Abstract
We study the possibility of cartel formation among primary exporters who face an inelastic world demand for their exports. The phenomenon of immiserizing export growth appears as a non-cooperative equilibrium in a two-country export game. With infinite repetitions of the one shot game, we show that `different country size' will be detrimental to the sustenance of the collusive behavior needed for eliminating the possibility of immiserization.
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Marjit, S., Beladi, H. South-South Cooperation and Export. Theory and Decision 50, 283–293 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010340726882
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010340726882