This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
Richard DeGeorge's own views on international economic justice are summarized on pp. 161–163 and are developed further in the rest of Chap. 9 (on “The International Business System, Globalization, and Multinational Corporations”) and in Chap. 21 (on “Global Issues and International Obligations”) of his well-known book Business Ethics 2010.
A Theory of Justice. Harvard University Press, 1971. (Oxford University Press published TJ in Britain in 1972. A revised edition of TJ was published by Harvard University Press in 1999.) All subsequent citations to TJ by page, unless otherwise noted, will be to the revised edition of 1999 (hereafter TJ 1999).
All the other books by John Rawls (1921–2002), referred to later, are cited as follows:
-
(a)
Political Liberalism 1993/1996 (hereafter PL). All citations to PL, by page, will be to the paperback version of 1996.
-
(b)
The Law of Peoples with "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" 1999 (hereafter LP).
-
(c)
John Rawls: Collected Papers 1999 (hereafter CP).
-
(d)
Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 2001 (hereafter JF)
-
(a)
The idea of using an egalitarian constraint on efficient and mutually beneficial outcomes is found in Rawls's writings at a number of points. See “Distributive Justice: Some Addenda” (1968) in CP (1999, pp. 164–166); TJ 1999, pp. 60, 65–67 and Sect. 17 entitled “The Tendency to Equality” (esp. pp. 89–90); “Some Reasons for the Maximin Criterion" (1974) in CP (1999, pp. 230–231); PL (1993/1996, pp. 16–18 (esp. no. 18), 50, 54); JF (2001, Sect. 39).
Rawls himself says, at several points, that his difference principle goal point is the pareto optimal point closest to the equality line—for example, point D in the figure on JF (2001, p. 62). See also Rawls JF (2001, pp. 68, 123); Rawls, “Reply to Alexander and Musgrave” (1974) in CP (1999, pp. 246–247); and Rawls, “Social Unity and Primary Goods” (1982) in CP (1999, p. 374 no. 12). As Rawls notes, point D in that figure is also the point at which the least advantaged, the least well off, achieve their greatest benefit, in terms of income and wealth. See JF (2001, pp. 62–63); in TJ (1999, pp. 72, 266–267) Rawls identifies the greatest well-being of the least well off as the goal point.
The proof of this contention (as regards these two goal points) is provided in the Appendix, by Prakash Shenoy and myself, in my book Rawls and Rights 1985, pp. 197–201.
Liberal societies have three main features in Rawls's view. (1) They subscribe to an extensive list of fundamental constitutional rights and liberties. (2) They assign a “special priority to those rights, liberties, and opportunities” over such matters as the general good or aggregate well-being. (3) And, finally, they try to assure to all their citizens what Rawls calls “adequate all-purpose means” (basically things like income and wealth) so that the citizens can make effective use of their liberties and opportunities. Rawls regards these three points as the core of political liberalism; they count as generic principles, as something that all members of the "family" of liberal conceptions (including justice as fairness with its two principles) have in common. For these three points see PL (1993/1996, p. 6); also Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (1997), as reprinted in CP (1999, pp. 581–582), and LP (1999, p. 57); for the term “family” see PL (1993/1996, p. xxxviii), and LP (1999, pp. 57, 125).
To this characterization, Rawls adds two additional things. (4) Liberal states are peaceable toward one another and, in general, are not aggressive toward other societies so long as these societies are themselves unaggressive (see LP 1999, pp 44–54). (5) Last of all, liberal societies are democratic in their fundamental formation (see PL 1993/1996, pp. 13, 15, 175, 223).
See LP (1999, p. 37) (also pp. 27, 42) for a short listing of the eight articles of Rawls's “basic charter of the Law of Peoples” (also called by Rawls, in shorthand fashion, the “law of peoples”). This “law” includes the traditional international relations view of states (that states are equal, autonomous, and have territorial integrity, that states should observe treaties) but adds to it certain conditions or constraints on that traditional view. These constraints derive from the post-World War Two settlement and are intended to restrict the sovereignty granted to states on the Westphalia model. The most important of these constraints are the prohibition on waging war except in self-defense (or in collective defense or even sometimes in the international enforcement of human rights), the claim that certain standards (standards of jus in bello) are to prevail in the conduct of wars, the notion of a duty to aid deeply impoverished or “burdened” societies, and finally the idea that human rights are to be respected internally.
For earlier formulations of this short list, see Rawls, “Law of Peoples” (Amnesty Lecture, 1993) in CP (1999, pp. 546–547, 552). Rawls groups societies that conform, or tend to conform, to the law of peoples under the single heading of peoples. When referring to such societies, be they liberal and democratic societies or nonliberal but consultative ones, I will (following Rawls) use such terms as “a people” or “peoples,” reserving the term “decent” just for the latter kind of societies.
For Rawls's discussion of burdened societies, see LP (1999, Sect. 15); for his discussion of the main contributory causes of the “unfavorable conditions” under which most people in those societies live or are forced to live, see LP (1999, pp. 106, 108–110, 112, 117). Rawls draws heavily on Sen's account of these main contributory causes (as found, e.g., in Sen, Poverty and Famine 1981; Sen and Jean Drèze, Hunger and Public Action 1989; and Sen "Population: Delusion and Reality" 1994).
Rawls emphasizes that a country does not have to be rich in natural resources to be well ordered (LP 1999, pp. 106, 108) and that it does not have to be wealthy either; indeed, a society that was rather poor could be well-ordered (LP 1999, pp. 106, 107). But it is, of course, true that burdened societies are typically desperately poor, or at least a vast part of their population is.
See Chen and Ravaillon, "Absolute Poverty Measures for the Developing World" (2007, pp. 1, 16). Thomas Pogge, using World Bank figures from 1999, paints roughly the same picture as the World Bank figures from 2004. And, quoting UN Food and Agriculture postings, Pogge says “Two out of five children in the developing world are stunted, one in three is underweight and one in ten is wasted.” See his essay “Priorities of Global Justice” in Pogge (ed.) Global Justice (2001, pp. 6–23, 7).
See Sen, Development as Freedom 1999, chap. 4, esp. pp. 99–107, and chap. 7; see also Chen and Ravaillon, “Absolute Poverty Measures for the Developing World” (2007, p. 12); and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) Human Development Report 2010, pp. 162–163. The World Bank figures cited in notes 12 and 13 suggest that the problem of a significant failure to meet minimum subsistence standards, though it may be concentrated in Sen's 50-odd countries, is widespread and may even be worldwide.
See Wenar, “What We Owe to Distant Others” (2003, pp. 291–294).
The passage quoted is from LP (1999, p. 113).
The percentage of gross national income (GNI) devoted by the most developed nations (in North America, Western Europe, the Pacific Rim) to official development assistance (ODA) stood at roughly 0.33 % (well less than 1 %) in 1990, at the very end of the Cold War. In the year 2000 it had dropped to 0.22 %. Of this aid only about 7 % went (in 2001) to meeting basic needs (well below the target figure that the most developed nations had set for themselves). The G8 Accountability Report from its 2011 meeting in Deauville, France, indicates that the G8 average stood at just 0.28 % overall. (And only a small part of such ODA aid actually goes toward meeting basic needs).
Thomas Pogge and others estimate that to bring everybody up above the $2/day income line (set by the World Bank as the higher of two target lines) would cost about $300 billion annually. In percentage terms this comes to about 1.2 % of the combined GNI of the most affluent countries. These figures are cited from Pogge’s "Severe Poverty as a Human Rights Violation" in Pogge (ed.) Freedom from Poverty as a Human Right: Who Owes What to the Very Poor? 2005, pp. 11–54. (See also Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights 2002, chaps. 4, 6, 8.)
Marshall Plan aid, extended by the US to the devastated economies of Western Europe after World War Two, came to about 3 % per year of the US GDP, for the years it was in place, April 1948-June 1952 (though some have put the figure lower, at about 1.3 % per year). I mention the Marshall Plan for two reasons—to emphasize the sheer size of that aid, as regards the donor nation's GDP, and to emphasize that it was provided only to nations willing to receive it and to cooperate in the rebuilding effort.
Rawls (in his Law of Peoples) makes clear that he regards the rights in articles 3–18 in the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948) as "human rights proper." These rights plus other rights generated from them—as found preeminently in the international conventions against genocide (1948) and apartheid (1973)—are among the human rights that peoples (be they liberal or nonliberal ones) are committed to upholding. See LP (1999, esp. no. 23 on p. 80), for the points made and for the quoted phrase.
The UN Declaration has a total of 30 articles. The first two Rawls regards as essentially aspirational and hortatory in nature. Articles 3–18, for the most part, cover the so-called political and civil rights. And many of the remaining ones (in articles 19–30) cover rights usually called “social and economic.” Rights in articles 19–30, Rawls says, often "presuppose specific kinds of institutions" (LP 1999, p. 80n), thereby suggesting that those rights (in content) deviate significantly from the universality expected of human rights. (For Rawls's discussion of human rights more generally, see LP (1999, pp. 9, 67, 68, 78–81, 83), and "The Law of Peoples," as reprinted in CP (1999, pp. 551–555).
It should be noted that the two duties of aid are both of them duties incumbent on peoples, on nations or countries; they are thus unlike the so-called natural duties of justice (TJ 1999, Sect. 19) which are properly understood as duties of individual persons.
On the enormous burden of national debt in poorer countries, see DeGeorge, Business Ethics 2010, p. 495. In chapter 9 of his book, DeGeorge uses the issue of agricultural subsidies, in more developed countries, as one of his principal examples of arguably unfair practices; see Business Ethics 2010, pp. 159–160, 165.
For Rawls’s possible willingness to accommodate the point about variabilities in weather and in markets, see LP (1999, p. 38), and to allow for the point about fair trade, see LP (1999, pp. 42–43, 115). Thomas Pogge complains that Rawls does not make clear in these passages how we are to judge whether “distributive effects are “unjustified” or trading arrangements “unfair.” “See Pogge, “The Incoherence Between Rawls's Theories of Justice" (2004, p. 1751).
But this is not a wholly fair criticism. Rawls is not making a philosophical argument in these passages; rather, he is laying out considerations that would be widely understood and widely thought to be reasonable. He does, of course, discuss (albeit briefly) what he regards an “unjust” distribution to be. Rawls says, "A scheme is unjust when the higher expectations, one or more of them, are excessive. If these expectations were decreased, the situation of the least favored would be improved" (Rawls, TJ 1999, p. 68; see also pp. 68–69). Rawls criterion here is clear enough; it provides a benchmark for a discussion of the considerations he has raised.
In any event it should be noted (as the principal relevant issue here) that ideas about fair trade and fair terms of borrowing are spelled out in treaties and in the reports and regulations on trade and on credit issued by international organizations. Here Rawls mentions such organizations as GATT and the World Bank (LP 1999, pp. 42–43).
Among the earliest advocates of the idea of a global difference principle idea are Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz. See Pogge, Realizing Rawls 1989: part 3, chs. 5–6; Pogge, "An Egalitarian Law of Peoples" (1994); and Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. 2nd edn., 1999, part 3, Sects. 3–4. See also Beitz’s "Afterword" (to the 2nd edn.): 185–216, at pp. 198–214. The term “interdependence” that I used in point (ii), of the points just sketched, I took from Beitz.
Even Brian Barry, who is no friend of Rawls's original position construct, developed his own version of a cosmopolitan difference principle, relying on the notion of impartiality, out of a careful critique of Rawls's TJ analysis. (See Barry, Theories of Justice 1989, chaps. 5 and 6, esp. 6.) For additional citations to theorists favoring a global principle of distributive justice, in particular a global difference principle or some other global egalitarian principle, see my paper "Rawls on Human Rights: Liberal or Universal?" in Haddock, et al. (eds), Principles and Political Order 2006, p. 202 no. 38.
In particular, Rawls denies the analogy between the circumstances and setting of (i) principles and institutions of justice for an individual body politic and (ii) international or global ones (see LP 1999, pp. 82–83, 114–116).
For the first comparison, and for the passages quoted, see LP (1999, p. 117).
See LP (1999, pp. 117–118) for the second case and for the passages quoted. Rawls says in another context (as regards the family as an institution in the basic structure of a liberal and well-ordered society): "[A] liberal conception of justice may have to allow for some traditional gendered division of labor within families—assume, say, that this division is based on religion—provided it is fully voluntary and does not result from or lead to injustice." ("The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" (1997) in CP (1999, pp. 573–615, 599) and see the important note (no. 68) there on "voluntary"; this essay is also reprinted in LP (1999, pp. 131–180), see here pp. 161–162.) What Rawls says about "voluntary" in the quote here is very like his remark cited earlier about religious reasons "freely held by women" (in a very traditional, presumably decent, society).
Rawls's emphasis throughout is on the contention that the members of the society did what they did by choice, a choice affirmed and therefore ratified by subsequent generations. This contention does not alter the main lines of argument already laid down in the paragraphs in the text previous to this one. Indeed, any such emphasis on voluntary choice presupposes that the relevant background conditions in the society and in the relations between societies are not unjust and that the choice so made is not itself unjust, either in intention or in outcome.
Other than in his discussion of "just savings" (which I take up in the next two paragraphs of the present paper), there is little textual support for thinking that Rawls had broad-ranging past/present or present/future comparisons in mind as a ground for making basic normative evaluations within his theory (see, for example, TJ 1999, pp. 253–254; JF 2001, p. 159).
For the passage quoted in the previous paragraph, see "Basic Structure as Subject" (1978), reprinted unchanged in PL (1993/1996, p. 274). For discussion of just savings, see TJ (1999, Sects. 44, 45); JF (2001 pp. 159–160).
The point I have just made about just savings in the present paragraph is part of what Rawls meant when he said that the choices made in these societies—the pastoral one and the prolific one—were voluntary.
See LP (1999, pp. 106, 117, 118–120).
In a brief discussion of close-knitness (the idea that the income curves of the various income groups are always either rising or falling), Rawls denies close-knitness, denies the simplifying assumption that such curves never have "flat stretches." He then goes on revise his understanding of the difference principle (which he initially understood simply as "everyone's advantage"—as "everyone benefits") and calls attention to another version (called the lexical version) which allows such flat stretches, where at least one group becomes neither better off nor worse, over extended periods. Rawls endorses this other, new version of the difference principle in the first edition, in 1971, of his book Theory of Justice. (See TJ 1971, p. 61 for Rawls's initial version of the difference principle, TJ 1971, p. 81–82 for his discussion of close-knitness, and TJ 1971, p. 83 for his actual statement of the lexical version of the difference principle). So far as I can tell he never mentions that version again in the first edition.
But in the second edition, 1999, Rawls makes the very same points I have just outlined, up through the discussion of close-knitness, but then makes a sharp criticism of the lexical principle and shortly after drops altogether his endorsement of it—drops, that is, the principle which in effect allows that income groups (or at least some groups, but not all) might permanently plateau at some point, and neither improve nor decline in well-being after that (see TJ 1971, p. 72).
These are considerations that Rawls himself advances. See LP (1999, pp. 114, 118–119).
Rawls does not desert or repudiate the difference principle in Political Liberalism or, by extension, in The Law of Peoples. Rawls is willing to assert that he believes "justice as fairness—its two principles, which of course include the difference principle—…to be the most reasonable conception" among all presently feasible reasonable alternatives (for the matter quoted see PL (1993/1996, p. xlviii), in the preface to the 2nd edition, 1996). Justice as fairness is the version, within the family of liberal conceptions, that Rawls personally continues to prefer as the standard for domestic justice in liberal societies. See also PL (1993/1996, pp. 164–168), and "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" (1997) in CP (1999, pp. 581–583, esp. no. 27 on p. 582), and LP (1999, p. 128).
For this particular version of the difference principle (one of Rawls's main or standard versions) see TJ 1999, p. 53, all of Sect. 13, and, finally, p. 72 (concerned with Rawls's discussion of close-knitness).
In LP (1999, Sects. 15 and 16).
See the section“Some Difficulties in the Idea of a Cutoff Point” in the present paper, especially no. 20.
For some suggestive lines of criticism against what might be called “original-position cosmopolitanism” (the interpretation which treats the original position construct and other features of justice as fairness as in effect the prototype for the idea of a global difference principle), see "Rawls on Human Rights: Liberal or Universal?" (Martin 2006, pp. 202–205).
For some examples of such arguments, see Freeman (2006), "Distributive Justice and The Law of Peoples," in Martin and Reidy (eds.), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, pp. 245–252 (regarding arguments against a global distributive principle) and pp. 252–258 (regarding arguments against a global application of the difference principle; and see here Sect. D in particular, at pp. 255–258). This chapter has been republished (with some additions) in Freeman (2007), Justice and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy, chap. 9.
See TJ (1999, pp. 53–54, 77, 266–267). The same basic account of priority is also found in JF (2001, pp. 43, 46–47). The pattern is somewhat different in PL (1993/1996, p. 6), where Rawls (after his first statement of the two principles) proclaims only the priority of the first principle over the second.
By “fair value” (PL 1993/1996, p. 5) Rawls means that steps are taken to make people substantively equal (or more nearly equal) in the exercise of their political participation liberties, in voting and in campaigning (LP 1999, pp. 197–199; JF 2001, pp. 148–152); and the Tanner Lectures on "The Basic Liberties and Their Priority" (1982), as reprinted in PL, lecture VIII, esp. Sect. 7, at pp. 327–331). Among the steps designed to do this are such things as public funding of elections (JF 2001, pp. 131, 149).
The difference principle is especially closely connected, theoretically and conceptually, with fair equality of opportunity. This is why Rawls, from the beginning, treats them together as two main elements in a single complex principle called the second principle of justice (see TJ 1999, chap. 2, esp. Sects. 11–13, 17).
For these two points see LP (1999 36, 38–39); also Leif Wenar, "Why Rawls is Not a Cosmopolitan Egalitarian," in Rex Martin and David Reidy (eds), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia? 2006.
On the dangers posed by such extremes of wealth and poverty, see DeGeorge, Business Ethics (2010, p. 496).
Rawls broaches the idea of "preserving significant room…for some kind of loose or confederative form of a Society of Peoples" (LP 1999, p. 111). He goes on, on pp. 112–113, to raise this question in particular respecting the duty of assistance and the desirability of cultivating institutional forms of cooperation there.
Toleration is one of Rawls's principal examples (see LP 1999, pp. 113–114 and sects. 7.2, 7.3). For further discussion and some detailed examples, see my paper "Political Toleration and Coercive Intervention in the International Sphere," in Young (ed.), Reflections on Rawls: An Assessment of his Legacy 2009, especially at Sect. 2 (pp. 179–191). See also Blain Neufeld, "Liberal Foreign Policy and the Ideal of Fair Social Cooperation" (2013), especially Sects. 4 and 5.
For Rawls's account of not-well-ordered societies (such as those he identified under the headings of "burdened societies," "outlaw states," or "benevolent absolutisms"), see LP (1999, pp. 4–5, 63, 80–81, 90, 105–106. For further discussion and criticisms of Rawls's account of the not-well-ordered societies (and Rawls's overall typology, as including "peoples") see Chris Brown, "The Construction of a Realistic Utopia: John Rawls and International Political Theory" (2002). For a very helpful discussion of peoples, in particular, see Pettit (2006), "Rawls's Peoples," in Martin and Reidy (eds), Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?.
On the problems posed by the paucity of international background institutions and the pressing need to develop such institutions, see DeGeorge, Business Ethics (2010, pp. 162, 170–174, 481, 497, 505).
Rawls first sketched a brief discussion of just war and other principles of the "law of nations" in Theory of Justice (TJ 1999, Sect. 58, pp. 331–333). Even so, The Law of Peoples owes more to Political Liberalism and its important idea of reasonable pluralism than it does to A Theory of Justice.
References
Barry, B. (1989). Theories of justice. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Beitz, C. (1999). Political theory and international relations (2nd edn.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (1st edn. 1979).
Brown, C. (2002). The construction of a realistic Utopia: John Rawls and international political theory. Review of International Studies, 28, 5–21.
Chen, S., & Ravaillon, M. (2007). Absolute Poverty Measures for the Developing World. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4211.
DeGeorge, R. (2010). Business ethics (7th edn.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall (an imprint of Pearson).
Freeman, S. (2006). Distributive justice and the law of peoples. In R. Martin & D. Reidy (Eds.), Rawls’s law of peoples: A realistic Utopia? (pp. 243–260). Oxford: Blackwell.
Freeman, S. (2007). Justice and the social contract: Essays on Rawlsian political philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.
Martin, R. (1985). Rawls and rights. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas.
Martin, R. (2005). Just wars and humanitarian interventions. Journal of Social Philosophy, 36(4), 439–456.
Martin, R. (2006). Rawls on human rights: Liberal or universal? In B. A. Haddock, et al. (Eds.), Principles and political order: The challenge of diversity (pp. 192–212). London: Routledge.
Martin, R. (2009). Political toleration and coercive intervention in the international sphere. In S. Young (Ed.), Reflections on Rawls: An assessment of his legacy (pp. 177–198). Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate.
Neufeld, B. (2013). Liberal foreign policy and the ideal of fair social cooperation. Journal of Social Philosophy, 44(3), 291–308.
Pettit, P. (2006). Rawls’s peoples. In R. Martin & D. Reidy (Eds.), Rawls’s law of Peoples: A realistic Utopia? (pp. 38–55). Oxford: Blackwell.
Pogge, T. (1989). Realizing Rawls. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Pogge, T. (1994). An egalitarian law of peoples. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 23(3), 195–224.
Pogge, T. (Ed.). (2001). Global justice. Oxford: Blackwell.
Pogge, T. (2002). World poverty and human rights. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Pogge, T. (2004). The incoherence between Rawls’s theories of justice, in symposium: “Rawls and the law.” Fordham Law Review, 62(5), 1739–1759.
Pogge, T (Ed.). (2005). Freedom from poverty as a human right: Who owes what to the very poor? Oxford: Oxford University Press (a volume published under UNESCO sponsorship).
Rawls, J. (1993/1996). Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. (Hardback published in 1993, paperback in 1996). Cited as PL.
Rawls, J. (1999a). A theory of justice (revised edn., with a new preface). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (1st edn. 1971) Cited as TJ 1999.
Rawls, J. (1999b). The law of peoples with “the idea of public reason revisited.” Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Cited as LP).
Rawls, J. (1999c). In S. Freeman (Ed.), John Rawls: Collected papers. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Cited as CP).
Rawls, J. (2001). In E. Kelly (Ed.), Justice as fairness: A restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Cited as JF).
Roberts, P. (2012). The supreme emergency exemption: Rawls and the use of force. European Journal of Political Theory, 11(2), 155–171.
Sen, A. K. (1981). Poverty and famine. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sen, A. K. (1994). Population: Delusion and reality. The New York Review of Books, 41(15), 62–71.
Sen, A. K. (1999). Development as freedom. New York, NY: Random House.
Sen, A. K., & Drèze, Jean. (1989). Hunger and public action. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Shue, H. (1996). Basic Rights: Subsistence, affluence, and US Foreign Policy (2nd edn.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (1st edn. 1980).
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). (2010). Human development report 2010. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Vincent, R. J. (1986). Human rights and international relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wenar, L. (2003). What we owe to distant others. Politics, Philosophy, and Economics, 2(3), 283–304.
Wenar, L. (2006). Why Rawls is not a cosmopolitan egalitarian. In R. Martin & D. Reidy (Eds.), Rawls’s law of peoples: A realistic Utopia? (pp. 95–113). Oxford: Blackwell.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Martin, R. Rawls on International Economic Justice in The Law of Peoples . J Bus Ethics 127, 743–759 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2184-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2184-x