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An Isolation Objection to Phenomenal Conservatism

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Abstract

Phenomenal conservatism as developed by some philosophers faces a previously unnoticed problem. The problem stems from the fact that, as some develop the view, phenomenal conservatism holds that seemings alone justify—sensations have no justificatory impact. Given this, phenomenal conservatism faces a problem analogous to the isolation objection to coherentism. As foundationalists, supporters of phenomenal conservatism will want to allow that the isolation objection is effective against coherentism, and yet claim that a similar objection is not effective against their view. Unfortunately, it appears that on most understandings of the nature of seemings phenomenal conservatism can only avoid its version of the isolation objection by sacrificing its internalist character.

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Notes

  1. See also Huemer (2001), Cullison (2010), Skene (2013), and Tucker (2010, 2013). Pryor (2000) endorses “dogmatism”, which while similar in various ways to PC is importantly different. These differences will not matter here.

  2. Actually, Tucker divides things into four views rather than five. However, he presents the Experience View as a disjunctive view. So, I separate the disjuncts into two distinct views (Attitude View and Experience View) in order to make things clearer. Other than this minor modification my discussion of these views of seemings is drawn from Tucker (2013) and the various entries contained in that volume.

  3. Some coherentists respond to this objection by allowing that experiences themselves can play a justificatory role along with beliefs in a coherent system, see Kvanvig (2012), Kvanvig and Riggs (1992), and Poston (2014).

  4. It is worth noting that the Isolation Objection has not only been leveled at coherentism. Michael Bergmann (2003) argues that Richard Swinburne’s doxastic foundationalism is susceptible to this problem too. The reason this problem arises for Swinburne’s view is that he maintains our justified perceptual beliefs are not justified by our experiences. Instead, Swinburne claims perceptual beliefs are justified by the probability they have in virtue of our believing them. As Bergmann points out, if these beliefs are justified solely by our believing them, then they are isolated from our experiences in the way that gives rise to the Isolation Objection.

  5. Tucker (2010) explicitly claims that only seemings justify. Cullison (2013) appears to accept this claim too. Huemer’s (2001, 2007) argument that PC is the only epistemological theory that is not self-defeating suggests that he is sympathetic to this view as well. Similarly, Skene (2013: 558) maintains that seemings are “a precondition on the possibility of epistemic justification.” See DePoe (2011), Hasan (2013), Huemer (2011), and Mizrahi (2014) for discussion of Huemer’s self-defeat argument.

  6. It is worth noting that this objection is particularly troublesome for proponents of PC. After all, one of the things that makes PC attractive is that it purports to offer a version of moderate foundationalism. As moderate foundationalists proponents of PC are apt to endorse the Isolation Objection as a reason for rejecting coherentism. So, the fact that an analogous problem exists for PC is a significant problem for its proponents.

  7. While there may be other ways of construing seemings, these are the only ways that have been put forward in the contemporary literature on PC and the nature of seemings.

  8. Lycan (1988) and Swinburne (2001) both offer at least tentative endorsements of this sort of view. See Tucker (2013) for an explanation of why this view of seemings is very unpopular now.

  9. See Sosa (2007) and Swinburne (2001).

  10. See Conee (2013) and Tooley (2013) for discussions of this view.

  11. See Chudnoff and Didomenico (2015) for reasons to doubt that the phenomenon of blindsight provides support for the view that seemings and sensations come apart in the way that Tucker suggests.

  12. Chudnoff and Didomenico (2015) provide reasons to doubt this as well.

  13. See Chisholm (1942) for a seminal presentation of this problem.

  14. Brogaard (2013) also claims that this distinction can help solve the problem of the speckled hen. Chudnoff and Didomenico (2015) demur.

  15. For example, Bergmann (2013), Brogaard (2013), Conee (2013), Lyons (2009), Sosa (2007), and Tucker (2010) accept different views of the nature of seemings, but they accept the claim that seemings and sensations are distinct.

  16. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this potential response.

  17. See Chudnoff and Didomenico (2015), Lyons (2015), and Reiland (2015).

  18. This is a restriction of PC that Tucker (2010) explicitly rejects when responding to the threat of cognitive penetration.

  19. See Goldman (2009), Lyons (2011), Markie (2005), and Siegel (2012) for objections to PC on the basis of cognitive penetration.

  20. This is the sort of view that Berit Brogaard (2013) defends. Brogaard’s (2013: 278) “Sensible Dogmatism” combines PC with the restriction that in order for a seeming to provide justification it must be “grounded in the content of S’s perceptual, introspective, or memory-related” sensations. Most supporters of PC are not likely to be keen on accepting Brogaard’s Sensible Dogmatism because she includes a reliability condition on grounding. This reliability condition on grounding makes Sensible Dogmatism an externalist view of justification. Whether or not supporters of PC would be happy with Sensible Dogmatism, the Isolation Objection presented here provides some reason to take such a view seriously.

  21. Another possibility is to allow that seemings and sensations are distinct, but maintain that justification requires the correct combination of both seeming and sensation. Audi (2013) and Reiland (2015) argue for this sort of view.

  22. Additionally, the Experience View may face problems of its own. Sosa (2003) argues that there are different kinds of awareness when it comes to our sensations. When having a sensation we might have intellectual-awareness (where we take particular notice of some of the features of the sensation), or we might only have experiential-awareness (where we are not taking notice of particular features of the sensation). It may be that if we have a sensation with only the latter kind of awareness, we will not have any corresponding seeming. This possibility seems to be a significant problem for the Experience View. According to the Experience View, every sensation is a seeming, but a sensation of which we only have experiential-awareness is an apparent counterexample. Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this problem for the Experience View.

  23. Thanks to Matt Frise, Jon Matheson, Ted Poston, and anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussion.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, 900 13th Street South, Birmingham, AL, 35294-1260, USA

    Kevin McCain

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McCain, K. An Isolation Objection to Phenomenal Conservatism. Erkenn 82, 1381–1390 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-017-9881-7

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