Abstract
The method of strong inference, wherein multiple hypotheses are constructed and a crucial experiment is carried out, is said to have special status in science because it guarantees falsifying results. However, the proposition that strong inference is in any way superior to the method of constructing and testing a single hypothesis is contradicted both by close rational analysis and by the empirical evidence. An experiment is reviewed in which subjects who conduct strong tests are much less likely to discover or approximate the truth than subjects who conduct simple tests of a false hypothesis. It is concluded that a potential to falsify is necessary for a test to have corroborative value; however, arguments as to the general superiority of one type of potentially falsifying test over another have no logical basis. Any claim as to a general superiority of strong tests over simple tests would require access to information about the probability of each strategy to produce various relationships between the truth and whatever explanations are most accessible, and such information is not knowable, even in principle.
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McDonald, J. Is strong inference really superior to simple inference?. Synthese 92, 261–282 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414301
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00414301