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How to co-exist with nonexistent expectations

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Abstract

Dozens of articles have addressed the challenge that gambles having undefined expectation pose for decision theory. This paper makes two contributions. The first is incremental: we evolve Colyvan’s “Relative Expected Utility Theory” into a more viable “conservative extension of expected utility theory” by formulating and defending emendations to a version of this theory that was proposed by Colyvan and Hájek. The second is comparatively more surprising. We show that, so long as one assigns positive probability to the theory that there is a uniform bound on the expected utility of possible gambles (and assuming a uniform bound on the amount of utility that can accrue in a fixed amount of time), standard principles of anthropic reasoning (as formulated by Brandon Carter) place lower and upper bounds on the expected values of gambles advertised as having no expectation–even assuming that with positive probability, all gambles advertised as having infinite expected utility are administered faithfully. Should one accept the uniform bound premises, this reasoning thus dissolves (or nearly dissolves, in some cases) several puzzles in infinite decision theory.

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Notes

  1. Like any conditionally convergent series, the expectation series can thus be made to diverge (or converge to any finite value whatsoever) by rearrangement of its terms. On the other hand, as noted by Easwaran (2008), X does have a weak expectation of \(\log 2\). Since weak expectations are invariant under rearrangements, \(\log 2\) therefore has some claim to be the presumptive value of the game, if it has one.

  2. We take utility to be linear with respect to currency, and in particular unbounded.

  3. What makes this Dutch Book work is that the positive and negative parts of the Pasadena variable each have infinite expectation, and the argument can be generalized to show that one cannot coherently place a value on any such variable. It is probably fair to say that the argument is implicit in the “Two Envelopes” literature; see especially Broome (1995) and Chalmers (2002).

  4. By Finitary Dutch Book we intend an almost surely finite sequence \(X_1, \cdots ,X_N\) of gambles (here N is a “stopping time”), each deemed individually favorable at time of offer (information may be obtained between gambles), but entailing an almost sure net loss, such that either (a) N is uniformly bounded, or (b) \(\sum _{i=1}^N E(\min \{ X_i, 0\})> - \infty \) almost surely. (See the “Appendix”.)

  5. For example, let the state probabilities \(p_i=P(X=i)\) be given by \((p_1,p_2,\ldots , ) = ({1\over 4}, {1\over 8}, {1\over 16}, {1\over 4},{1\over 32}, {1\over 64}, {1\over 128}, {1\over 8}, {1\over 256}, {1\over 512}, {1\over 1024}, {1\over 16},{1\over 2048}, \ldots )\). (The pattern is \(p_{4n+4} = {1\over 2}p_{4n}\), \(p_{4n+i} = {1\over 8}p_{4n+i-4}\), \(i=1,2,3\).) Next let \((a_1,a_2,\ldots , ) = (2,4,8,0,16,32,64,0,128,256,512,0,1024,\ldots )\) and \((b_1,b_2,\ldots , ) = (0,0,0,2,0,0,0,4,0,0,0,8,0, \dots ).\) \(a_X\) and \(b_X\) are identically distributed, but REU dominance judges \(a_X\) preferable to \(b_Y\); in particular, \(\sum _{i=1}^{4n} p_i (a_i-b_i) = n\rightarrow \infty \). What makes this example work is of course an ordering under which the states associated with positive outcomes for \(a_X\) sufficiently precede the corresponding states having positive outcomes for \(b_Y.\)

  6. What Colyvan and Hájek actually say is that \(REU(A,B) = \sum _{i=1}^\infty P(X=i)(a_i-b_i)\) “where the right-hand side absolutely converges, or diverges to infinity or negative infinity.” That generates sensitivity to order, as any conditionally convergent series has rearrangements tending to (positive or negative) infinity. We believe that our formulation corresponds to their intention.

  7. Colyvan and Hájek probably want to allow more comparisons than those provided by the “minimal” suggestion in the text. Indeed, that suggestion won’t even allow one to compare Bet 3, which pays 6 if the coin lands heads and nothing otherwise, with Bet 4, which pays 6 if the die lands on anything other than one (and nothing otherwise). That limitation would not sit well with Easwaran (2014), for example, who writes: “The central observation in the development of my theory is that if one ought to prefer act A to act B, and one ought to be indifferent between acts B and C, then one ought to prefer A to C.” (Taking \(A=\)“accept Bet 4”, \(B=\)“accept Bet 2” and \(C=\)“accept Bet 3”, this principle calls for Bet 4 to be deemed preferable to Bet 3.)

  8. The decision theory described in the third section of Easwaran (2014) (entitled “One Version of the Theory”, i.e. of the general type described in the first two sections) advocates for state identifications, and so is vulnerable to the current objections. Easwaran however hedges as follows: “I think that the relations presented here are normative for decision theory, but if some of them are not, then they can be switched out for others that might do some of the same work.”

  9. Our original proof was needlessly complicated; this simplification is due to Máté Wierdl.

  10. This sort of disaster can’t befall Trump if he knows his afterlife to have expected duration (in days) \(E(X)=L<\infty \). This is a consequence of the optional stopping theorem (thanks to an anonymous referee for this point). It is also a consequence of Theorem 2 in the “Appendix”, which establishes that finitary Dutch Books are precluded under ORET more generally.

  11. Cf. the “contagion” issue raised in Hájek and Smithson (2012).

  12. By, for example, setting the probability of veracity equal to some infinitesimal hyperreal \(\epsilon \) and setting the expectation, conditional on veracity, equal to a finite non-zero multiple of \(\epsilon ^{-1}\).

  13. Cf. Sleeping Beauty, where the majority intuition is that (2) fails for \(A={ heads}\), \(B={ tails}\), vs. Bostrom’s “Presumptuous Philosopher”, where the majority intuition is that (2) holds for \(A= { trillion}\; { trillion}\; { persons}\) and \(B={ trillion}\; { trillion}\; { trillion} \; { persons}\). See Bostrom (2007).

  14. A referee suggests a line of resistance to this argument: assume instead (against the second premise) that Trump is offered one day in “St. Petersburg Heaven”, i.e. a Heaven offering a single-day experience which, with probability \(2^{-n}\), will be as gratifying as \(2^n\) days in Hell is ungratifying. This method of realizing an infinite expectation payoff requires one to countenance the notion of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction, presumably) “singularities”. (In an instant’s compass, great hearts sometimes condense to one deep pang, the sum total of those shallow pains kindly diffused through feebler men’s whole lives.) Note however that for the objection to work, unbounded quantities of satisfaction would have to be–to put the matter somewhat crudely–“crammed into a bounded quantity of consciousness”. Put to the choice, this is where we would draw the line. Wherever satisfaction is singular with respect to spacetime, the currency of anthropic reasoning (“consciousness”, if you like) is singular with respect to spacetime as well.

  15. This seems a fair way to compute E(X); as alluded to in footnote 12, one could also come to this conclusion via nonstandard analysis by letting L be an appropriate infinite hyperreal (so that \(L^{-1}\) is infinitesimal).

  16. Replacing the genuine St. Peterburg variables by genuine Pasadena variables in the first calculation of the Trump example yields bounds \(E(X)\in [50-\frac{62\epsilon }{1-\epsilon }, 50+ \frac{62\epsilon }{1-\epsilon }]\).

  17. Thanks to Máté Wierdl, the editors of Synthese, and the anonymous referees.

  18. There is a positive measure set \(F\in {\mathcal F}_1\) such that \(E(X_2|{\mathcal F}_1)\ge E(X_1|{\mathcal F}_1)\) a.e. on F. To assume that \(E(X_2|{\mathcal F}_2) < E(X_2|{\mathcal F}_1) \) a.e. on F leads to an immediate contradiction, as integrating both sides of this equation over F yields \(E(X_2\cdot 1_F) < E(X_2\cdot 1_F)\). So, there is a positive measure set \(F'\in {\mathcal F}_2\) (with \(F'\subseteq F\)), on which \(E(X_2|{\mathcal F}_2)\ge E(X_2|{\mathcal F}_1) \ge E(X_1|{\mathcal F}_1)>0\).

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Appendix

Appendix

In Sect. 5 we saw that ORET subscribers are vulnerable to group Dutch Books and to infinitary Dutch Books. The content of the following theorem is that they needn’t worry about finitary Dutch Books.

Theorem 2

Individual ORET subscribers are not vulnerable to finitary Dutch Books.

Proof

Let \((\Omega , \mu )\) be a probability space and let \(({\mathcal F}_n)_{n=0}^\infty \) be a filtration on \(\Omega \). That is, for each n, \({\mathcal F}_n\) is a \(\sigma \)-algebra of measurable subsets of \(\Omega \), with \({\mathcal F}_0\subseteq {\mathcal F}_1\subseteq {\mathcal F}_2\subseteq \cdots \). For \(n=0,1,2,\ldots \), let \(X_n\) be a real valued random variable defined on \(\Omega \). We assume that \(X_0=0\) a.e. and \(E(X_{n+1}-X_n|{\mathcal F}_n) \ge 0\) a.e., \(n=0,1,2,\ldots \).

The idea here is that \(X_n\) represents the agent’s bankroll at timestep n. Also at time step n (or shortly after), the agent is assumed to learn which cell of \({\mathcal F}_n\) obtains. The agent then consents (between time n and time \(n+1\)) to a gamble having payoff \(X_{n+1}-X_n\). Since the agent knows which cell of \({\mathcal F}_n\) obtains and \(E(X_{n+1}-X_n|{\mathcal F}_n) \ge 0\) a.e., the agent is at least indifferent to these gambles (she may view them as favorable), so we can assume that she accepts them.

The challenge for the would-be finitary Dutch Bookie is to construct a random variable T such that the gambles stop at time T (that is, the agent’s final bankroll is \(X_T\)) and \(X_T<0\) a.e. We require that for every n, \(\{\omega \in \Omega : T(\omega ) \le n\} \in {\mathcal F}_n\). (T is a stopping time; the bookie is allowed to know no more than the agent–when the gambles have stopped, the agent will know this.) For the Dutch Book to be finitary, one of following two additional conditions must be met (cf. footnote 4).

First condition \(T(\omega )\le K\) a.e. for some \(K<\infty \).

Note that \(E(X_1|{\mathcal F}_0)= E(X_1-X_0|{\mathcal F}_0)\ge 0\) a.e., which implies in turn that \(P\big (E(X_1|{\mathcal F}_1)\ge 0\big )>0\).

Next note that \(E(X_2|{\mathcal F}_1)\ge E(X_1|{\mathcal F}_1)\) a.e. (both may = \(+\infty \)), so that

$$\begin{aligned} P\big ( E(X_2|{\mathcal F}_1)\ge E(X_1|{\mathcal F}_1)\ge 0\big ) >0. \end{aligned}$$

This, in turn, implies thatFootnote 18

$$\begin{aligned} P\big ( E(X_2|{\mathcal F}_2)\ge E(X_1|{\mathcal F}_1)\ge 0\big ) >0. \end{aligned}$$

Having shown that

$$\begin{aligned} P\big ( E(X_n|{\mathcal F}_n)\ge E(X_{n-1}|{\mathcal F}_{n-1})\ge \cdots \ge E(X_1|{\mathcal F}_1)\ge 0\big ) >0, \end{aligned}$$

note that \(E(X_{n+1}|{\mathcal F}_{n})\ge E(X_{n}|{\mathcal F}_{n})\) a.e. This implies that

$$\begin{aligned} P\big ( E(X_{n+1}|{\mathcal F}_n)\ge E(X_{n}|{\mathcal F}_{n})\ge E(X_{n-1}|{\mathcal F}_{n-1})\cdots \ge E(X_1|{\mathcal F}_1)\ge 0\big ) >0, \end{aligned}$$

which implies in turn that

$$\begin{aligned} P\big ( E(X_{n+1}|{\mathcal F}_{n+1})\ge E(X_{n}|{\mathcal F}_{n})\ge E(X_{n-1}|{\mathcal F}_{n-1})\cdots \ge E(X_1|{\mathcal F}_1)\ge 0\big ) >0. \end{aligned}$$

By induction, then, one has

$$\begin{aligned} P\big ( E(X_{K}|{\mathcal F}_K)\ge E(X_{K-1}|{\mathcal F}_{K-1})\ge E(X_{K-2}|{\mathcal F}_{K-2})\cdots \ge E(X_1|{\mathcal F}_1)\ge 0\big ) >0. \end{aligned}$$

There is, therefore, a positive measure set \(F\in {\mathcal F}_K \) such that

$$\begin{aligned} E(X_{K}|{\mathcal F}_K)\ge E(X_{K-1}|{\mathcal F}_{K-1})\ge E(X_{K-2}|{\mathcal F}_{K-2})\cdots \ge E(X_1|{\mathcal F}_1)\ge 0 \end{aligned}$$

a.e. on F. We may, moreover, assume that \(T(\omega )\) is constant on F, say \(T(\omega )=n\le K\), \(\omega \in F\). We therefore have

$$\begin{aligned} F\subseteq \big \{ \omega : E(X_n|{\mathcal F}_n)(\omega )\ge 0\big \} \cap T^{-1}(n) =F_n\in {\mathcal F}_n . \end{aligned}$$

Now if \(X_{T(\omega )} (\omega )<0\) a.e. then \(X_n(\omega )<0\) for a.e. \(\omega \in F_n\), which implies that \(E(X_n|{\mathcal F}_n)(\omega )<0\) for a.e. \(\omega \in F_n\), contradicting the definition of \(F_n\). So \(P\big (X_{T(\omega )}(\omega )\ge 0\big )>0\) and there is no Dutch Book.

Second condition \(\sum _{n=0}^\infty E[ (X_{n+1}-X_n)_-\cdot 1_{\{ T>n\}}] <\infty \).

Let \((X^T_n)_{n=0}^\infty \) denote the stopped process, defined by \(X^T_n =X_n\) if \(n\le T\) and \(X^T_n = X^T_T\) when \(n>T\). Notice that \(E(X^T_{n+1}-X^T_n|{\mathcal F}_n) \ge 0\) a.e., \(n=0,1,2,\ldots \) and \(X^T_n (\omega )\rightarrow X_{T(\omega )}(\omega )\) a.e. Let now

$$\begin{aligned} M = \sum _{n=0}^\infty (X_{n+1}-X_n)_-\cdot 1_{\{T>n\}} . \end{aligned}$$

Then \(E(M) = \sum _{n=0}^\infty E[ (X_{n+1}-X_n)_-\cdot 1_{\{ T>n\}}] <\infty \) by the monotone convergence theorem. Moreover one has

$$\begin{aligned} -M\le X^T_n \le X_{T(\omega )} +M \end{aligned}$$
(1)

a.e. Since \(E(X_{T})\ge E(-2M)>-\infty \), either \(E(X_{T})=+\infty \), or \(E(X_{T})\) is finite. In the latter case, \((X^T_n)\) is uniformly integrable by (1) and so

$$\begin{aligned} E[X_{T}] = \lim _{n\rightarrow \infty } E[X^T_n] \ge E(X^T_0) =0 \end{aligned}$$

by the dominated convergence theorem, since \(E(X^T_{n+1})\ge E(X^T_{n})\) in the integrable case. So in either case, \(E[X_T] \ge 0\) and there is no Dutch Book. \(\square \)

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McCutcheon, R.G. How to co-exist with nonexistent expectations. Synthese 198, 2783–2799 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02246-1

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