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Ontic and Epistemic Differentiation: Mechanistic Problems for Microbiology and Biology

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Abstract

Species are considered the basic unit of biological classification and evolution. Hence, they are used as a benchmark in several fields, although the ontological status of such a category has always been a matter of debate. This paper aims to discuss the problem of the definition of species within the new mechanistic approach. Nevertheless, the boundary between entities, activities, and mechanisms remains difficult to establish and always requires an analysis of what is meant by explanation. As a case study, the paper describes the debate concerning the species category by considering different kingdoms: Animals, Bacteria, and Fungi. The inherently biological differences between those groups prevent the use of a single, universally applicable concept of species that could fit the mechanisms responsible for the variability present in these kingdoms. The same issue is encountered within each group, as highlighted through a focus on mammals and microbes. This controversy has given rise to opposite approaches, namely: monism, which looks for a single definition that might account for all species, and pluralism, which admits that different groups of organisms require somewhat different definitions. In order to develop an adequate definition of species, we propose to apply a new mechanistic framework, which considers the ontic-epistemic dimensions of scientific explanation in close parallel. The apt correlation between epistemic and the ontic aspects highlights the way in which the concept of species and the reference to data are strictly co-determined. This suggests that the concept of species is better understandable within a dual ontic-epistemic approach.

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Acknowledgements

Our work had various stages of development. Our gratitude is devoted to Gianluigi Cardinali who encouraged us to carry out this work in the early stages of the research. A special thanks goes to Marco Nathan for his suggestions, which helped us in the development of the paper. Lastly, we extend our gratitude to the anonymous reviewers who gave exact suggestions that vastly improved and broadened the initial material. Responsibility for any inaccuracies remains ours.

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  1. Faculty of Philosophy, Pontifical Lateran University, Vatican City, Vatican City State

    Flavia Marcacci

  2. Faculty of Theology, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Toruń, Poland

    Michal Oleksowicz

  3. Department of Pharmaceutical Sciences, University of Perugia, Perugia, Italy

    Angela Conti

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  1. Flavia Marcacci
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  2. Michal Oleksowicz
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  3. Angela Conti
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We began designing this article a few years ago during a winter school in biotechnology held at the University of Perugia in January 2020. FM was responsible for the direction and organization of the project, MO contributed more to writing the philosophical analysis, and AC edited the biological part. However, all the content of the paper was conceived, discussed, and written together, and each author has intervened repetitively in all the sections. Thus, the authors share the full responsibility of the publication.

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Correspondence to Flavia Marcacci.

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Marcacci, F., Oleksowicz, M. & Conti, A. Ontic and Epistemic Differentiation: Mechanistic Problems for Microbiology and Biology. Found Sci (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10699-023-09918-9

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