Abstract
A new investigation is launched into the problem of decision-making in the face of ‘complete ignorance’, and linked to the problem of social choice. In the first section the author introduces a set of properties which might characterize a criterion for decision-making under complete ignorance. Two of these properties are novel: ‘independence of non-discriminating states’, and ‘weak pessimism’. The second section provides a new characterization of the so-called principle of insufficient reason. In the third part, lexicographic maximin and maximax criteria are characterized. Finally, the author's results are linked to the problem of social choice.
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Maskin, E. Decision-making under ignorance with implications for social choice. Theor Decis 11, 319–337 (1979). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126383
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00126383