Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the connections and links that existed between Buchanan and Italian economists. We show that, even though Buchanan had read them, it was only after having spent one year in Italy—1955–1956—that Buchanan paid attention to these economists. Here, Francesco Forte played a particularly important role. It did not only transform Buchanan’s conception of the public debt but also lead him to pay more attention to law, institutions and political phenomena.
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Notes
- 1.
In his autobiography (1992, Chap. 6, pp. 82–92).
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
1936 is the date of publication of de Viti de Marco’s book in English. De Viti’s handbook was widely used for many years, starting from 1886 to 1887, in the form of lithographed handouts, then in 1923 it was printed in a limited edition, and lastly published in 1928.
- 5.
- 6.
One may add that Buchanan used their works to develop an “individualist” theory of the state, that he opposed to an “organismic” theory of the state (1948, Chap. 2, 1949; see also, Marciano 2016). In his dissertation, he justified the term “organismic” with a reference to the Swedish economist, Erik Lindahl. Domenico da Empoli (1989, p. 16) suggested that the opposition between the organismic and the individualistic theories of the state also reflects De Viti’s dual model of the state. As we have shown elsewhere (Marciano 2019), Benham (1934b) precisely insisted on the importance of a cooperative theory of the state in his comment of Einaudi’s Contributo alla Ricerca dell’ “Ottima Imposta” (1929).
- 7.
Surprisingly, Buchanan referred to Einaudi’s work in his dissertation as well as in the preliminary version of “The Pure Theory”, where he wrote “Professor Einaudi, Italy’s current President, is a representative of this school in his work on fiscal theory’s” (1949, p. 25)—directing his readers to Benham’s article rather than to Einaudi’s work. But the name and reference disappeared in “The Pure Theory” where the only Italian economists mentioned were Pantaleoni and de Viti de Marco.
- 8.
The proposal was made by the Clay Committee—an Advisory committee on a National Highway Program, chaired by general Lucius D. Clay and established by the then president of the U.S.A., Dwight Eisenhower, to suggest mechanisms to finance the expansion and modernization of the highway network. The bonds issued by the government would be managed, the Committee proposed, by a Federal Highway Corporation.
- 9.
The preface itself is dated from December 1957.
- 10.
In his autobiography, Buchanan cited the following names: “Ferrara , Mazzola, de Viti de Marco, Pantaleoni , Ricca-Salerno, Puviani, Montemartini, Barone, Einaudi, Fasiani, Fubini, Cosciani, Griziotti, De Maria, Arena—and many others” (1992, p. 87).
- 11.
“For three decades, we [his wife and himself] have counted Francesco and Carmen Forte among a relatively small number of friends for life” (Buchanan 1992, p. 89).
- 12.
In the preface of Public Principles, Buchanan wrote: “[i]n a specific sense, none of the Italian theorists appears to have formulated a fully acceptable theory of public debt” but, even more, “the dominant theory in Italy, even prior to the 1930s, has much in common with that which characterizes the ‘new economics’” (1958, p. xix).
- 13.
Thus, he noted, their “approach to the whole problem of public debt was instrumental in shaping my views as they now stand, and I should, therefore, acknowledge this influence” (1958, p. xix).
- 14.
Wagner (2014) also linked this book to Buchanan ’s main interests and methodology, however he stated that Buchanan “failed to carry forward fully his insights from highway finance to public debt more generally” (260). For an analysis of Buchanan ’s work on public debt, see also Templeman (2007) and contextualized in a history of ideas perspective by Salsman (2017).
- 15.
“I am hopeful that the long essay of my own in which I summarize the development of Italian fiscal theory will be published this year” (Buchanan to Einaudi, 3 March 1959), Fondazione Einaudi, Archivio Luigi Einaudi .
- 16.
Buchanan wrote him: “You were kind enough to make some comments on this essay for me about two years ago through the office of my good friend, Professor Parravicini”. Buchanan to Einaudi, 3 March 1959.
- 17.
Buchanan to Einaudi, 27 January 1961.
- 18.
“My long range plans include a second long stay in Italy within the next five years. During this period, I shall plan to concentrate on Ferrara who has been almost completely neglected by English speaking economists. I should hope to sponsor and organize an English translation of several of his famous Prefaces” (Buchanan to Einaudi, 3 March 1959). And also: “I hope to return for an additional year’s research in Italy soon to learn more about the life and work of Ferrara . He is an economist who seems to have been seriously neglected by English-language scholars, and I should like to organize, if possible, an English translation of some of his critical prefaces. These are, in my opinion, very good works” (Buchanan to Einaudi, 27 January 1961).
- 19.
Ferrara contrasted an “economic” model of the state with an “oppressive” one: the former was regarded as an ideal, the latter as the form existing through history.
- 20.
Letter from Buchanan to Einaudi, 27 January 1961. This project was already envisaged in Buchanan (1960, p. 64, fn. 39): “It is along these lines that I hope to do considerably more work”.
- 21.
Buchanan thanked Giardina: “I have benefited from several discussions with my colleagues, James Ferguson and Emilio Giardina” (1964, p. 150).
- 22.
This part of their correspondence was in Italian: “Quando ho scritto il mio libro credevo che il trasferimento del peso al futuro dipende dalla presenza dell’illusione sull’individuo non ‘capitalizing’ l’imposta in futuro”—“When I wrote my book, I believed that the transfer of the burden to future generations depend on the existence of the illusion on the individual not ‘capitalizing’ the tax in the future” (our translation).
- 23.
Chapter 10 of the book is in fact entitled “The fiscal illusion”.
- 24.
In his words: “One very important influence of the Italian year on me it was not only the reading this material, it was also living there, living in the culture, becoming a part of the culture, the attitude of the Italians toward politics, politicians and the state. You are much more skeptical, much more cynical, much less idealistic, much less romantic about the state, and that influenced me, influenced me a great deal” (Buchanan ’s interview in Mosca 2016, p. 131).
- 25.
On the Italian origins of Public Choice (see Giuranno and Mosca 2018).
- 26.
Letter from Buchanan to Einaudi, 27 January 1961. Here is the full passage: “During last year and for a part of this year, we have been fortunate in having here at the University of Virginia as visitor one of the outstanding young Italian scholars in public finance. I refer to Dr. Francesco Forte, with whom I believe you are acquainted. Forte and I have done some joint research, and we have further studies projected. I feel certain that Forte will carry on in an excellent fashion the outstanding Italian tradition in this particular field of scholarship”.
- 27.
Forte was MP in various legislatures, and Minister from 1982 to 1986.
- 28.
In an interview given to Manuela Mosca on 18 June 2018.
- 29.
The Italian Constitution was enacted in 1947.
- 30.
Buchanan later wrote: “I was … fortunate that these complementary ‘readings’ occurred during residence in Italy” (1992, p. 91). In fact, as we have argued elsewhere (Marciano 2019; see also Section 3 of this paper), Buchanan probably made the connection between Wicksell and the Italian public economists by reading Benham (1934b). This explains why he talked of “complementary” readings.
- 31.
However, Forte doesn’t underestimate the influence of Buchanan ’s master Frank Knight on this point.
- 32.
For example, in 1974 Forte published the Italian translation of Buchanan ’s essays in edited volumes.
- 33.
In the first footnote of the paper Buchanan writes: “Special acknowledgement should be made for the critical assistance of Emilio Giardina of the University of Catania and W. Craig Stubblebine of the University of Delaware” (1965, p. 1).
- 34.
- 35.
Bruno Leoni was professor of philosophy of law and political science at the University of Pavia during Buchanan ’s Italian year.
- 36.
Leoni is also acknowledged among those critics of the book who “disturbed, disappointed, provoked, and stimulated” the authors by their constructive comments (Buchanan and Tullock 1962, p. 9).
- 37.
Leoni reciprocated, speaking of “his friends, Buchanan and Tullock , with whom [he] had the pleasure of discussing recently and publicly of these themes in Virginia” (1962, p. 746).
- 38.
Bruno Leoni died in 1967.
- 39.
The journal was re-launched in 2018 by Giampaolo Garzarelli and Emma Galli.
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Acknowledgements
We thank the Fondazione Einaudi for two letters from the Archivio Luigi Einaudi . We also thank Francesco Forte for all his help.
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Marciano, A., Mosca, M. (2018). Italian Influences on Buchanan’s Research Program. In: Wagner, R. (eds) James M. Buchanan. Remaking Economics: Eminent Post-War Economists. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03080-3_46
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