a ladder that is to be thrown away after the theory is developed. Second, I could adopt a logical pluralist position according to which there are various logical systems right for different inferential or interpretive contexts. I tend to take the latter point of view.
When I use “set” from here forward, I mean a set in the sense of a classical set theory such as ZF.
Postulate 3 is not usually given for B. It is useful for the present project to ensure that for up-sets X and Y that \(X\circ Y\), in the sense of definition 2 of Sect. 4, is always an up-set.
The idea is to treat subscripts as picking out, not individual situations, but sets of situations. Then we can have as a disjunction elimination rule from \(A\vee B_{\alpha }\) to infer \(A_{\beta }\) and \(B_{\gamma }\) with the side conditions that \(\beta \cup \gamma = \alpha \) and a conjunction introduction rule from \(A_{\alpha }\) and \(B_{\beta }\) to infer \(A\wedge B_{\alpha \cap \beta }\). These rules make the proof of distribution of conjunction over disjunction straightforward. This, however, is not the place to present this system.
For the full natural deduction system for R, that uses \(\lambda \)-abstraction in this way, see Mares (2016).
For a taxonomy of relevant logics that trivialise with a Curry-style argument, see Øgaard (2016).
References
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Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Elia Zardini for inviting me to write a paper for this issue, to the participants of the Frontiers of Non-Classicality Conference held in Auckland in 2016 for comments, and especially to the three referees for this journal who gave me very helpful comments that, in my opinion, improved the paper greatly.
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Appendices
Appendix I: The logics B and DJ
The logic B.
Axioms:
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1.
\(A\rightarrow B\)
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2.
\((A\wedge B)\rightarrow A\); \((A\wedge B)\rightarrow B\);
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3.
\(A\rightarrow (A\vee B)\); \(B\rightarrow (A\vee B)\);
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4.
\(((A\rightarrow B)\wedge (A\rightarrow C))\rightarrow (A\rightarrow (B\wedge C))\);
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5.
\(((A\rightarrow C)\wedge (B\rightarrow C))\rightarrow ((A\vee B)\rightarrow C)\);
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6.
\((A\wedge (B\vee C))\rightarrow ((A\wedge B)\vee (A\wedge C))\);
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7.
\(A\leftrightarrow \lnot \lnot A\).
Rules:
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\(\vdash A\rightarrow B, \ \vdash A \ \Longrightarrow \ \vdash B\);
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\(\vdash A, \ \vdash B \ \Longrightarrow \ \vdash A\wedge B\);
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\(\vdash A\rightarrow B, \ \vdash B\rightarrow C \ \Longrightarrow \ \vdash A\rightarrow C\);
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\(\vdash A\rightarrow \lnot B \ \Longrightarrow \ \vdash B\rightarrow \lnot A\).
To obtain DJ add the conjunctive syllogism axiom, \(((A\rightarrow B)\wedge (B\rightarrow C))\rightarrow (A\rightarrow C)\), and the contraposition axiom, \((A\rightarrow \lnot B)\rightarrow (B\rightarrow \lnot A)\).
Appendix II: Natural deduction systems for B and DJ
For the logic B:
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\(\rightarrow \) E From \(A\rightarrow B_{\alpha }\) and \(A_{\beta }\) to infer \(B_{\alpha \circ \beta }\).
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\(\rightarrow \) I From a subproof that proves \(B_{\alpha \circ a}\) from the hypothesis \(A_{a}\) to discharge the hypothesis, end the subproof and infer \(A\rightarrow B_{\alpha }\).
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\(\wedge \) E From \(A\wedge B_{\alpha }\) to infer \(A_{\alpha }\) or \(B_{\alpha }\).
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\(\wedge \) I From \(A_{\alpha }\) and \(B_{\alpha }\) to infer \(A\wedge B_{\alpha }\).
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\(\vee \) E From \(A\vee B_{\beta }\), \(A\rightarrow C_{\alpha }\), and \(B\rightarrow C_{\alpha }\) to infer \(C_{\alpha \circ \beta }\).
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\(\lnot \hbox {E}_1\) From \(A\rightarrow B_o\) and \(\lnot B_{\alpha }\) to infer \(\lnot A_{\alpha }\).
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\(\lnot \hbox {E}_2\) From \(\lnot \lnot A_{\alpha }\) to infer \(A_{\alpha }\).
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\(\lnot \) I From \(A_{\alpha }\) to infer \(\lnot \lnot A_{\alpha }\).
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Dist From \(A\wedge (B\vee C)_{\alpha }\) to infer \((A\wedge B)\vee (A\wedge C)_{\alpha }\).
Left Push From \(A_{\alpha }\) to infer \(A_{o\circ \alpha }\).
Left Pop From \(A_{o\circ \alpha }\) to infer \(A_{\alpha }\)
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To obtain DJ add the rules: (DJ) From \(A_{\alpha \circ (\alpha \circ \beta )}\) to infer \(A_{\alpha \circ \beta }\); (Contrap) From \(A\rightarrow B_{\alpha }\) and \(\lnot B_{\beta }\) to infer \(\lnot A_{\alpha \circ \beta }\).
Appendix III: Semantic proof sketch of triviality for full DJ-frames
Lemma 4
In all Routley–Meyer models, for all \(X\subseteq S\) that are closed upwards under \(\le \), \(0\circ X = X\).
Proof
Suppose first that \(x\in 0\circ X\). Then there is a \(y\in 0\) and a \(z\in X\) such that Ryzx. Since \(y\in 0\), by the definition of \(\le \), \(z\le x\). Since X is an up-set, \(x\in X\). Generalizing, \(0\circ X\subseteq X\).
Now suppose that \(x\in X\). Since \(\le \) is a partial order, \(x\le x\). Thus, by the definition of \(\le \), there is some \(y\in 0\) such that Ryxx. So \(x\in 0\circ X\). Generalizing, \(X\subseteq 0\circ X\) and hence \(0\circ X=X\). \(\square \)
Lemma 5
For all X, Y up-sets of members of S, \(X\subseteq Y\) iff \(0\subseteq X\Rightarrow Y\).
Proof
First, suppose that \(X\subseteq Y\). Now suppose that \(o\in O\), Roxy, and \(x\in X\). By the definition of \(\le \), \(x\le y\). Since X is an up-set and \(x\in X\), \(y\in X\). Since \(X\subseteq Y\), \(y\in Y\). Thus, by the definition of \(\Rightarrow \), \(o\in X\Rightarrow Y\). Generalising, \(0\subseteq X\Rightarrow Y\).
Second, suppose that \(0\subseteq X\Rightarrow Y\). Suppose that \(x\in X\). By semantic postulate 1, \(\le \) is reflexive, so \(x\le x\). By the definition of \(\le \), there is some \(o\in 0\) such that Roxx. But, by the definition of \(\Rightarrow \), if Roxx and \(x\in X\), then \(x\in Y\). Hence \(X\subset Y\). \(\square \)
Lemma 6
\((X\circ Y)\subseteq Z\) iff \(X\subseteq (Y\Rightarrow Z)\).
Proof
First assume \((X\circ Y)\subseteq Z\). Now suppose that \(x\in X\), Rxyz, and \(y\in Y\). By the definition of \(\circ \), \(z\in X\circ Y\). By the assumption, \(z\in Z\). Hence \(x\in Y\Rightarrow Z\).
Now assume that \(X\subseteq Y\Rightarrow Z\). Also assume that \(z\in X\circ Y\). By the definition of \(\circ \), there are x and y such that Rxyz, \(x\in X\), and \(y\in Y\). By the assumption and the definition of \(\Rightarrow \), \(z\in Z\). \(\square \)
The semantic version of naïve comprehension. For each propositional function \(\psi \) there is some \(i\in D\) such that
As I showed in Sect. 9, from naïve comprehension the following can be derived for full frames:
Theorem 7
In every full-frame for DJ that satisfies naïve comprehension, \(0\subseteq \pi \) for every proposition \(\pi \).
Proof
\(\varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2]) = ((\varphi _{\in }(f[k/1,k/2]) \circ \varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2]))\Rightarrow \pi )\), so \(\varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2]) \ \subseteq \ ((\varphi _{\in }(f[k/1,k/2]) \circ \varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2]))\Rightarrow \pi )\). By lemma 6, \((\varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2])\circ ((\varphi _{\in }(f[k/1,k/2]) \circ (\varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2])) \subseteq \pi \). By proposition 3, \(X\circ Y\subseteq X\circ (X\circ Y)\), so \(((\varphi _{\in }(f[k/1,k/2]) \circ (\varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2])) \subseteq \pi \). Thus, by lemma 5, \(0\subseteq (((\varphi _{\in }(f[k/1,k/2]) \circ (\varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2])) \Rightarrow \pi \). But this implies that \(0\subseteq \varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2])\). Thus, \(0\circ 0 \subseteq (\varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2])\circ \varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2]))\). By lemma 4, \(0 \subseteq (\varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2])\circ \varphi _{\in } (f[k/1,k/2]))\) hence \(0\subseteq \pi \). \(\square \)
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Mares, E. An informational interpretation of weak relevant logic and relevant property theory. Synthese 199 (Suppl 3), 547–569 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1524-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1524-7