Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

SEVERE TESTS, ARGUING FROM ERROR, AND METHODOLOGICAL UNDERDETERMINATION

  • Published:
Philosophical Studies Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

REFERENCES

  • Earman, J. (1992), Bayes or Bust? A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grünbaum, A. (1978), “Popper vs. Inductivism”, in G. Radnitzky and G. Andersson (eds.), Progress and Rationality in Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. LVIII. Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 117–142.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, L. (1990b), “Demystifying Underdetermination”, in C. W. Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIV. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 267–297.

    Google Scholar 

  • Laudan, L. (1995), Beyond Positivism and Relativism. Boulder: Westview Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayo, D. (1985), “Increasing Public Participation in Controversies Involving Hazards: The Value of Metastatistical Rules”, Science, Technology, and Human Values 10: 55–68.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayo, D. (1988), “Brownian Motion and the Appraisal of Theories”, in A. Donovan, L. Laudan and R. Laudan (eds.), Scrutinizing Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 219–243.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayo, D. (1991), “Novel Evidence and Severe Tests”, Philosophy of Science 58: 523–552.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mayo, D. (1996), Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge. Series in Conceptual Foundations of Science. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Miller, R. (1987), Fact and Method: Explanation, Confirmation and Reality in the Natural and the Social Sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Salmon, W. (1990), “The Appraisal of Theories: Kuhn Meets Bayes”, in A. Fine, M. Forbes, and L. Wessels (eds.), PSA 1990, Vol 2, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 325–332.

    Google Scholar 

  • Suppes, P. (1962), “Models of Data”, in E. Nagel, P. Suppes and A. Tarski (eds.), Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress. Stanford: Stanford University, pp. 252–261.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA, 24061-0126, USA

    DEBORAH G. MAYO

Authors
  1. DEBORAH G. MAYO
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

MAYO, D.G. SEVERE TESTS, ARGUING FROM ERROR, AND METHODOLOGICAL UNDERDETERMINATION. Philosophical Studies 86, 243–266 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017925128970

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1017925128970

Keywords

Search

Navigation