Abstract
A collective choice mechanism can be viewed as a game in normal form; in this article it is shown, for very attractive rules and for sets with any number of alternatives, how individuals involved in a collective decision problem can construct the preferences they choose to express. An example is given with a version of plurality rule. Manipulability results are deduced from such a characterization.
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Mbih, B. On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures. Theor Decis 39, 169–188 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01078983
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01078983