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Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas

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Abstract

On an expressivist view, ethical claims are understood as expressions of our attitudes, desires, and feelings. A famous puzzle for this view concerns the use of logic in ethical reasoning, and two standard treatments try to solve the puzzle by explaining logical inconsistency in terms of conflicting attitudes. I argue, however, that this general strategy fails: because we can reason effectively even in the presence of conflicting moral attitudes – in cases of moral dilemmas – avoiding these conflicts cannot be a ground for correct moral reasoning. The result is a dilemma for expressivists: if they take all kinds of attitudes to be under consideration, then conflict cannot play the required role, since attitudes can fail to be compatible in cases of moral conflict. If they restrict attention to ‘all-in attitudes’ or to intentions or plans, then there is an important notion of obligation, used in standard arguments – one for which conflicts are allowed – that they fail to capture. I explain why expressivists should be especially tolerant of conflicting attitudes, and I conclude that they should pursue a different strategy for grounding logical normativity.

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Notes

  1. For general texts on contemporary expressivism, see Blackburn (1984, 1998), and Gibbard (1990, 2003).

  2. See van Roojen (1996), Schueler (1988), and Hale (1986, 1993).

  3. The problem was first raised by Geach (1960), who in turn credited Frege for the basic insight. It was also pressed by Searle (1969).

  4. See note 1. I’ll be skipping over a lot of details here, just focusing on what’s relevant to the puzzle.

  5. In this presentation, I am following Blackburn (1988).

  6. Blackburn (1988 p. 513); he credits Hintikka with the general idea.

  7. Blackburn (1988, p. 513).

  8. Blackburn (1988, p. 514).

  9. The “not” here is somewhat confusing. Is it the “not” of having and not having an attitude, or the “not” of having an attitude against and an attitude not against? The semantics, and everything Blackburn says about it, suggest the latter interpretation. In what follows I will assume that is what is meant.

  10. I am indebted here to Mark van Roojen, whose (1996) helped me understand Blackburn’s logic. See especially p. 318. As we will see below, “could not coexist” turns out to have a slightly subtle meaning for Blackburn, something like, “could not coexist in any logically possible world.”

  11. In this presentation, I am following Gibbard’s most recent book (2003), though some of his previous writings are relevant also, as I indicate below.

  12. Gibbard (2003, p. 10).

  13. Gibbard (2003, p. 44).

  14. Gibbard (2003, p. 59).

  15. Gibbard (2003, p. 59).

  16. Gibbard (2003, pp. 142–143).

  17. Van Roojen (1996) and Schueler (1988), have each criticized Blackburn on the grounds that there is no logical error in having conflicting attitudes, and I endorse their criticisms. My point here is that furthermore, we can reason effectively in the face of these, and so there are examples of what seem to be valid reasoning that are not captured by Blackburn’s logic. Blackburn’s particular “logic of attitudes” is developed in response to Schueler, and I argue in the rest of the paper that it fails for various reasons. I explore below a possible reply to van Roojen and argue that it, too, fails. I say more about the appropriateness of consistency requirements in Sections 4 and 5 below.

  18. See Brink (1994, p. 216).

  19. For some arguments that moral dilemmas are real, see Marcus (1980), Sinnott-Armstrong (1988), van Fraassen (1973), and Marino (2001). For some arguments that they are not, see Donagan (1984) and Brink (1994).

  20. de Haan (2001).

  21. For more on this type of strategy, see, e.g., Brink (1994).

  22. I don’t agree with de Haan about ought because as proponents of moral dilemmas stress, it seems possible that I fail in my obligations whatever I do, so that the permissibility of A would not follow from its obligatoriness. See especially van Fraassen (1973), Marcus (1980), and Marino (2001). For other criticism of de Haan related to some deontic principles, and a way of seeing dilemmas in the context of possible worlds, see Morscher (2002).

  23. See note 19.

  24. At one point Blackburn suggests that someone who wants A and B but not both doesn’t know what he wants. Perhaps LA could be altered accordingly; I’m not sure.

  25. Marcus (1980) has argued that we should give up the agglomeration principle for obligations: analogously to “it is possible that,” it may be that obligations to do A and B do not result in obligations to do B. There may be something to that, but it seems ill-motivated in this setting: attitudes and plans both seem to obey agglomeration.

  26. For a nice discussion of deontic principles relevant to moral dilemmas, see McConnell (2002).

  27. Or something more radical: they are correct principles, there are moral dilemmas, and thus morality is truth-inconsistent.

  28. Blackburn (1988, p. 514).

  29. Blackburn (1988). For the relevant rules, see pp. 513–514. For an example showing how first approximations work, see p. 515.

  30. van Roojen (1996, p. 318).

  31. This might give Blackburn a way to answer van Roojen and Schueler (see note 17), since if we see the Principle of Consistency of Attitudes as a logical law, along the lines of the Principle of Deontic Consistency, having a conflict of attitudes would involve a logical error. As I explain below, however, I don’t think the expressivist should pursue this line of thought.

  32. With LP, I’ll use the regular names of the principles, since LP has a “deontic” feel to it anyway.

  33. Gibbard (1990).

  34. Gibbard (1990, p. 98).

  35. Compare Marcus’s definition of consistency in her (1980).

  36. Schueler (1988). Schueler gives the example in terms of being “fatter” but the point is the same.

  37. Blackburn (1988, p. 509).

  38. Blackburn (1988, p. 510).

  39. For an argument that possibility might be understood as conceivability, see Yablo (1993).

  40. Since closure fails in LA, the fact that going to the movie means not going to the concert is irrelevant here.

  41. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to consider this possibility.

  42. See Gibbard (2003, p. 56), and (1992, p. 973). Some remarks in Gibbard (1990) are related; see especially p. 289.

  43. This last clause allows the expressivist to separate out attitudes he has only for himself, and those he thinks should be universally accepted.

  44. For an argument that in the emotional case, genuine ambivalence is possible, see Greenspan (1980), section 2.

  45. For a related discussion of the relationship between consistency and expressivism, see Marino (2005).

  46. For some empirical research, see, for example, Haidt (2001); for a philosophical exploration, see Nichols (2004).

  47. Thanks to Mark van Roojen, Dave DeVidi, and two anonymous referees for Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada, N2L 3G1

    Patricia Marino

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Marino, P. Expressivism, Logic, Consistency, and Moral Dilemmas. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 9, 517–533 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-006-9034-6

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