Freedom, receptivity, and God

Conclusion

The practical question about God's relation to human freedom isthe issue between Nietzsche and Sartre, on the one hand, and Marcel,on the other. God is compatible with human freedom, for Marcel,because He is conceived as an absolute “Thou,” not an objectivecause, and because human freedom is essentially disposability, openand receptive to the other. God is relevant to human freedom becauseHe is more intimate to me than I am to myself, because He can re-veal to me possibilities about myself and the world which I can thenaccept or reject. If the other is essential for self-knowledge in thefinite sphere, then the absolute Other is essential for the deepestself-knowledge. Also God is essential as the ground of that hopewithout which creative fidelity would die.

The most fundamental question, therefore, of the atheism-theismdebate is the nature of freedom. If freedom is conceived in an “either-or” manner as totally subjective, independent, and closed in uponitself, then there is an essential antagonism between man and God.If freedom is conceived in a “both-and” fashion as both independentand dependent, active and receptive, personally responsible and yetopen to the other, then there is not antagonism, but rather fruitfulinteraction. One of Gabriel Marcel's major contributions to existentialphilosophy and the philosophy of religion is to have indicated theplausibility and fruitfulness of such a model.