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Two Conceptions of Truth? – Comment

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  1. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 77 Massachusetts Avenue Building 32-0931, Cambridge, MA, 02139, USA

    V. Mc. Gee

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Gee, V.M. Two Conceptions of Truth? – Comment. Philos Stud 124, 71–104 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-4912-z

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